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  The dissertation analyzes why legislators fail to use their oversight powers over 
bureaucracy in democratic Mexico. While dominant institutional theories assume a 
unidirectional flow of authority from politicians to bureaucrats, in Mexico there is a 
bidirectional negotiation process; as such, principals have formal rights to control the 
agents, but agents have informal leverage over principals, as well. Due to the absence of a 
Weberian state and extensive state intervention, bureaucrats are able to control resources 
that legislators require in order to advance their careers. By distributing resources that 
politicians can use for patronage purposes, bureaucrats obtain legislators‘ consent to 
design and implement programs as they wish. Consequently, members of Congress 
renounce their control powers in exchange for securing resources for their constituents or 





powers that legislators have over bureaucrats. Public officials‘ power and the lack of 
legislative control over bureaucracy are documented by analyzing the budgetary process 
and health policy in Mexico between 1997 and 2006. The main implication of the 
dissertation is that although democratization produced changes that gave more formal 
powers to Congress, it has not eliminated the informal mechanisms used by bureaucrats 
to influence legislators. As a result, public officials continue to enjoy ample leeway in 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Does democratization make bureaucrats accountable?  The conventional wisdom 
on authoritarian regimes is that bureaucrats impose order and control over society without 
any checks imposed by the legislative branch.  Under authoritarian rule, public officials 
have unlimited autonomy and huge bureaucratic discretion to design and implement 
public policies.  To what extent do these practices change under democracy?  What is the 
impact of democratization on legislative control over the bureaucracy? Do legislatures in 
new democracies constrain public officials‘ leeway?   
 The tension between democracy and bureaucracy has been examined profoundly 
in developed countries.  In the U.S., for instance, while some scholars argue that officials 
act autonomously, others claim that legislators are able to rein in bureaucracies through 
the establishment of various institutional mechanisms (e.g. Dodd and Schott 1979; 
Carpenter 2001; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 1989). In contrast, it is still 
unclear whether new democracies have imposed democratic principles and constraints on 
their bureaucratic structures. Because autonomous bureaucratic practices and actions may 
slowly undermine democracy, it is critical for the life of these new regimes that public 
servants are responsive and held accountable to legislators and ultimately to the citizenry.  
The purpose of this dissertation is thus to investigate the extent to which democratization 
has produced an increase in legislative control over the bureaucracy in Mexico.   
This topic deserves attention for at least two reasons: In theoretical terms, the 





examine bureaucratic-legislative relations in First World countries. This approach 
borrows principal-agent theory from economics to analyze in what ways legislators are 
able to rein in the bureaucracy. According to RCI, there should be higher congressional 
control over the executive‘s agencies in democracy than under authoritarian rule. This 
change is expected since democratic countries have a system of checks and balances 
between the branches of government.  Furthermore, democracies allow for the existence 
of certain political conditions and contexts, such as divided governments, that facilitate 
congressional control over the bureaucracy. For this reason, it is expected that when a 
country moves from authoritarianism to democracy, bureaucrats will face significant and 
increasing constraints.   
My dissertation examines whether this change really happens. Do politicians exert 
effective control over the bureaucracy under democratic conditions?  By examining this 
question I assess an important aspect of the RCI approach. In particular, I contend that 
principal-agent theory (PAT) does not apply in new democracies --at least in the way it 
has been utilized in First World countries-- since its assumptions are not valid in these 
settings.  I claim that certain factors not considered by PAT, such as the weak rule of law, 
make it difficult to apply this framework to developing countries. I argue that certain 
political factors have to be included in the PAT in order to provide a valid account of 
bureaucratic-congressional relations in Mexico, as well as in other fledgling democracies.  
In substantive terms, bureaucratic-legislative relations need to be studied because 
it is still unknown to what extent democratization has modified bureaucrats‘ behavior in 





officials in recent democracies, few studies have analyzed whether democratization has 
had an impact on bureaucracies (Siavelis 2000; Eaton 2003; Ferraro 2008). This is an 
important issue for Mexico because its bureaucracy used to be a state within the state, so 
has democracy made a difference? The answer to this question is not only relevant to 
Mexico but has broader implications for other developing countries. To date, it is known 
that legislatures in these countries have started to play an important role in balancing the 
relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government.  In particular, 
legislators have used their power to initiate, amend and block bills to counterbalance the 
previously pervasive influence of presidents.  However, there are almost no studies that 
focus on whether democratization has also affected other aspects of the executive-
legislative relationship, such as the latitude commanded by the bureaucracy. By 
examining the case of Mexico I analyze to what extent democracy has increased the level 
of legislative control over public officials in developing countries.    
 
 
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
During the PRI administrations, bureaucrats acted with hardly any constraints 
(Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 1998; Weldon 2002; Cejudo 2008). Since the dominant 
party controlled all branches of government, Congress did not effectively check public 
programs. Thus, executive agencies decided autonomously how and where to allocate 





provided ample room for officials to frequently abuse their office with corrupt acts 
(Ugalde 2000).  
In the wake of democratization, the Mexican legislature's formal control over the 
bureaucracy has increased. But in reality this change has been insufficient to keep 
bureaucrats constrained. Democratic conditions have allowed legislators to enact stricter 
legislation that, in principle, should limit bureaucrats‘ leeway to design and implement 
public programs. In practice, however, officials do not respect such laws and, 
consequently, bureaucrats continue to carry out many policies at their convenience. What 
explains the lack of effective legislative control over the bureaucracy in democratic 
Mexico? Why do legislators tolerate significant bureaucratic discretion in the 
implementation of public policies? Why has democratization not made officials more 
accountable to the legislative branch?  Why are legislators reluctant to use their oversight 
powers? In short, why are democratic expectations, in terms of greater legislative control 
over the bureaucracy, not met in Mexico?  
The reason why there has not been a significant shift in the legislature's actual 
influence is that bureaucrats control resources that legislators need. I argue that in 
Mexico, the control of governmental resources allows bureaucrats to influence 
legislators. Whereas principal-agent theory stipulates that politicians exert unilateral 
control over public officials, in Mexico there is a bidirectional influence: legislators have 
formal rights to control bureaucrats, but officials have informal leverage over lawmakers 
as well. Due to the absence of a Weberian state, politicians‘ reliance on clientelistic 





officials are able to control resources that legislators require in order to advance their 
careers. By distributing resources that politicians can use for patronage purposes, 
bureaucrats obtain legislators‘ consent to design and implement programs as they wish.  
As a result, in exchange for securing resources for themselves or their constituents 
members of Congress do not use their control powers  
In contrast to the expected effects of democracy on bureaucratic-legislative 
relations, namely significant control over the bureaucracy, there is mutual influence 
between members of Congress and officials in Mexico. In fact, democratization has 
encouraged the enactment of stricter legislation which has allowed legislators to obtain 
more influence than they had under the non-democratic regime. However, although 
democratization has brought changes in formal laws, it has not transformed informal 
practices. Consequently, bureaucrats still have ample discretion to perform their daily 
tasks without effective oversight.    
 
 
 BUREAUCRACY IN AUTHORITARIAN AND DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 
In all forms of government there are politicians that design and pass public 
policies and programs and bureaucrats that implement them. Politicians thus delegate 
authority to appointed officials to carry out their policies. The work of bureaucrats, 
however, starts even before politicians decide what policy is going to be adopted since 





and Congress. Thus, although politicians decide the policy guidelines, bureaucrats are the 
ones that know how to ―give shape and form‖ to such policies (Gruber 1987: 6).      
The delegation of authority from Congress to the bureaucracy does not guarantee 
that officials will obey the politicians‘ directives. Consequently, in such delegation of 
power there lies an inherent risk: the abuse of power by bureaucrats. That is, instead of 
implementing policies that were approved by politicians, bureaucrats can make use of 
their position to pursue their interests and advance their priorities. Bureaucrats, for 
instance, can distribute government resources according to their own preferences or offer 
tax breaks to certain interest groups. To ensure that bureaucrats will not deviate from 
politicians‘ directives, the latter need to establish checks on the formers‘ actions.  But can 
politicians effectively control bureaucrats?          
Political control over the bureaucracy is one of the most studied topics in the 
social sciences.  Since the time of Bismarck in Germany, Max Weber (1946) analyzed the 
effectiveness of the ‗master‘s‘ influence over the ‗expert‘.  Regardless of the type of 
political regime, politicians—or rulers heading the state—try to establish control over 
their subordinates. Why? What advantages do politicians gain from checking 
bureaucratic work?  Politicians care about bureaucratic compliance because they need it 
to achieve their goals (Gruber 1987:  5).  In democratic regimes, for example, citizens 
reward or punish politicians for the outcomes obtained from public policies.  
Consequently, in order to advance their careers, politicians need to enact effective 
programs that satisfy the citizenry‘s demands. In attaining this goal politicians face a 





contrast, bureaucrats have the technical knowledge and the information necessary to plan, 
prepare, and operate all the public programs.   
  Rulers in authoritarian regimes also seek bureaucratic compliance but, in 
contrast to democracies, they use it for different objectives.  Instead of exercising control 
as a means to satisfy citizens‘ demands, authoritarian rulers exert their influence over the 
bureaucracy to maintain their authority and keep the citizenry and opposition groups 
under their grip. The political control of the bureaucracy in democracies, on the other 
hand, has a very different purpose. In democratic systems, control mechanisms are 
essentially used to prevent the abuse of power and to ensure efficient policy results.  In 
fact, democracy implies the idea that elected representatives should control 
administrative action (Scher 1963: 526). Accordingly, officials‘ accountability and 
responsiveness are considered to be two core elements of this form of government 
(Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999).       
In contrast to authoritarian governments, where rulers‘ accountability does not 
exist or is very limited, democracies have both electoral and intrastate accountability 
(Mainwaring 2003).
1
 That is, in democratic regimes politicians are not only accountable 
to citizens, mainly through elections (electoral accountability); but appointed officials 
and bureaucracies are also answerable to certain state institutions such as legislatures 
(intrastate accountability).  In order to stay in power and continue governing politicians 
must, among other tasks, design policies and check that bureaucrats are producing 
effective outcomes. Thus, whereas authoritarian rulers are not obliged to produce benefits 
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to society, democratic rulers are supposed to impose checks on public officials to avoid 
the abuse of power and ensure positive policy results.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, bureaucrats behave very differently in authoritarian and 
democratic regimes.  Under authoritarianism, bureaucrats design and implement policies 
as commanded by dictators.  Thus, there is no state agency or branch of power –besides 
the executive branch-- that can serve as a check and modify or stop bureaucratic 
decisions.  By contrast, decision-making in democracies allows for the participation of 
the president, the legislature and diverse societal actors in public programs being 
implemented. Once public programs are approved, politicians and interest groups monitor 
them, make sure that policies are being implemented according to the guidelines 
previously approved, and denounce or sanction any deviations from the laws.  
Bureaucrats, therefore, tend to respect politicians‘ directives and give an account of their 
work.    
In both authoritarian and democratic regimes, then, politicians seek bureaucratic 
compliance. There is a difference, however, in the kind of control exerted in both 
political regimes. Under authoritarianism, bureaucratic compliance is exercised by a 
dictator (or junta); while in a democracy constraints are imposed either by the citizenry, 
an elected representative or a state institution (Gruber 1987: 12). Moreover, while 
citizens in authoritarian systems cannot ask for control over officials, people in a 
democracy are entitled to demand it.  Additionally, whereas rulers and bureaucracies are 
not accountable to society in authoritarian regimes, in democracy it is expected that both 





Finally, in terms of the number of institutions overseeing the bureaucracy, in democracies 
the president is not the only actor interested in checking the work of the bureaucracy, as 
members of Congress also want to play a role. The involvement of more players in 
decision making and in the control over the bureaucracy makes the relationship between 
public officials and politicians more complicated in democracy than in authoritarian 
regimes.   
As described above, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is very 
different in democracies and authoritarian regimes. For this reason, it is expected that 
when a country changes its regime from authoritarianism to democracy, bureaucrats will 
face significant and increasing constraints. This dissertation examines these expectations 
by assessing whether democratic conditions in Mexico induce legislators to effectively 
constrain public officials.   
 
 
THE TENSION BETWEEN BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY 
One of the main principles of democracy is that public power should be used to 
serve public ends (Gruber 1987: 49). Rulers, therefore, should provide citizens with 
public goods, services and solutions to collective action problems (O‘Donnell 2003: 36).  
In order to accomplish this objective and prevent the abuse of power, people must 
constantly keep their rulers in check. Accordingly, democracy implies the idea that 





In modern societies, the citizenry‘s direct control of bureaucracy ―is possible only 
in a very limited degree‖ (Weber 1978: 224) because people do not have the direct 
mechanisms necessary to sanction the actions of the bureaucracy (Przeworski, Manin, 
and Stokes 1999: 20).
2
  Nonetheless, public officials are expected to be responsible and 
accountable to the people‘s elected representatives. Hence, accountability and 
responsiveness can be achieved through legislative control over public officials.  In this 
way, by giving an account of their bureaucratic work to legislators, officials are indirectly 
accountable to the public as well.   
Unfortunately, in practice the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians 
does not run so smoothly in democratic regimes, and a tension emerges in at least two 
ways.  First, citizens in democracies demand two contradictory goals. On the one hand, 
people want bureaucracies to deliver effective policy outputs. On the other hand, the 
citizenry demands the control of public officials to prevent the abuse of power. How can 
politicians reconcile these conflicting goals?   
As pointed out by Weber (1948), there is an asymmetry in the relationship of 
power between bureaucrats and politicians.  While politicians have the authority to make 
decisions, bureaucrats have the expertise to manage the administration of the state. With 
frequency, Weber asserted, technical expertise gives bureaucrats an advantage over 
politicians.  Given the asymmetry of information and expertise, politicians face a difficult 
dilemma. In order to achieve policy goals, they can either impose strict controls or 
delegate ample discretion.  If politicians establish severe constraints they may prevent the 
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abuse of power, but they may also inadvertently hinder bureaucratic efficiency.  That is, 
by imposing administrative and procedural controls on the design and implementation of 
policies, politicians may delay the policy process. By contrast, if ample discretion is 
granted to bureaucrats, efficient results might be obtained but the risk remains that 
officials will abuse their power and depart from citizens‘ demands. Can politicians 
neutralize the impact of asymmetry of information through institutional constraints and 
force bureaucrats to accomplish only the policy goals established in legislation?  How 
can politicians take advantage of bureaucrats‘ expertise without undermining their 
efficiency? Is it possible to reconcile bureaucratic expertise with political controls? 
Second, democracy implies the premise that the ruled choose their rulers through 
elections. In the case of bureaucracies, these are administrative apparatuses integrated by 
both appointed officials and medium and low level officials hired by recruitment systems 
that do not necessarily follow meritocratic principles. Thus, bureaucrats are not elected 
by the public and, consequently, they are not forced to respond to people‘s interests.  In 
addition, and as mentioned earlier, there are no direct mechanisms through which citizens 
can sanction bureaucrats‘ work. Why, then, should bureaucrats care about people‘s 
interests?  If the bureaucracy does not fulfill citizens‘ demands, the relationship between 
state and society would deteriorate and, as a result, the quality of democracy might 
decline.             
In sum, the bureaucracy‘s objectives are frequently in conflict with democracy‘s 
principles. The challenge to politicians and bureaucrats is to find an equilibrium in which 





a common ground where bureaucrats can achieve efficient results while respecting the 
guidelines and procedures previously established by politicians. Similarly, politicians 
should impose controls over the bureaucracy that make them accountable without unduly 




This dissertation focuses on examining intrastate accountability.  In contrast to 
electoral accountability, in which rulers are accountable to citizens mainly through 
elections, in intrastate accountability appointed and non-elected officials are answerable 
to state institutions through diverse mechanisms. Accordingly, appointed officials, and 
bureaucracies in general, have to give an account of their duties to certain state 
institutions that are entitled to demand such accounting and/or impose sanctions on non-
elected officials (Mainwaring 2003: 7).
3
 State agencies can control bureaucrats either by 
establishing constraints in laws, carrying out oversight actions such as the monitoring and 
supervision of public programs, or by imposing sanctions on those officials who have 
transgressed the law or who have not achieved certain goals.    
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 This type of accountability is what O‘Donnell (1999) calls ―horizontal accountability‖.  Specifically, 
O‘Donnell defines horizontal accountability as ―the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and 
empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal 
sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that 
may be qualified as unlawful‖ (1999: 38).  I use Mainwaring‘s term ‗intrastate accountability‘ because it is 
a more comprehensive concept. For instance, in contrast to O‘Donnell‘s definition, intrastate accountability 
is not limited to officials‘ transgressions of the law.  Thus, intrastate accountability includes not only legal 
transgressions by state actors but also officials‘ political and juridical accountings for their performance 





The legislative branch is one of the state institutions that should exert control over 
the bureaucracy.  In fact, the control of executive agencies is, along with the creation and 
reform of laws and the representation of citizens‘ interests, one of the legislative branch‘s 
main functions. Legislators create agencies and public policies and then allocate 
resources to be spent in the respective areas. By passing legislation, members of 
Congress define policy guidelines that contain substantive and procedural instructions to 
be followed by public officials.  Such instructions establish the limits of what bureaucrats 
can and cannot do when implementing public programs. In theory, legislators should 
monitor whether officials are carrying out policies according to the procedures and 
guidelines included in legislation.  Lawmakers can also carry out oversight actions such 
as information requirements, officials‘ appearances before legislative committees, and 
investigations of certain state agencies or programs to verify that officials are 
accomplishing their tasks and not transgressing laws.  By exercising this type of control 
legislators try to achieve effective policy outcomes, avoid wrongdoings, or prevent and 
sanction –directly or indirectly-- acts of corruption within the bureaucracy. These types 
of legislative actions are part of the checks and balances that are supposed to prevail in 
political systems with separation of powers.          
This dissertation will investigate the control that the legislative branch exerts over 
the bureaucracy in democratic Mexico.  In contrast to the executive branch, the Mexican 
Congress did not effectively exercise its functions during the non-democratic era.  In fact, 
both chambers of Congress served as rubber-stamp institutions. That is, the legislative 





legislators proposed many legislative bills, the great majority of the initiatives that 
became laws were the ones sponsored by the executive branch.  Similarly, the Mexican 
Congress never effectively utilized its control powers to check the work of the 
bureaucracy. The fact that PRI presidents had ample majorities in Congress, and that 
legislators‘ political careers depended upon—to a great degree— their loyalty to the head 
of the executive branch, explains the lack of legislative control during the non-democratic 
period. Had members of Congress exerted control over government policies, their careers 
could have been endangered.   
The appearance of the first divided government in 1997 and the PAN victory in 
the 2000 presidential election changed the role of the Mexican Congress in the political 
system. In terms of legislative bills, for example, lawmakers started to approve their own 
initiatives and to discuss, modify or reject executive bills. In other words, presidents 
stopped being the main sponsors of bills and were consequently forced to negotiate the 
presidential agenda with opposition legislators.  But did democratization activate the 
control powers of Congress?   
At first glance, it seems that democracy produced more bureaucratic 
accountability. Since the 1990s, for example, lawmakers have imposed diverse 
constraints on bureaucrats in legislation and members of Congress have modified laws to 
reduce bureaucrats‘ discretion to manage and allocate various types of public funds.  
Furthermore, public officials now have to give an account of their duties by providing 
reports about their public programs, and bureaucrats are frequently asked to appear 





All of these actions would make it seem as though legislators are effectively 
constraining public officials. A deeper analysis shows, however, that the level of 
bureaucratic discretion remains at a high level.  That is, the legislative efforts to control 
the bureaucracy have not been sufficient to effectively rein in public officials.  While 
legislators have enacted stricter laws that should, theoretically, keep officials under 
control, in practice bureaucrats do not respect many provisions of such laws and continue 
to enjoy ample discretion in designing and implementing public policies. Similarly, 
bureaucratic reports have not proven to be efficient mechanisms to oversee agencies‘ 
work. Legislative hearings with officials are very superficial; lawmakers use them not to 
analyze the state of policies but to try to damage bureaucrats‘ image. The main purpose 
of this dissertation is to explain why legislators continue to allow high bureaucratic 




This dissertation analyzes legislative control over the bureaucracy in democratic 
Mexico.  The relevance of the dissertation lies in the fact that it addresses three topics 
scarcely studied in developing countries. First, the role of bureaucrats in new 
democracies is explored.  The dissertation studies to what extent bureaucracies strengthen 
or weaken democratic regimes. Second, legislative-bureaucratic relationships are 
examined in a developing country. Although scholars have recently analyzed the function 





studies that assess the relationship between bureaucratic apparatuses and lawmakers.  The 
dissertation will thus try to fill a gap in the literature.  Finally, in explaining the deficient 
political control over the bureaucracy in Mexico, the dissertation will underscore the 
importance of informal institutions.  The next section explains each one of these points. 
 
BUREAUCRACIES IN NEW DEMOCRACIES. In modern democracies, citizens elect 
representatives in order to make laws that regulate different aspects of their lives. With 
great frequency, legislation passed by Congress creates public policies and programs that 
benefit—or cause detriment—to certain sectors of the population.
4
  In order to implement 
these programs legislators assign authority and delegate power to appointed officials.  In 
this way, the bureaucracy is the part of government that organizes and regulates the 
citizenry‘s ordinary activities.  
Complex societies cannot function without the work of bureaucracies.  Almost all 
activities that people undertake are regulated or administered by a public agency. 
Carpenter (2005: 41) describes the influence of the bureaucracy in the U.S. as follows:      
 
The simple details of American daily life reveal the pervasive presence of the 
bureaucratic state—the dollars in our wallets, printed by the Treasury 
Department; the peanut butter we eat, subsidized and regulated by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA); the pain medications we take, approved and 
governed by the Food and Drug Administration; the cars we drive, produced in 
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factories regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) … and the $423.3 billion in checks that our elderly and disabled receive 
annually from the Social Security Administration. 
 
Thousands of daily activities are carried out because of the work of bureaucracies. 
The ways in which bureaucrats implement policies and supply public services have a 
direct effect on the life of the citizenry. Public officials frequently make decisions that 
significantly affect the relationship between the state and its citizens. For instance, 
bureaucrats‘ decisions determine the geographical area that will be covered by a public 
health policy, which agricultural producers will receive subsidies, and whether citizens‘ 
expenses qualify as tax deductions.   
Given the impact of bureaucracies on the citizenry, the manner in which officials 
interact with the public determines—to a great extent—the quality of the relationship 
between the state and society. If public officials, for instance, design and implement 
efficient public policies with strict adherence to laws, the relationship between the state 
and society will be healthy. In contrast, if bureaucrats transgress laws and carry out 
policies to satisfy their own interests, the relationship will be damaged.  Because public 
officials‘ actions have significant consequences for the daily lives of citizens, the work of 
bureaucracies is very important for the quality of democracy.  Accordingly, it is critical 
that new democracies assess to what extent bureaucrats are controlled and fulfilling their 






BUREAUCRATIC-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.  The relevance of 
this dissertation also arises from the fact that it examines bureaucratic-legislative 
relationships in a developing country.  This topic remains scarcely studied, at least from a 
political science perspective.
5
  Although rational choice institutionalism has examined the 
executive branch by focusing on presidentialism (Shugart and Carey 1992; Linz and 
Valenzuela 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Lanzaro 2003), it has systematically 
disregarded the role of the administrative apparatus that supports presidents. In particular, 
institutionalists have overlooked the relationship between lower levels of the executive 
branch and the legislature. In other words, by only addressing presidential-legislative 
relations political scientists have ignored the role of bureaucratic-legislative interactions 
in the political system.  This gap in the political science literature is unfortunate because 
the relation between bureaucracy and Congress produces outcomes that have significant 
consequences for democracies.
6
   
Such outcomes have not been thoroughly studied in developing countries.  In 
Latin America, for instance, despite the fact that all countries have adopted democracy as 
a form of government, it is still uncertain whether they have imposed controls over their 
bureaucratic apparatuses.  Can a few hundred elected legislators influence thousands of 
bureaucrats and control hundreds of governmental programs?  Can recently installed 
democracies make bureaucratic actions responsive to the citizenry?  Because autonomous 
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 Some exceptions are Siavelis (2000); Ugalde (2000); Eaton (2003); Ríos Cázares (2010); and Ferraro 
(2008).  
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 Just to mention an example, in agricultural issues, legislators decide whether or not the governments will 
help the farmers‘ production with subsidies whereas public officials are the ones that ultimately decide the 
extent and distribution of such subsidies. Legislators and bureaucrats‘ decisions then may produce 






bureaucratic agencies may undermine new democratic regimes, it is imperative to know 
to what extent legislatures are reining in bureaucrats. Congressional control over the 
bureaucracy is thus a function that should be exerted in fledgling democracies.   
Legislators in new democracies have, in fact, made substantial modifications to 
bureaucratic apparatuses.  Members of Congress, for instance, have created new agencies 
and reorganized the internal structure of others. But despite these changes it is still 
uncertain to what extent bureaucrats have, in practice, changed their behavior.  Similarly, 
the executive and legislative branches have adopted policies that have had a huge impact 
on the citizenry. Legislatures in recent democracies have approved very important 
legislation that, in principle, has transformed the political, social and economic spheres of 
developing countries. However, it is unclear whether bureaucrats have implemented these 
policies to satisfy citizens‘ demands or to benefit their own clientele. Another objective 
of this dissertation, then, is to assess to what extent bureaucracies operate under 
democratic rules and to know whether legislators exert effective control over public 
officials in order to benefit the citizenry.  
 
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS.  It is well known that, in addition to formal rules such as 
constitutions, legislation and statutes, informal institutions shape how democratic 
institutions work (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; 2006).  Informal institutions are defined as 
―socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced 
outside of officially sanctioned channels‖ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727).  As in other 





bureaucratic-legislative relationships.  For example, in addition to the secret meetings or 
negotiations that public officials and legislators have under the table to approve laws, 
there are also many informal practices through which bureaucrats provide benefits to 
legislators in exchange for allowing discretion in the implementation of public programs. 
This dissertation explores such informal practices and mechanisms.   
Scholars that analyze legislative control over the bureaucracy in developed 
countries tend to focus on formal institutions such as legislation, statutes and 
administrative procedures to determine the level of discretion granted to bureaucrats by 
legislators (e.g. McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). Analysts then assume that the 
level of discretion and constraints established in legislation and other formal rules will 
guide bureaucratic behavior. Scholars also assume that bureaucrats will respect such laws 
and will carry out public policies with strict adherence to lawmakers‘ guidelines. This 
may be the reality in developed countries with professionalized and hierarchically 
organized bureaucracies. But it is not necessarily the case in fledgling democracies 
without a Weberian state and extensive state intervention in economic and social spheres.  
Instead, in developing countries the bureaucratic-legislative relationship is driven in large 
part by informal patterns.   
This dissertation explains how informal practices embedded in the bureaucratic-
legislative relationship influence members of Congress to give ample leeway to public 
officials in exchange for benefits for themselves or their constituencies. Despite the fact 
that democratization has encouraged members of Congress to enact low discretion 





practices have subverted the controls and constraints imposed upon public officials by 
legislators. That is, unwritten rules and informal practices neutralize the effects and 
constraints of formal rules.  As a consequence, Mexican lawmakers pretend to control 
bureaucrats and public officials act as if they are reined in by legislators.  In contrast to 
U.S. studies, which, by and large, are focused on formal rules and institutions, this 
dissertation explains why the examination of formal rules alone cannot account for the 
lack of legislative checks on the bureaucracy. By analyzing the case of Mexico, this 




The dissertation focuses on the case of Mexico for two reasons.  First, Mexico 
recently changed its political regime.  Although there is controversy regarding when the 
transition to democracy started, analysts agree that the PRI‘s loss of an absolute majority 
in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997, along with the PAN‘s presidential victory in 2000, 
represented the end of the non-democratic period (e.g. Beer 2003).  In theory, the regime 
change should have produced a balance of power among the branches of government.  
The existence of divided governments since 1997, for instance, has led opposition 
legislators to propose and approve important legislation, such as the transparency law that 
has modified the state-society relationship.  Also, the judicial branch was transformed 
from a body subordinated to the executive power to a more independent institution that 





These changes seem to indicate that democratization activated an effective system 
of checks and balances among the branches of government.  In the specific case of the 
executive-legislative relationship, legislators‘ modification and rejection of presidential 
bills gives the impression that Congress has become an institution that really 
counterbalances the power of the executive branch.  However, it is still uncertain to what 
extent democratic conditions and modifications to formal rules have really changed the 
status quo that existed during the PRI era.  Up to now, studies have only uncovered that 
lawmakers are using their power to propose, modify and reject bills.  It remains unclear 
whether democracy has triggered effective legislative control over the bureaucracy.  
Given that Mexico has had a democratic regime since 1997/2000, the country serves as a 
good case to examine whether democratization has really produced significant changes to 
the executive-legislative relationship, and if those changes are of great consequence or 
remain superficial.   
Second, the political and economic effects of bureaucratic discretion seem to be 
highly consequential to the country.  For instance, public officials‘ corruption, which is in 
many ways a byproduct of deficient congressional control over agencies‘ actions, has 
significant negative consequences for the country. Different corruption indexes show that 
Mexico has one of the highest levels of corruption among Latin American countries 
(UNDP 2004).  According to Transparency International‘s Corruption Perception Index 
2007, Mexico currently has a high level of corruption in the public sector – it received a 
score of only 3.5 out of 10, where higher scores indicate less corruption. Similarly, 





have not significantly reduced the level of corruption in the last several years.  In 2001, 
Mexico received a score of 10.6 out of 100 in the national corruption and good 
governance index, where zero points mean no corruption.  By 2007, the score had barely 
been reduced by six decimal points (Transparencia Mexicana 2007). That same year, 
Transparencia Mexicana detected 197 million acts of corruption.  Another survey pointed 
out that 25 percent of Mexican citizens consider corruption as the country‘s main 
problem. In other words, one out of four Mexicans thinks that corruption is a more 
pressing problem than poverty or public security (SFP 2004).   
The amount of money spent in acts of corruption in Mexico is enormous.  Studies 
have shown that bureaucrats receive 29 billion dollars annually from entrepreneurs (a 
figure which is equivalent to 4.5 percent of GDP) in exchange for illicit practices, such as 
discretional concessions to contractors and preferential rates given to specific individuals 
(Jaramillo 2005).  In the same vein, a 2005 survey administered to Mexican entrepreneurs 
reported that private companies spend 6 percent of their annual income on bribes to 
public officials. Entrepreneurs pay these bribes to avoid having to comply with 
procedures established in laws and to receive special treatment from federal agencies 
(CEESP 2005). Transparencia Mexicana also reported that, on average, Mexican families 
use 8 percent of their income to bribe bureaucrats in exchange for public services 
(Transparencia Mexicana 2007). As the corruption data shows, the lack of legislative 
control over the bureaucracy has significant negative consequences for the country.  
Therefore, it is extremely important to assess why Congress is not using its control 






The dissertation examines the level of legislative control over the bureaucracy by 
carrying out in-depth case studies of two federal policies (fiscal and public health). The 
project draws on the analysis of governmental and congressional documents and reports 
to assess the impact of democracy on bureaucratic-legislative relations. Additional 
information was obtained through field research carried out in Mexico City between 
March 2006 and August 2009. Seventy three key informants, including legislators, 
bureaucrats, and legislative staff were extensively interviewed.
7
 In order to assess 
whether democratization has had an effect on the extent of congressional control, the 
dissertation analyzes the fiscal and health policies between 1991 and 2006.  These years 
comprise a period of PRI domination of Congress (1991-1997), an incipient democratic 
phase where the PRI still occupied the presidency but lacked a congressional majority 
(1997-2000), and a democratic period where the PAN won the presidency (2000-2006). 
The first period allows me to assess the extent of legislative control over the bureaucracy 
during the PRI era and to probe how diverse institutional variables (e.g. unified 
government) affected the level of bureaucratic discretion. The initial impact of 
democratization on bureaucratic-legislative relations is assessed between 1997 and 2000.  
Finally, the effects of full scale democratization on the administrative apparatus are 
examined during the government of President Fox. The comparison of the three periods 
reveals what changes democratization produced and how legislative influence on 
executive agencies has evolved over time.        
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Fiscal and health policies were chosen as issue areas for case studies because 
these policies vary in content and technical complexity.  The technical complexity of 
policy issues is said to determine the level of authority delegated to bureaucrats (Bawn 
1995; Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999).  It is likely that the degree of technical complexity 
of each policy influences the level of bureaucratic discretion stipulated by law and affects 
how easily agents‘ leeway can be constrained. In theory, legislators who do not command 
the knowledge to deal with complex technical issues will end up writing imprecise 
legislation that provides high discretion to bureaucrats. Following this argument, the 
greater the complexity of the issue area, the harder it will be to rein in bureaucratic 
discretion. This dissertation tests whether the nature of the issue area affects lawmakers‘ 
control.    
To assess the impact of democratization on legislative control over the 
bureaucracy, it is necessary to apply a formalistic-legal approach. The latter consists of 
examining the checks and controls stipulated by law. The analysis of this dimension is 
necessary because legislation is considered an ex ante constraint to bureaucratic leeway.  
That is, formal rules constrain political behavior, establish guidelines for deliberation, 
aggregate preferences, and generate shared mutual expectations among political actors 
(Carey 2000).  As Paul Pierson notes:  ―Both formal institutions (such as constitutional 
arrangements) and public policies place extensive, legally binding constraints on 
behavior‖ (2004: 34, emphasis in original).   
Although formal rules such as laws and legislative statutes establish the legal 





effective constraints on bureaucratic behavior (Carey 2000). The ineffectiveness of 
formal rules to bind political actors is characteristic of developing countries. For 
example, scholars who study Latin America have argued that the force of formal rules to 
guide and command political behavior is significantly weaker than in First World 
countries (Weyland 2002; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Applying this logic to legislative-
bureaucratic relations, there is no guarantee that bureaucrats will fully comply with such 
laws, even if legislators enact low-discretion legislation.  For this reason, in a second 
stage of the analysis I evaluate the enforcement of laws and the extent of bureaucratic 
compliance with them. In this way, the dissertation not only includes the analysis of 
discretion allowed in laws but also the effectiveness of the laws‘ final implementation.  
Obviously, this second aspect is decisive since it determines effective outcomes.      
 
 
MAIN CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
BUREAUCRACY.  Throughout the dissertation the term bureaucracy refers to those middle 
and top level public officials that are responsible for the design and implementation of 
public policies and programs (for a similar definition see Carpenter 2001).
8
  According to 
this definition, the bureaucracy includes those middle level governmental civil servants 
with permanent and stable employment, who have technical skills and keep their posts 
through governmental and regime changes.  In addition, the bureaucracy also comprises 
people appointed to ―cargos de confianza‖ that also may have technical expertise but that 
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owe their position to political considerations.  Ministers or secretarios de estado are thus 
included within this last group.  Middle and high level officials are considered direct 
agents of the president.  Hence, the term ―bureaucratic-legislative relations‖ refers to the 
interaction among members of Congress, presidents and middle and top level 
bureaucrats.      
I excluded lower level bureaucrats in my analysis because, although these 
officials are in charge of implementing governmental programs, they are not able to 
decide the content or the course of policy programs.  Moreover, low level bureaucrats are 
not politically accountable or responsible for the success or failure of policies.  For 
instance, the officials that take credit for the accomplishment of certain public programs 
are those in the middle and higher echelons of bureaucracy.  In the same vein, when 
Congress asks a bureaucrat to appear before a committee to explain the development of a 
certain policy, the person that provides the explanation is a middle or high level 
bureaucrat.   
 
POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THE BUREAUCRACY.  The executive and legislative branches 
are the two main state institutions that directly or indirectly oversee, monitor and sanction 
bureaucracies.  Presidents and top level officials as well as members of Congress rely on 
lower level bureaucrats to achieve their goals, given that they cannot design and 
implement all public policies and programs by themselves.  Presidents, top-level officials 
and legislators thus grant bureaucrats influence on policy making.  In order to ensure that 





branch—or agencies created by them—exert control over their administrative 
departments. Despite the similarities, there are important differences in the type of 
control that both institutions exercise over the agencies.  Presidents appoint ministers and 
many top-level officials of the bureaucracy. These civil servants then appoint other 
officials who are in charge of big sectors of the bureaucracy. Accordingly, top-level 
officials are the direct superiors of all the bureaucrats within an agency.  This hierarchical 
organization allows high ranking officials to have great power over the rest of the 
agency‘s civil servants.  In theory, due to their hierarchy top-level bureaucrats‘ decisions 
are followed faithfully by lower ranking officials. The middle and low levels of the 
bureaucracy might be at risk if they disobey high ranking officials‘ orders.  Given the 
power that ministers and other top officials exert over bureaucrats, there are few 
problems between chiefs and their subordinates within executive agencies.   
The power of high ranking officials over the rest of the bureaucracy is greater in 
developing than in First World countries. In the former, despite the recent 
implementation of civil service systems, high ranking officials have ample power to 
sanction their subordinates. In fact, it is easy to fire or remove them from their posts.  The 
high ranking officials‘ power gives them greater capacity to control the middle and low 
level bureaucrats.           
On the other hand, bureaucrats, in principle, also respond to legislators‘ 
commands. However, legislators belong to another branch of government.  Consequently, 
members of Congress are not the direct superiors of bureaucrats. Civil servants‘ jobs 





wants to remove certain bureaucrats from an agency, the process is neither easy nor 
immediate.  Moreover, while legislators delegate authority and give commands to the 
bureaucracy, congress people do not have daily contact with officials.  In contrast to 
appointed officials, legislators cannot closely oversee the work of the bureaucracy.  
Additionally, the asymmetry of information prevailing between legislators and 
bureaucrats is greater than the one that exists between top-level officials and lower 
echelons of the bureaucracy. Thus, it is easier for middle and low level bureaucrats to 
hide information and deceive legislators than it is to do with top-level officials.  
Furthermore, legislative power is decentralized; there is no single person in command of 
Congress.  Therefore, the oversight of the bureaucracy has to be approved by members of 
committees and, in many cases, by the entire Congress.  This process can be an obstacle 
to legislators‘ efforts to constrain and sanction bureaucratic work. In sum, since 
bureaucrats and legislators are from different branches of government, and because of the 
asymmetry of information and the Congress‘ decentralized power, legislative control 
over the bureaucracy is weaker in comparison to the control and influence exerted by the 
president and top level officials.                     
Although legislators do not have the same effectiveness as the executive branch in 
checking public officials, congressional oversight is of greater importance for the quality 
of democracy. This special significance arises from the checks and balance system that 
exists in democratic regimes. Without effective legislative constraints the executive 
branch, including the president and appointed officials, could accomplish their policy 





could guide their subordinates to not only produce efficient outcomes, but also to commit 
questionable acts and use their power for their own benefit. The unrestricted power of 
bureaucrats could lead to governmental abuses and authoritarian practices.  It is known 
that dictators in authoritarian regimes –at least during their heydays-- had strict control 
over the bureaucracy. Presidents during the PRI regime, for instance, managed to 
maintain pervasive power in great part because Congress did not exert any control over 
the bureaucracy.  The absence of congressional checks resulted in frequent bureaucratic 
misuses of office.  In theory, legislative supervision of the bureaucracy can prevent, stop 
and sanction the abuse of power by officials.  Legislative checks on executive agencies‘ 
actions, then, serve not only to improve the efficiency of government but also to constrain 
bureaucrats‘ power.  That is why legislative control over the bureaucracy is so important 
for democratic regimes. The dissertation therefore assesses democracy‘s effects on 
bureaucratic behavior.  
 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
 The dissertation is organized as follows:  the first part of the next chapter analyzes 
the three most important approaches to study the bureaucratic-legislative relationship.  
First, the bureaucratic autonomy approach is examined.  This framework argues that there 
is an administrative state in which bureaucracy has the upper hand and legislators only 
have marginal influence on the policy arena.  By contrast, the legislative dominance 





establishment of diverse institutional mechanisms such as policy procedures and statues.  
Finally, interactive models establish a ―balance‖ between the two previous approaches.  
According to this framework, public officials and legislators have the capacity to 
influence each other.  The second part of this chapter develops a theory along this line of 
reasoning.  The theory states that there is bidirectional influence between legislators and 
bureaucrats in which the former use formal rules to control public officials, while the 
latter utilize informal means to influence members of Congress. 
Chapter 3 serves as a link between the theory chapter and the case studies.  The 
chapter assesses which theoretical approach analyzed in the previous chapter 
(bureaucratic autonomy, legislative dominance, and interactive models) concerning the 
impact of democratization on the bureaucratic-legislative relation.  In addition, it assesses 
which approach seems to better capture the relationship between the public officials and 
legislators in Mexico. The last part of the chapter examines an important congressional 
mechanism used to exert control over the bureaucracy:  investigative committees. 
In chapters 4 and 5 I carry out in-depth analyses of budgetary and health policies 
respectively.  Chapter 4 investigates the budgetary process that involves officials of the 
Secretaría de Hacienday y Crédito Público and legislators of the Budget and Hacienda 
committees.  The case study explains how democratization allowed the transformation of 
budgetary rules since 1997.  In particular, the chapter documents how legislators have 
established checks and controls in legislation, especially in the rules governing the budget 
information available to Congress and the allocation of government resources. Despite 





to have ample discretion in the implementation of the budget by continuously 
transgressing fiscal legislation.   
Chapter 5 examines the modification of diverse General Health Law stipulations 
since the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies.  As in the case of Hacienda, 
legislators have introduced constraints and limits to rein in bureaucratic maneuvering 
over diverse health policies. The analysis reveals, however, that while certain rules 
governing important health areas have changed, the General Health Law continues to 
grant ample discretion to the Department of Health officials in other vital aspects as in 
the case of nutrition programs.  Furthermore, the chapter uncovers that legislators are not 
very interested in supervising the work of the Department of Health since they do not ask 
the Auditoría Superior de Hacienda (Federal Auditing Office) to carry out many audits on 
this agency‘s programs.  The last sections of chapters 4 and 5 explain why members of 
Congress tolerate bureaucratic leeway in the implementation of budgetary and health 
policies. Legislators deliberately allow bureaucratic maneuvering because they need 
governmental resources or favors to distribute among their constituents and cronies. By 
granting resources and favors, public officials obtain legislators‘ consent to implement 
public programs at their convenience. 
The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the dissertation and 
putting together the theoretical model with the case studies.  The chapter also develops 
the theoretical implications of the study and explains why the lack of effective legislative 
control over the bureaucracy affects the quality of democracy in Mexico.  In addition, the 





Latin American countries.  Finally, the last section of the chapter explores some ideas for 





CHAPTER 2:   MUTUAL INFLUENCE:  A CLIENTELISTIC THEORY OF 




Do politicians control bureaucrats?  Multiple studies have tried to answer this 
question through diverse approaches and methods.  The great majority of these analyses, 
focused on First World countries, have tried to provide a conclusive response to this 
important question.  Nonetheless, despite all academic efforts it is still not clear whether 
politicians are able to constrain public officials or whether bureaucrats enjoy autonomy to 
pursue their own goals and interests. In the case of developing countries, with few 
exceptions in the literature, the topic remains unexplored.  As a result, it is unknown 
whether democratization increases legislative control over the bureaucracy.   
In the first part of this chapter I review the three most important approaches that 
examine the congressional-bureaucratic relationship. First, Weber and his followers 
postulate the bureaucratic autonomy approach.  According to this framework, bureaucrats 
dominate the policy arena while legislators have only marginal influence on decision-
making. In the second approach, rational-choice institutionalists claim the opposite, 
namely legislative dominance. These scholars argue that legislators have the interest and 
capacity to control the bureaucracy through well-crafted institutional incentives and 
constraints. This approach acknowledges the informational advantage of bureaucrats, but 
claims that legislators can ultimately control bureaucrats‘ careers.  Officials, according to 
this approach, are thus compelled to use their informational advantage to contribute to 





 Finally, a third approach has begun to emerge, which strikes a balance between 
those two contending positions.  This is an incipient approach, however, and not nearly as 
well developed as the other two. Interactive models state that both bureaucrats and 
politicians have the ability and means to influence each other.  The second part of the 
chapter develops a theory that follows this last line of reasoning.  This theory applies well 
in developing countries with fledgling democracies and states that not only is there 
asymmetry of information between legislators and bureaucrats, but also a disadvantage in 
the control of governmental resources. Public officials deliver such resources and do 
special favors for legislators in exchange for allowing discretion to implement policies.   
In this way, bureaucrats neutralize legislators‘ constraints and checks established in laws.  
Accordingly, there is bidirectional influence between bureaucrats and legislators in which 
the latter utilize formal rules to control officials, but the former utilize informal means to 
influence lawmakers.  In sum, the theory explains why democratization allows legislators 
in new democracies to enact strict laws, but does not eliminate informal practices that 
hinder effective congressional control over public programs. After explaining the logic 
and argument of the theory, the chapter describes in detail the stages in which bureaucrats 
and legislators interact.  The chapter ends with conclusions.           
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE STUDY OF BUREAUCRATIC-LEGISLATIVE 
RELATIONS 
 
 As mentioned above, there are two well-developed approaches to study 





problem in that both assume a unidirectional flow of authority from one actor to another.  
While the bureaucratic autonomy approach states that public officials dominate the 
policy-making arena through their technical expertise and organizational knowledge, the 
legislative dominance framework claims that legislators control the bureaucracy through 
the establishment of institutional mechanisms. Accordingly, neither approach allows for 
the possibility of a balance of power between the two actors.   Furthermore, while both 
approaches acknowledge that there is an asymmetry of information between these actors 
that favors bureaucrats, they fail to notice that public officials in developing countries 
frequently have control over the governmental resources that legislators need to enhance 
their careers.    
In contrast, my theory, based on the line of reasoning of interactive models, states 
that given extensive executive branch intervention in economic and societal spheres in 
developing countries, bureaucrats exert leverage over legislators through the delivery of 
governmental resources. In sum, the mutual influence theory argues that, while legislators 
influence bureaucrats through the establishment of checks and constraints in legislation, 
bureaucrats exert leverage by delivering valuable resources that members of Congress 
need in order to advance their political careers.  The next section reviews the main tenets 
and limitations of the previous approaches and explains why the mutual influence theory 
is better for examining legislative-bureaucratic relations in developing countries.
1
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MAX WEBER AND THE BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY APPROACH 
In his seminal essay about bureaucracy, Max Weber (1946) pointed out that the 
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is asymmetrical.  While politicians hold 
the legal authority to rule, bureaucrats have valuable expertise and information about how 
to carry out governmental tasks.  Weber said: ―the ‗political master‘ finds himself in the 
position of the ‗dilettante‘ who stands opposite the ‗expert,‘ facing the trained official 
who stands within the management of administration‖.  Politicians are thus ―powerless 
opposite the superior knowledge of the bureaucratic expert‖ (1946: 232, 234).  
Consequently, the foundation of bureaucratic power rests on the expertise and 
information that bureaucrats manage.  Bureaucrats, Weber stated, take advantage of their 
expertise and knowledge to increase their superiority (1946: 233).  In fact, bureaucrats 
tend to monopolize all kinds of valuable information that could put their power at risk.    
Political scientists have drawn on Weber‘s argument to develop modern 
approaches to study the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians (Huber and 
Shipan 2002; Miller 2005).  By taking into account the public officials‘ advantage in 
information and expertise, scholars analyze whether or not politicians are able to control 
bureaucrats. In this vein, a part of the political science literature argues that there is an 
‗administrative state‘ in which public officials dominate the realm of public policies (e.g. 
Waldo 1948; Marx 1957; Redford 1969; Putnam 1975; Dogan 1975; Dodd and Schott 
1979; Gruber 1987).  According to this approach, countries began to increase the size of 
their administrative apparatus during and after the two world wars (especially WWII).  In 





and satisfy the supplies required.  After the international conflicts were over, states 
implemented numerous programs to deal with the subsequent economic crises.  The 
creation of new agencies, combined with the implementation of policies to lessen the 
effects of war, boosted the administrative role of the state in economy and society (Dodd 
and Schott 1979). 
With their new structure, governments in the twentieth century acquired an ability 
to plan, innovate, and implement policy that had not been developed previously 
(Carpenter 2001: 5).  States not only continued to administer public services, but they 
also started to promote social and economic growth. By planning and programming 
budgets, implementing welfare policies, and by nationalizing, protecting and subsidizing 
industries, governments have deeply intervened in economic, social and even cultural 
arenas (Dogan 1975: 5; Suleiman 1974; Dodd and Schott 1979; Hall 1986). As a result of 
this state intervention, governments have increased their size, governmental programs 
have multiplied and administrative procedures have become very complex.  In the United 
States, for example, ―in 1933, there was one federal civil servant for every 280 
Americans; by 1953 there was one for every 80 [...] While the gross national product […] 
grew by a factor of six in this period, the expenditures of the federal government grew 
more than twice as fast as the economy – some 15 times‖ (Dodd and Schott 1979: 34).   
According to the proponents of the bureaucratic autonomy approach, the 
expansion of the state and its ever more pervasive influence on society changed the 
balance of power in executive-legislative relations. By allowing the growth of the 





gave birth to a colossal administrative state. Over the decades the bureaucratic apparatus 
acquired structures, personnel, information and expertise that gave them a great 
advantage over the other branches of government.  Moreover, the complexity of the new 
administrative tasks produced a ‗government overload‘ that required the recruitment of 
trained bureaucrats (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; King 1975; Kerwin 1999).  
The officials‘ administrative skills, expertise and control over policy information 
produced an imbalance of power between members of Congress and the bureaucracy.  
Legislators quickly realized that they lacked the time and expertise to oversee and 
monitor the work of public servants and therefore felt compelled to delegate ample policy 
making authority to bureaucrats.  As a result, politicians retained scant leverage over the 
policy making process, and consequently there is bureaucratic dominance in the realm of 
public policies. A large part of the government‘s decision making, according to this 
approach, depends not on politicians, but on unelected officials and their clienteles 
(Huntington 1965; Lowi 1969; Aberbach and Rockman 1977; Peters 1981; Aranson, 
Gellhorn and Robinson 1982; Mashaw 1985).  In sum, given the government‘s size, its 
complexity, and the superiority of the officials in information and expertise, the 
bureaucracy became uncontrollable.   
A representative example of the administrative state approach is given by Dogan 
(1975), who argues that top civil servants in European democracies significantly 
increased their power after WWII. Dogan claims that the growth in the size of 
bureaucracy and the parliaments‘ loss of power account for this change.  Parliaments lost 





administrative regulations. The implementation of such regulations gave great authority 
to bureaucrats.  As a result, politicians lost significant leverage in the decision-making 
process. Second, given the rigidity of parliamentary procedures, the lack of technical 
capacity and the speed required for tackling problems, legislators gradually abdicated 
their power to intervene in the economy. Members of parliament, for instance, transferred 
the responsibility to draft the national budget to administrative agencies. Because 
legislators only make minor changes to agency budgets, Dogan said parliaments turned 
into registry offices (1975: 7-8).  Examining the American case, Dodd and Schott (1979) 
argue the decentralization of power within Congress weakened legislators‘ ability to 
control the bureaucracy.  The creation of multiple subcommittees caused inter- and intra-
committee conflict, which consequently produced a decline in congressional bargaining 
vis-à-vis agencies, lack of adequate information about policies, and legislative 
dependence on interest groups.    
By contrast, Carpenter (2001) contends that politicians‘ delegation of authority to 
officials is not the source of bureaucratic power, but rather officials have earned this 
power.  In Carpenter‘s view, bureaucratic autonomy emerges when executive agencies 
develop unique organizational capacities and build a strong reputation for providing 
unique public services to diverse society networks.  By constructing a positive reputation 
among societal groups and an independent base of power, agencies obtain political 
legitimacy that allows them to enact their own policies without the consent of Congress 





The claim that the bureaucracy was autonomous, that public officials were 
impervious to political influences, and that the administrative state could not be 
constrained was widely accepted among scholars until the late 1970s.  Political scientists 
concentrated their investigations on determining the causes of bureaucratic autonomy and 
on investigating to what extent public officials were able to produce effective policy 
outcomes. But in the early 1980s, rational-choice institutionalist scholars began to 
challenge the arguments of the bureaucratic autonomy approach and develop a new 
paradigm for studying bureaucratic-legislative relations.  This approach is examined in 
the next section.      
 
 
POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE BUREAUCRACY 
The most influential studies of bureaucratic-legislative relations in the U.S. and 
other industrialized countries published in the last twenty five years challenge the 
existence of the administrative state and put forth a congressional dominance approach.  
These studies apply the principal-agent framework from economics, which is a modeling 
technique, to analyze how politicians tackle the asymmetry of information and expertise 
as highlighted by Weber (Miller 2005).  In this model, legislators act as principals while 
bureaucrats play the role of agents.  In other words, legislators exert control over 
bureaucrats. The latter are subordinated to the former‘s commands.   
In order for members of Congress to order bureaucrats to perform a task, 





officials then carry out policy programs as instructed by lawmakers. The problem in this 
relationship is that bureaucrats frequently have incentives not to behave as legislators 
want. Using a principal-agent framework, scholars have analyzed the ways in which 
legislators may induce bureaucrats to comply with their directives.  The means by which 
legislators keep bureaucrats under control is through the establishment of institutional 
mechanisms. Using this approach, political scientists examine how formal rules and 
institutional mechanisms limit bureaucrats‘ behavior and align their incentives with those 
of the legislators. 
According to the principal-agent framework, there are three general categories of 
informational problems in the bureaucratic-legislative relationship that favor appointed 
officials (Huber and Shipan 2002: 26-27). The first category is general uncertainty about 
the future.  This problem refers to the legislators‘ inability to predict events. Politicians, 
for example, are not certain whether their actions will solve problems. The second 
category is private information.  This problem arises from the asymmetry of information 
between bureaucrats and legislators. Since bureaucrats have private information that 
politicians lack, officials know more about the problems, their solutions, and their effect 
on certain policies.  Clearly, officials are in a better position to decide which course of 
action will be to their benefit.  Conversely, given that politicians do not have complete 
information, they are not certain whether the policies delegated to bureaucrats will 
achieve the desired goals. Stated differently, the asymmetry of information puts 





against their interests.  Thus, legislators frequently face an adverse selection problem.
2
   
The last informational problem in the bureaucratic-legislative relation is the officials‘ 
unobservable behavior. Since it is very difficult and costly for legislators to monitor 
public officials‘ actions, bureaucrats have an incentive to stray from politicians‘ 
commands and pursue their own interests. As a result, members of Congress are never 
sure to what extent bureaucrats are complying with their orders. The difficulty in 
observing the officials‘ actual behavior leads to a situation of moral hazard. This problem 
occurs when bureaucrats face little risk of being caught if they violate lawmakers‘ 
commands.  In this situation, officials tend to act differently than they would if politicians 
were able to observe their behavior. Hence, bureaucrats‘ low probability of being 
monitored and sanctioned induce them to act in more risky ways, such as departing from 




To cope with the asymmetry of information and prevent undesirable policy 
outcomes, politicians (principals) establish different institutional mechanisms depending 
on the informational problem they face. For instance, if members of Congress realize 
bureaucrats have ample leeway to carry out a certain policy, legislators can include 
procedural provisions in the legislation to reduce public officials‘ discretion.   
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 Adverse selection is frequently used in the economics literature to explain insurance problems.  For 
instance, people who anticipate or have health problems are more likely to sign up for health insurance than 
the average person. Hence, ―adverse risks‖ self select, skewing the risk pool.  
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 In the insurance literature, moral hazard prevails when insurance protection induces an individual to act 





There are two kinds of institutional tools to control the bureaucracy: ex ante 
mechanisms (e.g. legislation and administrative statutes) and ex post mechanisms, such as 
congressional hearings and bureaucratic reports.
4
 Often, adherents of this institutional 
approach argue that the more effective tools to control bureaucrats are legislation and 
statutes; that is, ex ante institutional instruments.  Legislation limits what bureaucrats can 
and cannot do in the design and implementation of public policies and programs.  
Accordingly, analysts claim that members of Congress utilize legislation to hinder the 
bureaucrats‘ tendency to avoid policy directives. Since officials are regarded as the 
instruments for applying rules, and since these rules are backed up—ultimately—by 
litigation, scholars assume that bureaucrats respect all the constraints and limits stipulated 
in legislation.
5
 Hence, every time that Congress establishes constraints in legislation, 
bureaucratic behavior is constrained in practice. Therefore, political scientists who apply 
this approach –also known as the institutional approach for political control of 
bureaucrats– presume that a change in formal rules (legislation) will lead to a change in 
bureaucratic behavior.   
Principal-agent analyses applied to bureaucratic-legislative relationships build 
their explanations on four assumptions.
6
  First, legislators and bureaucrats frequently 
have different preferences and pursue divergent objectives. This divergence causes 
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 Principal-agent models generally assume that ex ante and ex post instruments are substitutes. That is, 
politicians prefer ex ante controls when legislative oversight over public programs is deficient. Conversely, 
politicians implement ex post mechanisms when they can rely on these tools to control bureaucrats (Huber 
and Shipan 2006). However, some authors argue that both institutional tools are complements (see Ting 
2001; Huber and Shipan 2006).  
5
 For an exception see Huber and Shipan (2002: 92-97). Their model takes into account bureaucratic 
noncompliance with legislative statutes. 
6
 Miller (2005: 205-206) argues that the canonical principal-agent model originally created by economists 
has six core assumptions: asymmetry in preferences, agent impact, information asymmetry, initiative that 





conflict in the relationship between the agencies and Congress. If members of Congress, 
or at least a majority of them, share the same preferences and objectives, there will be 
few problems in the relationship (Huber and Shipan 2006: 257). Second, there is 
asymmetric information and expertise, which favors public officials.  Bureaucrats have 
more information and expertise than legislators on how to attain the desired policy 
outcomes (Niskanen 1971; Miller 2005; Huber and Shipan 2006).  Third, the principal-
agent framework takes the Weberian state as given. The Weberian state is defined as a 
hierarchically integrated set of administrative organizations with the following 
characteristics:  rule-governed decision making; offices with no overlapping jurisdictions 
ordered by formal rules (laws or administrative regulations); recruitment of officials 
through a meritocratic system, and predictable career ladders. Bureaucratic work has an 
impersonal and rational character and presupposes a separation of the private sphere from 
public office.  In addition, the Weberian state is highly institutionalized: officials‘ duties 
are well defined by rules and bureaucrats closely comply with these norms (Weber 1946; 
Evans and Rauch 1999).
7
  Thus, the underlying assumption of these studies is that the 
state consists of a professionalized body that is hierarchically organized.  Under this 
theory, bureaucrats are rule applicators that carry out the administrative functions of the 
state (Grindle 1977).   
Finally, the principal-agent framework assumes a unidirectional flow of authority 
from principal (legislators) to agents (bureaucrats).
8
  Legislators exert influence over 
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 For additional characteristics see Weber (1946). 
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 Describing the canonical principal-agent model, Sappington (1991: 47) argues that ―the principal is 





bureaucrats but not the other way around (Krause 1999; Moe 2006).  Thus, politicians 
can, in principle, control officials either through legislation or through other institutional 
mechanisms.  By contrast, bureaucrats are not able to influence legislators by any means. 
Because of this assumption, scholars that apply principal-agent theory tend to call it the 
‗congressional dominance‘ approach.  Followers of this approach claim that the 
persistence of ample bureaucratic leeway to design and implement public policies is 
explained either because officials are responsive to legislator‘s interests — so there is no 
need to reduce their discretion — or because there are neither contextual nor institutional 
factors that allow for the enactment of low-discretion legislation (Weingast and Moran 
1983; Weingast 1984; Huber and Shipan 2002).   
Accordingly, Weingast (1984) rejects the bureaucratic dominance approach and 
argues that Congress is able to control the bureaucracy even without systematic 
oversight. Legislators drive policymaking by allocating resources to those agencies that 
deliver higher benefits to legislators‘ constituents; conversely, they impose sanctions on 
those agencies that fail to do so. Consequently, Weingast claims that the lack of 
legislative oversight does not indicate bureaucratic dominance, but rather that officials 
are fulfilling legislators‘ electoral needs. Similarly, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) state 
that legislators deliberately refrain from checking policies since the monitoring of 
bureaucracies slows down the achievement of their political goals. Instead of using 
―police patrols,‖ lawmakers establish ―fire alarms‖. The latter is a system that is 
comprised of rules, procedures and informal practices that allow citizens and interest 
                                                                                                                                                 
offer to the agent‖.  Making a similar point Krause (1999: 10) contends that principal-agent models assume 





groups to oversee bureaucrats‘ activities. Thus, the fire alarm system better serves 
legislators‘ goals, and reduces the costs of oversight. Elaborating on this argument, Lupia 
and McCubbins (1994) assert that fire alarms can be inefficient if legislators do not learn 
from this oversight activity. The conditions in which the fire-alarm system can be 
efficiently implemented are: a) when bureaucrats are sanctioned for lying to political 
authorities; and b) and when legislators and public officials have similar preferences 
regarding outcomes. If these conditions are met, Lupia and McCubbins assert, 
bureaucrats will act according to legislators‘ interests. Otherwise, delegation is equivalent 
to legislative abdication.  
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987, 1989) assert that congress people include 
administrative procedures in legislation as a means to control bureaucracies.  Procedures 
are instructions that ―describe the decision making process that must be followed during 
agency policymaking and implementation‖ (Huber and Shipan 2002: 45).  Administrative 
procedures thus increase the likelihood that bureaucrats will comply with politicians‘ 
directives.  Examples of procedural instructions are the obligation of agencies to send 
policy reports to the legislature, the enfranchisement of society groups in decision-
making processes, and deadlines for program implementation (Huber and Shipan 2002: 
56-59). In this way, procedural instructions reduce the asymmetry of information 
between legislators and bureaucrats, limit agencies‘ options, and ensure that agencies will 
favor interest groups that support legislators. In contrast, Moe (1989, 1990) challenges 
the usefulness of administrative procedures. To Moe, procedures divide authority by 





As a consequence, these formal rules reduce the agencies‘ efficiency and impede an 
effective functioning of the bureaucracy.
9
  
Other studies underscore the importance of additional institutional factors in their 
analysis. Appointments and administrative reorganizations, for instance, are other 
institutional instruments used to control bureaucrats (Laver and Shepsle 1994; Peters 
1997; Chang 2003). Similarly, congressional professionalization, legislative vetoes over 
agencies‘ internal regulations, and judicial review also tend to reduce bureaucratic 
discretion (Ethridge 1984; Aberbach 1990; Squire 1992; Shipan 1997; Carey, Niemi and 
Powell 2000; Canes-Wrone 2003). Other scholars argue that political contexts also 
determine the level of legislative control over the bureaucracy.  In this vein, some 
analysts claim that divided governments tend to produce policy conflict, and 
consequently increase legislative control over the bureaucracy (Epstein and O‘Halloran 
1999; Martin 1997; McCarthy and Razaghian 1999; Volden 2002).  Finally, the technical 
complexity of policy issues is also said to determine the level of authority delegated to 
bureaucrats (Bawn 1995; Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999).               
John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan‘s 2002 book Deliberate Discretion? 
synthesizes previous analyses and advances a model that explains why some legislatures 
enact very detailed and specific bills (low-discretion legislation), whereas others pass 
ambiguous laws (high-discretion legislation) that grant enormous policymaking latitude 
to bureaucrats.  By examining the choice between specific versus vague statutes across 
First World parliamentary systems and the U.S. states, Huber and Shipan (H&S 
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hereafter) uncover how differences in the political and institutional features of these 
systems affect the design of legislative statutes and, consequently, bureaucratic 
discretion.  Based on previous studies, H&S claim that four factors account for the level 
of discretion in legislation: the degree of policy conflict between the legislators who 
design policy statutes and the bureaucrats who implement policies; the bargaining 
environment in which legislation is approved; Congress‘ technical capacity to enact 
detailed statutes; and additional institutional features of the political system (non-
statutory factors).   
Legislative control of bureaucracies depends, to a great extent, on the level of 
policy conflict between legislators and public officials (Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999; 
H&S 2002). When legislators‘ and public officials‘ preferences and policy goals 
converge, members of Congress tend to delegate ample leeway to executive agencies 
because there is no reason to suspect that bureaucrats will produce policy outcomes 
unfavorable to legislators. In contrast, when legislators‘ goals diverge from those of 
bureaucrats, legislators worry that officials will not execute policies as they were 
designed. In order to prevent unwanted outcomes, members of Congress will reduce 
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 Legislative studies usually associate policy conflict between Congress and the executive branch with the 
existence of divided government (e.g. Mayhew 1991).  The logic is that when the legislature is controlled 
by one party and the executive branch by another, preferences and policy goals between executive agencies 
and Congress tend to differ to a greater extent than when just one party is in control of the executive and 
legislative branches (unified government). Such divergence of preferences leads legislators to write detailed 
legislation in order to constrain public officials‘ discretion (Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999; H&S 2002).  
Thus, under divided government, more detailed legislation is expected and, consequently, less bureaucratic 





The bargaining environment refers to whether the legislature is divided.  
According to H&S, when divided governments occur in bicameral systems, ―bicameral 
conflict is likely to be greater with a divided legislature (i.e. when each chamber of the 
legislature is controlled by a different party) than with a unified legislature (when one 
party controls both chambers)‖ (2002: 151).  Even if legislators would like to reduce 
bureaucrats‘ leeway in the execution of policy programs, they require certain factors such 
as technical knowledge and assistance of professional staff, among other resources, to 
write detailed legislation.  Together, these factors form legislative capacity. All else being 
equal, the higher legislative capacity is, H&S argue, the less leeway allowed in 
legislation. Finally, H&S argue that in addition to statutes, legislators can rely on features 
of the political environment to achieve the policy outcomes they want. These features are 
non-statutory factors that encourage the observation of laws.  Examples of non-statutory 
factors are legislative veto of agencies‘ internal rules and the power of courts to enforce 
the compliance of laws.   
Accordingly, the greater the level of policy conflict between lawmakers and 
bureaucrats, the higher the likelihood that legislators will constrain bureaucrats through 
laws. Therefore, divided governments (where opposition parties control both chambers of 
Congress) tend to reduce bureaucratic discretion.  Similarly, the higher the level of 
Congress‘ legislative capacity, the greater the chance legislators will enact low-discretion 
legislation. Finally, bureaucratic discretion is lower in political systems where non-
statutory factors are established.  In sum, public officials are more constrained by laws 





chamber, Congress has the technical capacity to write low-discretion legislation, and 
when courts or other institutions may also constrain bureaucratic leeway.    
By testing their model on the U.S. states and many European countries, H&S 
show how their explanatory variables systematically account for the variation of 
bureaucratic discretion in Medicaid and labor legislation, respectively. Empirical 
evidence demonstrates that political and institutional contexts determine, to a great 
extent, how much authority legislators delegate to bureaucrats and, consequently, how 
much bureaucratic discretion laws allow for.  Due to its explanatory power and 
compelling evidence, H&S‘s book is considered state of the art in the study of 




Although most studies that apply the principal-agent framework elaborate their 
arguments following the assumptions described above (different preferences between 
principals and agents, information asymmetry, Weberian state, and unidirectional 
authority), there are a few authors who relax the application of one or more of these 
assumptions in their analyses. As a result, as the asymmetry of influence in the 
bureaucratic-legislative relationship diminishes, Congress is seen as less clearly 
dominant, while bureaucrats are depicted as having great influence on legislators. This 
approach, however, has not been thoroughly developed.  In fact, it is an incipient line of 





In contrast to the bureaucratic autonomy and legislative dominance approaches, 
this framework asserts that neither bureaucrats nor legislators have complete control over 
the other. The few adherents of this inchoate approach suggest that both players in the 
bureaucratic-legislative relation have some resource that the other needs (Arnold 1979). 
While legislators frequently ask for benefits or favors for themselves or their constituents, 
bureaucrats demand discretion in laws or an increase in the amount of funds that 
legislators allocate to public programs. Accordingly, this approach asserts that legislators 
and bureaucrats have the capacity and means to influence the other.  Consequently, both 
actors can, to some extent, extract benefits from each other.  Stated differently, they are 
mutually dependent.  For this reason, there is a constant transaction of benefits between 
officials and members of Congress.   
Following this general line of reasoning, Arnold (1979) examines the geographic 
allocation of public expenditures in three federal programs in the U.S. and uncovers the 
interaction between members of Congress and top-level bureaucrats.  His main argument 
is that public officials distribute benefits strategically among congressional districts in 
order to maintain their supporting coalitions (Arnold 1979: 207).  Bureaucrats thus 
disproportionally allocate pork to legislators who have jurisdiction over their programs, 
especially to those lawmakers who vote for the authorization and disbursement of funds.  
In exchange for such benefits, legislators maintain or increase bureaucrats‘ budgetary 
authorizations for subsequent years.  In this way, Arnold states that the geographic 
allocation of public expenditures is a mutually rewarding system in which both actors 





Similarly, Krause (1999) criticizes the assumed ―natural hierarchy‖ of politicians 
over bureaucrats in principal-agent models, and stresses that these players are strategic 
and dynamic.
11
 Based on the work of Barnard (1938) and Simon (1947), Krause builds a 
‗dynamic systems model of administrative politics‘ in which agencies, Congress, and the 
president interact in an endogenous way. That is, the relation between these actors is 
interrelated. Krause‘s model thus implies that the players are not in isolation, but are 
mutually adaptable and consequently influence each other. The extent of influence 
between political principals (i.e. president and Congress) and agents is determined by the 
institutional design of the agency, the amount of information asymmetry benefiting the 
agency, and politicians‘ interest in a given policy area. By analyzing two regulatory 
agencies in the U.S., Krause argues that while presidents and Congress frequently 
influence each other, they do not always succeed in exerting effective control over the 
bureaucracy. For their part, public officials do not simply react to politicians‘ actions, 
such as budgetary cuts, but they also initiate action to shape the political environment to 
reach their objectives. In this way, Krause asserts that the relationship between the 
president, Congress and the bureaucracy is a ―dynamic system in which institutions 
interact with one another in the implementation of public policy‖ (1999: 21).    
In the same way, Moe (2006) argues that the principal-agent theory‘s premise that 
information asymmetry is the main source of bureaucratic power is incomplete, as 
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In addition, Krause criticizes the principal-agent assumption of no interaction between political principals.  
That is, principals have a separate, independent effect on bureaucratic agencies.  For instance, if it is 
acknowledged that both the president and Congress control the bureaucracy (i.e. both are principals), 
analyses using the principal-agent theory do not consider that Congress may pressure the president in order 






bureaucrats also have political power based on their ability to affect the elections of 
political authorities.  In his study of public school teachers in the U.S., Moe finds that 
officials are able to influence the election of politicians and what choices they will make 
in office. Thus, not only do politicians exert political control over bureaucrats, but there 
is reverse control as well: that is, by agents (bureaucrats) over principals (politicians).  As 
a result of bureaucrats‘ political power, elected authorities may not exert strict control 
over their agents. In fact, since bureaucrats influence the election of principals, the latter 
may decide to favor the former through policies or funding.   
In sum, the two main approaches to study bureaucratic-legislative relations, 
bureaucratic autonomy and the principal-agent theory, share two assumptions.  First, 
there is asymmetry of information and expertise that favors the bureaucracy. Followers of 
the bureaucratic autonomy approach argue that such asymmetry is the source of 
bureaucratic dominance over the policymaking process. While institutional scholars 
accept this claim, they state that legislators can counterbalance bureaucrats‘ informational 
advantage through the establishment of institutional mechanisms and in this was establish 
their own dominance. Second, both approaches assume that only one actor has control 
over the other. That is, both frameworks presuppose a unidirectional flow of authority 
from one actor to the other.  Furthermore, both approaches do not allow for strategic 
interaction or the existence of mutual influence between bureaucrats and politicians.  In 
the case of the bureaucratic autonomy approach, public officials dominate the policy 
arena.  According to this framework, legislators do not have significant influence on the 





Congress only ratify the bureaucracy‘s policies. On the other hand, principal-agent 
models assume that the bureaucracy is under congressional control.  In this approach, 
although bureaucrats may haves exert some  influence to advance their interests, they are 
bounded by legislation and other rules. Hence, legislators have much more influence than 
officials and can control them.     
In contrast, interactive models depict a balance between public officials and 
legislators.  According to this framework, both actors have resources to influence each 
other. Given that bureaucrats and politicians have control over resources that the other 
needs, both actors are mutually dependent. The theory presented in the second part of the 
chapter builds on this line of research. I argue that in developing countries there is 
bidirectional influence embedded in bureaucratic-legislative relations: legislators exert 
formal control over the bureaucracy, yet at the same time, public officials have informal 
leverage over members of Congress.  The theory is fully elaborated in section four.  It is 
first necessary, however, to analyze the predictions made about the effects of 
democratization, as based on each of the three approaches.  
 
  
THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS: THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRATIZATION ON 
BUREAUCRATIC-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS 
 
 As stated above, there are two main frameworks that examine the relationship 
between the bureaucracy and the legislature.  Since each one of these approaches studies 
the power relationships between public officials and legislators in First World countries, 





when these theories are applied to developing countries, the impact of democracy on 
bureaucratic-legislative relations has to be examined. What are the theoretical 
expectations of each approach regarding democratization?  Do these frameworks predict 
greater legislative control over the bureaucracy in democratic regimes? The analysis of 
the theoretical predictions shows why the bureaucratic autonomy and the legislative 
dominance approaches have problems explaining the bureaucratic-legislative relationship 
in recent democracies.  Furthermore, the overview shows why the mutual influence 
theory better accounts for the power relationship between public servants and members of 
Congress in new democracies.     
 
BUREAUCRATIC DOMINANCE PREDICTIONS  
The bureaucratic dominance approach does not predict a significant increase in 
legislative control over the bureaucracy with the arrival of democracy. According to this 
framework, bureaucrats dominate the policy arena due to the expansion of the 
administrative apparatus, the implementation of hundreds of public programs, and the 
asymmetry of information.  Thus, bureaucratic dominance rests on characteristics of the 
state, not the political regime; therefore, it is unaffected by a democratic transition. 
Accordingly, democracy does not bring a greater balance between the executive and 
legislative branches because this type of regime does not, per se, reduce the asymmetry of 
information and expertise between bureaucrats and legislators. As a consequence, 
legislators‘ participation in public policies remains marginal. Democracy, then, neither 





technical capacity to control the bureaucracy.  In contrast, bureaucrats—regardless of the 
political regime—have time and expertise to design and carry out dozens of public 
programs. Hence, for the proponents of this approach, there is no doubt about who 
governs complex societies since ―the modern political system is essentially 
‗bureaucratic‘—characterized by ‗the rule of officials‘‖ (Putnam 1975: 87). 
 The bureaucratic autonomy approach‘s prediction that democracy has little effect 
on the bureaucratic-legislative relationship is questionable. Democratic regimes allow for 
the participation of more political actors in the policymaking process.  Legislatures in 
consolidated democracies play a relevant role in the crafting of public policies and 
programs. Accordingly, members of Congress are able to initiate their own bills, or 
modify and reject presidential bills. Legislators, for instance, can make substantial 
changes to the federal budget. These changes can range from the authorization of new 
taxes to the cancellation of funds for certain programs. Given the legislatures‘ 
policymaking authority in democracy, top-level officials have to negotiate the approval of 
legislation with legislators.  For their part, bureaucrats offer, among other things, their 
technical knowledge and expertise to attain the objectives established by legislators.  
Public servants may also offer government resources to congress people in order to 
maintain the status quo in legislation or to include certain stipulations that benefit 
executive agencies. Consequently, legislators and bureaucrats frequently enter into a 
bargaining process where both actors concede demands to the other.  Because bureaucrats 





bureaucratic autonomy claim that bureaucracy has complete control over the policy realm 
is, at best, limited.  
 
LEGISLATIVE DOMINANCE PREDICTIONS                
In contrast to the bureaucratic autonomy approach, legislative dominance predicts 
that democratization leads to effective legislative control over the bureaucracy.  On the 
one hand, rational choice institutional scholars who have used this framework assume 
that bureaucrats in democratic regimes are constrained by laws.  That is, they presuppose 
that under democracy there is strict adherence to the rule of law and that any bureaucratic 
deviation from it is severely sanctioned by the judiciary (Huber and Shipan 2002: 96).  
For the followers of this framework, then, there is no doubt that legislators exert effective 
control over the bureaucracy by establishing limits and checks in legislation.  Based on 
this assumption, Wood and Waterman claim that ―the evidence for active political control 
is so strong that controversy should now end over whether political control occurs‖ 
(1991: 822). This approach also presupposes that bureaucrats respond to legislators‘ 
preferences established in laws since it is assumed that there is strict bureaucratic 
compliance with formal rules. Hence, this framework presumes that there is a link 
between politicians‘ preferences and policy outcomes (Huber and Shipan 2002: 25).     
On the other hand, the legislative dominance framework presupposes that 
democratic systems, more than other forms of government, allow for the establishment of 
institutional factors and political contexts that promote greater congressional control of 





This political context tends to produce effective control over the bureaucracy since the 
political opposition tries to limit bureaucrats‘ leeway through the enactment of low-
discretion legislation (Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002).  Similarly, 
in democracy, there are non-statutory mechanisms (e.g. legislative veto over agencies‘ 
rules) and non-legislative institutions such as courts that also constrain the bureaucracy‘s 
actions. 
Legislative dominance theories present three problems for the analysis of 
bureaucratic-congressional relationships in developing countries.  First, as mentioned 
above, they assume that officials‘ behavior is constrained through institutional 
mechanisms; especially statutes, procedures, and low-discretion legislation. This 
assumption is especially problematic in countries with deficient rule of law and that lack 
a Weberian state.  Since the enforcement of laws is poor and sanctions are rarely imposed 
in these settings, bureaucrats frequently violate formal rules. Rather than being 
constrained by legislation, informal patterns and practices guide public servants‘ behavior 
(Grindle 1977; Helmke and Levitsky 2004).  Second, legislative dominance theories 
assume a unilateral flow of authority from legislators to bureaucrats.  According to this 
framework bureaucrats respond to legislators‘ preferences but not vice versa.  Through 
the establishment of procedures, policy instructions, and constraints in legislation (among 
other institutional mechanisms), legislators induce bureaucratic compliance.  
Consequently, legislative dominance assumes that, while democracy allows members of 
Congress to control the bureaucracy, officials cannot exert leverage over lawmakers by 





control over fiscal and social policies. Given that in these settings bureaucrats have 
control over important resources that politicians need to advance their careers, officials 
exert ample influence over lawmakers. Public servants, for instance, are in charge of 
carrying out social policies that benefit thousands of citizens, including legislators‘ 
constituents. Members of Congress need bureaucrats to deliver handouts and other 
resources to their constituents and cronies. Similarly, top-level officials may do special 
favors for legislators or their cronies.  The fact that bureaucrats could have the power to 
exert leverage over legislators is not considered by the legislative dominance approach.   
Finally, given the unilateral claim, followers of the legislative dominance 
framework do not take into account that clientelism may exist between legislators and 
bureaucrats. That is, officials may ―buy‖ immunity in exchange for the delivery of 
valuable resources to legislators. Bureaucrats and lawmakers in developing countries may 
enter into a patron-client relationship where the former may offer handouts to the latter in 
exchange for not controlling executive agencies‘ work. Similarly, bureaucrats can 
provide important resources in exchange for not presenting charges against public 
servants who have committed wrongdoings. In their analyses, legislative dominance 
theories do not consider that bureaucrats may exert influence over lawmakers by 
providing them with desired resources.  This omission seriously limits the explanatory 
power of this approach in developing countries.  
In sum, the absence of a Weberian state, along with ample executive branch 
intervention and politicians‘ reliance on clientelistic rather than programmatic linkages, 





countries.  In this setting, the relationship of power between principals and agents is, to 
some extent, in ―balance‖ since legislators establish laws to constrain bureaucrats and 
bureaucrats, in turn, control governmental resources that members of Congress need for 
their political careers. 
 
INTERACTIVE MODELS AND THE MUTUAL INFLUENCE THEORY PREDICTIONS                             
Interactive models, the least developed approach, also predict that democracy will 
bring changes to bureaucratic-legislative relationships.  In this approach however, and in 
contrast to the legislative dominance approach, democracy does not produce absolute 
congressional control over the bureaucracy, but rather a balance between lawmakers and 
public officials. Accordingly, this framework acknowledges that bureaucrats and 
legislators have means and resources to influence each other. Stated differently, followers 
of interactive models accept that there is interdependence between officials and 
lawmakers.            
My approach, the mutual influence theory, builds on the interactive model‘s 
reasoning and predicts that democratization leads to a modification of formal rules that 
regulate bureaucratic behavior. That is, democracy allows members of Congress to enact 
stricter, low-discretion legislation that formally limits bureaucrats‘ leeway to implement 
public programs.  Yet this framework holds that—in terms of actual, informal patterns—
democracy does not bring significant changes.  In other words, despite the fact that 
democracy allows legislators to modify formal rules, in practice, bureaucrats continue to 





have some influence on bureaucrats (mainly through legislation), in practice, 
congressional control is less tangible. The next section fully elaborates the mutual 
influence theory.   
 
 
THE MUTUAL INFLUENCE THEORY:  INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN BUREAUCRACY AND 
CONGRESS  
    
In contrast to the bureaucratic autonomy and the legislative dominance 
approaches that claim unidirectional authority from one actor over the other, my 
argument states that there is a bidirectional flow of influence between these two actors.  
Legislators make or reform legislation to constrain bureaucrats‘ behavior, while 
bureaucrats exert informal leverage over lawmakers by allocating important resources.  
Additionally, I argue that bureaucrats and legislators interact in all stages of policy 
making.  The next section describes in detail how bureaucrats and legislators interact, and 
what the effects of such interaction are.    
 
 
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND LEGISLATORS   
In both First World and developing countries, bureaucrats and legislators have 
resources to influence each other.  In the case of legislators, they have the power to set 
the rules of the game.  By making laws and other statutes, legislators approve budgets, 





Legislators can also oversee the work of agencies and punish – directly or indirectly – 
those officials who do not comply with laws and other congressional commands.  
Similarly, members of Congress have the power of the purse. That is, lawmakers 
authorize the disbursement of funds for public policies and programs.    
For their part, bureaucrats‘ power arises from two different sources:  1) their 
technical expertise and information about public policies and programs, and 2) their 
control over significant resources. The bureaucracy has expertise and an informational 
advantage over Congress because officials are the ones in charge of running government 
programs. They are technical experts dedicated full time to the design and 
implementation of public policies. Over the years, bureaucrats have acquired the 
information and expertise that allow them to understand the details of each policy and its 
possible effects. In addition to the informational and expertise advantage, officials also 
have control over government resources. Once Congress approves a law and disburses 
money for its implementation, bureaucrats are responsible for carrying out the policies 
contained in legislation. Although lawmakers can establish limits and details on how 
policies should be instituted, bureaucrats are the ones that give shape and form to public 
programs. Accordingly, public servants decide, among many other things, where to 
allocate funds, the timetable to distribute resources, and what regions will benefit from 
the programs. The authority to make these decisions gives bureaucrats an advantage over 
their principals.   
Since the way in which laws are enacted is very important for agencies, public 





particular. Bureaucrats take advantage of their technical capacity and information to 
formulate and propose policies to politicians. Although lawmakers may change these 
policies, bureaucrats define—to a great extent—the policy agenda, as well as the 
framework, boundaries, and content of public programs. Even when members of 
Congress initiate bills without the advice of the bureaucracy, public officials frequently 
know more about the potential effects of those bills and how to shape them according to 
their interests. During the deliberation of bills, for example, bureaucrats can advise 
politicians to change their initial proposals and modify certain provisions in the bills 
according to the agency‘s goals. Officials can either negotiate with legislators to establish 
certain stipulations that benefit them or shape legislation in a way that, in theory, is 
beneficial to legislators, but that in reality is advantageous to the bureaucracy. Once 
Congress passes a law, public officials are responsible for its implementation. Public 
servants, then, are the ones that ultimately control and distribute important resources to 
diverse actors.   
Although bureaucrats and legislators have resources to influence each other, the 
power relationship between these two actors is hardly in balance. As Weber pointed out 
in his seminal essay, with great frequency bureaucrats have the upper hand in the policy 
making process. Legislators, however, use institutional factors and take advantage of 
political contexts to offset the superior power of bureaucrats.  Despite the limitation of 
resources, structural deficiencies, and other disadvantages, lawmakers in new 





at least to some extent—the technical capacity of executive agencies. Additionally, 
legislators in developing countries have begun to modify the legal frameworks that allow 
politicians to effectively exert ex ante and ex post controls over public policies and 
programs. In theory, the combination of vast legislative resources and effective legal 
frameworks should make the power relationship between bureaucrats and members of 
Congress more balanced in new democracies than in authoritarian regimes. However, 
legislators rarely use the resources and formal powers that they have established.  Why? 
What explains the lack of effective legislative control over the bureaucracy in new 
democratic regimes?  Why do legislators tolerate significant bureaucratic discretion in the 
implementation of public policies?   
To answer these questions it is necessary to first assess the applicability of 
principal-agent theory in developing countries. The assumptions underlying the principal- 
agent framework—particularly the existence of a Weberian state and the unidirectional 
flow of authority from principals to agents—may be valid in First World countries, but 
does the dominant institutionalist approach apply in underdeveloped countries?   
There are three main differences in the relationship between legislators and 
bureaucrats in First and Third World countries: First, due to the strength of informal 
patterns of behavior, the principal cannot have effective control over the agent through 
legislation.  The assumptions of the legislative dominance approach presuppose that there 
is an effective rule of law and that the relationships between officials and legislators are 
largely regulated by formal rules.  This does not seem to be the case in underdeveloped 





(Grindle 1977).  Since officials do not follow formal rules, any laws made by Congress 
cannot reliably guide and constrain them (Grindle 1977; Helmke and Levitsky 2004).  
Even if legislators enact low-discretion legislation, there is no guarantee that bureaucrats 
will act as lawmakers want. Furthermore, the fact that the rule of law in developing 
countries is inefficient provides more power to bureaucrats since it is likely that they will 
not be punished for violations of laws or for not carrying out legislators‘ commands.  The 
weak rule of law, along with the absence of a Weberian state, makes it exceedingly 
difficult to constrain bureaucratic behavior through laws and statutes.  
Second, in contrast to First World countries, politicians in the developing world 
tend to attract voters through clientelistic rather than programmatic linkages (Kitschelt 
2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).  That is, although parties may offer universalistic 
packages of policies, in practice politicians are prone to provide direct and personal 
goods or money to particular individuals or groups of citizens in exchange for political 
support. If legislators get citizens‘ votes with programmatic messages, bureaucrats would 
have much less leverage since the provision of benefits to people would be universal 
rather than particularistic. However, in developing countries, bureaucrats‘ influence is 
very strong given that they have control over governmental resources that are delivered in 
a clientelistic way to the citizenry.  
Finally, the agent is not as powerless as the dominant institutionalist approach 
assumes. In developing countries, there is not only an asymmetry of information between 
bureaucrats and legislators, but also a disadvantage in terms of control over governmental 





over their principals who, in theory, have the right and responsibility to allocate the 
resources of the state. Consequently, the dominant institutionalist framework may not 
apply well in political systems where the executive branch still intervenes deeply in 
diverse societal and economic spheres. Although legislatures and interest groups in Latin 
America today have more weight in policymaking than in the past, officials still have 
great influence in the design and implementation of policies.
12
 Given this kind of 
intervention, bureaucrats have control over multiple resources that are allotted in a 
discretionary way. This practice promotes widespread clientelism and politicians‘ 
reliance on patronage. Bureaucrats in these settings often become involved in patronage-
client relationships (PCRs) in which they offer goods, positions or services to their 
subordinates or other political actors in exchange for political support and loyalty 
(Grindle 1977).
13
 Consequently, PCRs are effective and efficient means by which public 
officials secure the flow of resources needed to achieve certain goals and advance their 
careers.   
The same logic of PCRs within the bureaucracy can be applied to the relationship 
between bureaucrats and legislators.  Officials offer benefits to legislators in exchange for 
allowing bureaucratic discretion in the design and implementation of policies. The 
benefits might range from resources, goods and special favors for legislators‘ 
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In Mexico, for instance, between 85 and 95 percent of states‘ resources come from national taxes 
collected by the federal government.       
13
 The patron-client relationship is characterized by ―an enduring dyadic bond based upon informally 









constituency or interest groups, to getting a position within the agency. By allowing 
bureaucrats to have significant leeway, legislators secure resources to distribute among 
their constituents and other interest groups that politically support them.  Accordingly, by 
not exercising their control powers, lawmakers increase their support, influence and 
prestige, which are elements needed to advance their political careers (Scher 1963).   
Legislators, then, enjoy greater payoffs by maintaining good relationships with 
bureaucrats than by exercising strict control over them.  Stated differently, lawmakers get 
higher rewards if they maintain cordial communication with public officials from whom 
they can obtain benefits. The legislative-bureaucratic relationship would deteriorate if 
policymakers started investigations or accused bureaucrats of policy failures. Given that 
legislators depend on bureaucrats for patronage, agents in developing countries are not 
powerless. Therefore, the ―controllers‖ depend, to some extent, on those who they are 
supposed to control for their ―political survival‖. 
In sum, my theory claims that there is mutual influence between legislators and 
public officials. On the one hand, bureaucrats need laws not to contain excessive checks 
and controls that could severely limit their leeway to carry out public programs. Public 
servants also need legislators‘ disbursement of resources for the implementation of 
policies. Additionally, officials prefer not to have systematic congressional monitoring 
over agencies‘ work. On the other hand, legislators require bureaucrats‘ technical 
knowledge and expertise to reach certain goals.  Furthermore, given that bureaucrats have 
control over government resources, legislators require that bureaucrats distribute those 





influence over the other, my approach states that lawmakers and officials are mutually 
dependant. Therefore, the mutual influence theory argues that there is not unilateral 
control, but bidirectional authority in the bureaucratic-legislative relationship. While 
members of Congress formally constrain bureaucratic behavior through legislation, 
bureaucrats exert informal leverage over lawmakers by distributing handouts to 
politicians or by doing favors for legislators‘ constituents and cronies. By distributing 
resources that are valuable to legislators, bureaucrats may ―buy‖ discretion to carry out 
policies at their convenience. 
The extent to which officials can influence lawmakers depends on the 
bureaucrats‘ degree of control over governmental resources.  The higher it is, the greater 
leverage they have over legislators, and the lower the legislators‘ control over public 




Now that the logic of bureaucratic-legislative relations in developing countries 
has been explained, I proceed to the analysis of the stages in which these two actors 
interact. By examining these different stages, one can grasp the details of the mutual 
influence theory. Although bureaucrats exert influence over members of Congress during 
the first three stages of the interaction, legislators have the upper hand since they are in 
charge of the legislative process. However, in the implementation stage, bureaucrats use 





convenience. In addition, the analysis of the stages will also allow for the opportunity to 
derive specific hypotheses that will later be tested in the empirical chapters.   
Before analyzing this interaction, it is first necessary to mention two important 
assumptions:  1) Public officials have greater expertise, staff and experience in the policy 
making process than legislators;  2) In developing countries the executive branch, despite 
the recent waves of deregulation, still deeply intervenes in economic and societal spheres.  
This assumption implies that bureaucrats have almost complete control over government 
resources. The following stages describe the interaction between bureaucrats and 
legislators in recently installed democracies.  In these regimes legislatures have started to 
counterbalance the influence of executive agencies by proposing and passing their own 
bills and modifying and blocking the president‘s bills (e.g. Morgenstern and Nacif 2002).  
In the following analysis, I examine the policy-making process, when bureaucrats 
propose a bill via the president or his party and Congress decides to either modify or 
reject it.  I also assume that in the previous authoritarian regime, bureaucrats had ample 
discretion to carry out policies and that legislators in the new democratic regime are 
willing to modify the legal system in order to reduce bureaucratic leeway. My analysis 
explains the bureaucratic-legislative interaction under a divided government setting.  In 
theory, legislative control over the bureaucracy is greater in divided governments than it 
is in unified governments because the interests of both actors diverge (Epstein and 
O‘Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002). Legislators under a divided government tend 
to approve more low-discretion legislation that seeks to limit bureaucrats‘ leeway to 





tends to approve laws that allow executive agencies to implement public policies with 
ample discretion.  In my analysis, I examine a political context in which—according to 
the standard principal-agent framework—legislators should exert more effective control 
over the bureaucracy.        
 
BILL ELABORATION STAGE.  The interaction between bureaucrats and legislators begins in 
the elaboration of bills. Although formal rules grant Congress exclusive authority to 
discuss and debate bills, public officials do, in fact, intervene at this stage. Bureaucrats 
utilize their superiority in technical knowledge and information to play a significant role 
in the designing, elaboration and preparation of policies. That is, bureaucrats introduce 
legislative bills usually via the president or his party. In this way, public officials help 
define the options, frame the issues, and propose the solutions that the executive 
leadership—and later, Congress—considers, debates, and decides on (see figure 2.1). 
Even when legislators, for their part, propose bills to advance public programs that will 
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 Even when such consultation does not exist, bureaucrats can intervene in the deliberation process and 
negotiate with legislators the inclusion of certain provisions that benefit them. Bureaucrats, for instance, 





Hypothesis 1: Although formal rules grant legislators the exclusive authority to 
consider, discuss and debate bills, bureaucrats intervene in the process by taking 
advantage of their superiority in technical knowledge and information in order to 
define and frame the issues of  bills analyzed by Congress.     
 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the bureaucrats‘ preferred bill in a single policy dimension and the 
interval of bills acceptable to bureaucrats.  Officials establish the left and right boundaries 
of this interval; any bill inside these boundaries is acceptable to bureaucrats. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Bureaucrats‘ Preferred Bill and the Range of Acceptable Bills 
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DELIBERATION AND BARGAINING STAGE.   Members of Congress decide whether or not to 
discuss the president‘s bill (or the president‘s party‘s bill) that was previously elaborated 
by the bureaucracy. If legislators decide to analyze this bill, they will usually make 
changes to it. These changes, however, will normally be made to only certain elements of 
this bill. That is, most of the time lawmakers do not propose a different bill; they modify 
only certain elements of the president‘s bill. Members of Congress also establish a range 
of policies acceptable to them. Congress‘ modified bill is within this range.  In cases of 
divided government, however, the modified bill may well be outside the range of the 
policies acceptable to bureaucrats. Figure 2.2 shows how Congress‘ bill is far from the 
bureaucrats‘ preferred policy.  In fact, the bill is outside of the policies acceptable to 
bureaucrats.  Negotiation between the bureaucracy and legislators occurs only if there is 
an overlap between bureaucrats‘ and legislators‘ ranges of acceptable policies.   
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 All things being equal, both legislators and bureaucrats want to enact laws that 
ensure them benefits. A common procedure to guarantee legislators‘ benefits is by 
establishing laws that contain concrete objectives, procedures and outcomes that 
bureaucrats should follow and accomplish (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; 1989).  
Stated differently, lawmakers will try to limit bureaucratic behavior through laws in order 
to obtain what they want. Conversely, bureaucrats will demand ample discretion in 
legislation that allows them to implement policies and public programs at their 
convenience. In this way, a bargaining process begins in which both players want to 
ensure themselves the greatest possible benefits in legislation.
15
 With frequency, 
bureaucrats offer handouts to legislators in exchange for relaxing the checks and 
constraints proposed in the bill.
16
 Legislators thus propose a second bill that is closer to 
the bureaucrats‘ preferred policy, but that is still far from the officials‘ interval of 
acceptable policies. For their part, bureaucrats draft a second bill that is closer to the 
legislators‘ most preferred policy, but that is still inside their own range of acceptable 
policies and outside of the legislators‘ acceptable policies. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Public officials offer handouts and other valuable resources to 
legislators in exchange for eliminating or relaxing the constraints and controls 
proposed in bills aimed to reduce bureaucratic leeway.  
 
                                                 
15
 The venue through which bureaucrats and legislators negotiate is frequently informal, for example, non-
official meetings.   
16
 Public officials may also negotiate the delivery of important resources to members of Congress in 





Figure 2.3:  Bargaining Process 
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APPROVAL STAGE. The bargaining process frequently produces a legislative bill that 
benefits both actors. However, the approved bill generally favors Congress. On the one 
hand, Congress people tend to approve a law that is close to their second proposal.  
Additionally, legislators are usually able to specify in the new law what procedures and 
outcomes bureaucrats should produce.  On the other hand, the new law does not severely 
constrain the bureaucracy or command it to produce policy outcomes that go completely 
against public officials‘ interests.  Stated differently, the new law is restrictive, but not as 
restrictive as legislators would want since lawmakers frequently concede to many of the 
bureaucrats‘ demands (see figure 2.4). Despite these concessions, lawmakers are able to 





to these directives may be sanctioned – directly or indirectly – by Congress.  In short, 
legislators establish stipulations in legislation in an effort to obtain benefits and to punish 
public servants if they fail to accomplish certain tasks. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Although legislators concede to many of the bureaucrats’ demands 
in the bargaining process, the former establish controls and constraints in laws 
that significantly reduce officials’ leeway.  
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IMPLEMENTATION STAGE. Once Congress approves a law, the responsibility to implement 





delegate authority and resources to the bureaucracy so that it can carry out public 
policies. Because the new law constrains bureaucrats‘ behavior and affects their interests, 
officials either do not strictly follow its procedures and instructions, do not produce all 
the outcomes established in laws, or violate laws in order to pursue their own objectives.   
 
Hypothesis 4a: Public officials are not reliably constrained by low-discretion 
legislation, despite its approval by Congress. Bureaucrats follow laws at their 
discretion.     
Hypothesis 4b: Bureaucrats will only strictly adhere to legislation if it does not 
interfere with their interests. 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the distance between the law approved by Congress and the 
bureaucratic policy that is, in reality, implemented.  While the latter is within the original 
bureaucrats‘ range of acceptable policies, it is very close to the legislators‘ interval due to 
the fact that bureaucrats also make concessions to legislators in the implementation 
process.  In other words, bureaucrats do not implement the most preferred policy, but one 
that is closer to the legislators‘ preferences. The figure also depicts the low level of 
discretion that the law allows for, as well as the much greater discretion that bureaucrats 
enjoy in practice.  Bureaucrats can implement any policy within this interval. That is, 
officials can either strictly adhere to the law approved by Congress, or implement any 






Figure 2.5:  Distance between the Law and the Policy Implemented 
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Due to the asymmetry of information and expertise, legislators do not 
automatically detect bureaucratic transgressions of laws. Yet, either by themselves or 
through interest groups, members of Congress eventually become aware that bureaucrats 
are not complying with the stipulations established in legislation. In this scenario, 
legislators have three options to counteract bureaucrats‘ actions: 1) Members of Congress 
can start oversight actions and investigations of specific agencies and/or public programs; 





leeway or, 3) legislators can take no action against the bureaucrats‘ transgressions of the 
law and demand that officials deliver important resources that benefit their electoral 
interests. Put differently, congress people can renounce their control powers in exchange 
for certain type of resources, such as money, material goods, or governmental positions 
that the bureaucracy has under its control. 
 Legislators most frequently take options 1 and 3, or a combination of both.  
However, the first option—to carry out oversight actions—is very ineffective and 
superficial. That is, legislators do not exert strict supervision of governmental programs.  
Committees, for example, do not systematically and continuously oversee the 
implementation of policies. Committee members neither read bureaucratic reports nor ask 
agencies for important information that reveals the progress of policies. Similarly, serious 
legislative investigations are rarely carried out. Congressional hearings with bureaucrats 
only last a few hours and legislators do not verify the information provided by officials 
during the meetings. In the same way, lawmakers do not follow up on the problems 
discussed with bureaucrats. Most of the time legislators ask bureaucrats to appear before 
committees due to requests by interest groups or media pressure. But once bureaucrats 
appear before committees, legislators do not check whether the problem has been solved.   
Why do legislators not exert their oversight powers better? There are at least two 
reasons that account for the legislators‘ reluctance to use their control powers.  First, 
overseeing the bureaucracy is costly. Given the information asymmetry, legislators 
cannot easily supervise public policies and programs. Therefore, members of Congress 





Second, oversight actions produce political conflict. Often, the supervision of 
governmental programs produces enmity between legislators and agencies. Such enmity 
is not convenient for legislators since bureaucrats control resources (or do favors) that 
they need to advance their political careers. Moreover, as mentioned previously, 
bureaucrats are not powerless; they have means and resources that can be used to strike 
back at legislators. For instance, bureaucrats may retaliate by cutting the flow of 
resources delivered to those legislators who try to control them.  In sum, since oversight 
actions and investigations can be counterproductive to lawmakers, these instruments are 
rarely used as mechanisms to exert control over the bureaucracy.             
The third option, congressional self-restraint against taking actions to counter the 
bureaucrats‘ violation of the law, is observed most often in new democracies because it is 
more politically beneficial to legislators. Bureaucrats‘ control over important resources 
encourages legislators to renounce their control powers. That is, lawmakers can obtain 
more resources from the bureaucracy by not exercising their control powers than by 
exerting effective supervision of policies and programs. The implementation of effective 
legislative control (either by approving stricter legislation or by carrying out systematic 
oversight actions) would damage lawmakers‘ relationship with the bureaucracy. Strict 







Hypothesis 5: There is an informal exchange in the bureaucratic-legislative 
relation in which bureaucrats give important resources to legislators in exchange 
for not exerting their control powers over public policies and programs.  
 
 
In this way, there is an informal exchange of immunity for resources.  Legislators 
do not supervise or sanction bureaucratic actions, while officials pay back this service by 
distributing resources to members of Congress. In general, this informal practice is an 
implicit agreement between both actors. In other words, legislators do not have to 
threaten bureaucrats with investigations or sanctions in order to obtain what they need.  
For their part, officials do not need to intimidate lawmakers by stopping the delivery of 
resources to get bureaucratic discretion.  In some cases, legislators let bureaucrats know – 
either directly or through the media – which procedures and outcomes established in laws 
are not being accomplished, or that agencies are violating certain stipulations. This 
warning is sufficient to persuade bureaucrats to continue with (or increase) the 
distribution of goods. In the same way, bureaucrats can temporally cut the flow of 
resources or favors to let legislators know that some congressional action is bothering 
them, such as a bill that intends to affect bureaucrats‘ interests, a congressional statement, 
or a committee investigation. This unwritten pact between lawmakers and bureaucrats 
continues until one of the two actors realizes that the other is violating the agreement, or 





If there is an informal agreement in which legislators allow bureaucratic 
discretion in exchange for governmental resources, why have members of Congress 
approved stricter laws that seem to be designed to reduce officials‘ leeway?  In order to 
get credit from voters and interest groups, legislators need not only material resources but 
also symbolic actions to legitimize their role as the people‘s representatives. One of the 
main means of legitimizing legislative work is through the amendment of laws.  In fact, 
the enactment of tighter laws is an opportunity to engage in symbolic action (March and 
Olson 1983).  By reducing officials‘ discretion in laws, legislators send the signal that 
Congress is carrying out meaningful work by holding bureaucrats accountable.  Although 
deputies and senators are not, in practice, insistent on constraining bureaucratic leeway, 
the approval of stricter laws may be a ―tactic for creating an illusion of progress where 
none exists‖ (March and Olson 1983: 290). Furthermore, the enactment of low-discretion 
legislation gives legislators the possibility to sanction bureaucrats if they stop delivering 
resources. Lawmakers can also use stricter laws as an instrument to negotiate the 
distribution of more handouts. Hence, it is very likely that legislators pass tighter laws not 
because they want to limit officials‘ behavior, but because they either seek to get credit, 
legitimize their work, or obtain more resources. 
Given extensive state intervention, the absence of a Weberian state, bureaucrats‘ 
power to control governmental resources and the legislators‘ need for resources, is it 
possible to exert legislative control over public programs in developing countries?  In 
principle, it is possible to control bureaucrats. However, effective control over the 





agency is hurting their interests. This happens when an agency implements or modifies a 
policy in a way that systematically hurts political parties‘ privileges. Under this 
circumstance, legislators will use their formal control powers as a mechanism to stop 
such a policy. Thus, lawmakers will carry out oversight actions that lead to either the 
transformation or the elimination of the policy. Only under this condition will legislators 
pay the costs (time, effort, energy) and run the political risks involved in the monitoring 
of public programs. The failure to pursue oversight actions, in this case, could imply 




The theory presented here explains the interaction between bureaucrats and 
legislators throughout the policy-making process. More important, the theory captures the 
impact of democratization on the bureaucratic-legislative relationship in developing 
countries by including in its logic the mutual influence that exists between public 
officials and legislators. Consequently, the theory acknowledges that democratization 
brings a significant change in the bureaucratic-legislative relationship given that 
legislators are able to obtain more influence than they had under the authoritarian regime, 
when bureaucratic dominance prevailed.      
In contrast to the bureaucratic autonomy approach and the principal-agent models, 
which contend that just one actor dominates the other, I argue that both legislators and 





holds particularly true in developing countries where there is bidirectional influence in 
which principals have formal rights to control agents, but agents have informal leverage 
over principals. These informal mechanisms of influence neutralize the formal control 
powers that legislators have over bureaucrats. By distributing resources for handouts, 
bureaucrats obtain legislators‘ consent to design and implement programs as they desire.  
Chapters 4 and 5 apply this theory to account for the budgetary process and the 
implementation of health policies, respectively. But before the analysis of these case 
studies, the next chapter explains why this theory better captures the relationship between 
bureaucrats and members of Congress in Mexico than the bureaucratic autonomy and 









CHAPTER 3:  DEMOCRACY’S IMPACT ON BUREAUCRATIC-LEGISLATIVE 




Chapter 2 presented the basic theoretical frameworks to study bureaucratic-
legislative relations. The present chapter draws out the implications for the issue of 
democracy by empirically examining how democratization affected the relationship 
between public officials and members of Congress in Mexico. Before chapters 4 and 5, 
the empirical core of the dissertation in which two issue areas are examined, this chapter 
provides an analysis of some of the overarching institutional changes to the bureaucratic-
legislative relationship brought on by Mexico‘s democratization.   
The first section assesses whether the bureaucratic autonomy and the legislative 
dominance approaches are effective tools in accounting for the bureaucratic-
congressional relationship in Mexico‘s new democracy. The bureaucratic autonomy 
approach is useful in explaining this relationship during the PRI era, but it fails to provide 
a convincing explanation of the increasing power of Congress under democracy.  For 
instance, this approach cannot account for the establishment of multiple controls and 
constraints in legislation since the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies.  
Moreover, since the bureaucracy is considered the main actor in the policy making 
process, this approach cannot explain for deputies‘ cuts to the president‘s budget since 
1997.    
For its part, legislative dominance predicts that democratization will activate 





discretion. These factors have been present in Mexico since the PRI lost the majority of 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997. Therefore, this approach seems to be 
successful in accounting for the bureaucratic-legislative relation in the country.  This 
section also explains why Congress functioned as a ―rubber-stamp institution‖ during the 
PRI era and how democratization gradually allowed legislators to become the main 
sponsors of bills. In particular, I analyze bill approval between 1982 and 2006.  The 
analysis shows how presidents‘ bill approval rate decreased as the process of 
democratization advanced.    
The second section examines the effectiveness of the legislative dominance 
framework by focusing on one institutional mechanism—the investigative committees—
through which the legislature, in principle, could hold the government accountable.  
Although more investigative committees have been created since democratization, their 
effectiveness is limited in making bureaucrats accountable. The last part of the chapter 
documents ―a most-likely case‖ of an investigative committee to illustrate the 
ineffectiveness of this oversight mechanism. The conclusion explains why the mutual 
influence approach better accounts for the bureaucratic-legislative relation in Mexico.        
 
        
MEXICAN REALITIES  
APPLYING THE BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY APPROACH TO MEXICO‘S NEW DEMOCRACY 
 The bureaucratic dominance approach is useful in accounting for the interaction 





explaining this relationship under democracy. As is well known, the PRI had absolute 
majorities in both chambers of Congress until 1997.
1
 PRI hegemony in Congress 
produced at least two consequences for the bureaucratic-congressional relationship.  First, 
the legislative branch functioned as a rubber-stamp institution that validated almost all 
presidential bills. Accordingly, PRI presidents could change the constitution and 
secondary laws at their discretion. Second, Congress did not effectively control public 
policies and programs. That is, since the executive and legislative branches were 
controlled by the president and the PRI, there was no effective system of checks and 
balances whereby Congress could limit and supervise the work of the bureaucracy.        
Evidence of the legislative branch‘s subordination to the president is found in the 
number of bills enacted during the PRI era.  As Table 3.1 shows, the great majority of the 
bills enacted in the Chamber of Deputies between 1982 and 1997 were introduced by PRI 
presidents. While deputies introduced more bills than the president, only a small portion 
of these legislative initiatives were enacted in this period.  In the LII legislature (1982-
1985), for instance, 92 percent of the bills approved in the Chamber of Deputies were 
introduced by the president.  In contrast, only 8 percent of approved legislation emerged 
from congressional initiatives, despite the fact that deputies initiated more bills than the 
president.  It is also noteworthy that presidents were able to pass at least 97 percent of 
their bills during this period. Furthermore, Congress enacted presidents‘ bills either 
unamended or with minor changes (Goodspeed 1955; González Casanova 1965; Wilkie 
1967; Casar 2002). Since legislators approved the great majority of executive bills 
                                                 
1
 Between 1970 and 1988, the PRI controlled, on average, 78 percent of the seats in the Chamber of 





without significant modifications, Congress was considered a rubber-stamp institution 
that ―had a poor performance regarding its law making and oversight authority‖ (Casar 
2002: 116).           
 

















































































Total 352 164 540 223 317 110 319 214 266 120 
 
Source:  Based on Casar (2001, 2002); and Weldon (2004).  
 
* The number between parentheses indicates the percentage of bills approved. 
 
 The lack of congressional checks on executive agencies allowed for the 
discretionary implementation of public policies by the bureaucracy.  Similarly, 
ineffective supervision of government programs by the legislature furthered the 
expansion of bureaucratic autonomy. The absence of effective checks and balances 
during the post-revolutionary period is evidenced by the fact that Congress deliberately 
delegated its legislative powers to presidents.  According to Casar (2002), Congress took 





the delegation of legislative power to the executive branch under special circumstances, 
presidents exceeded the constitution‘s stipulations by legislating in several prohibited 
policy areas, such as education and industry (Casar 2002: 120).
2
  Even in the late 1970s, 
Congress abdicated its legislative powers by approving a revenue bill that allowed the 
president to undertake additional expenditures without the authorization of Congress 
(Carpizo 1978: 145, cited in Casar 2002: 120).  
Legislators also failed to effectively oversee the work of the bureaucracy. Given 
the prohibition of consecutive reelection, legislators‘ political careers greatly depended 
on PRI leadership and the president, who controlled nominations to most administrative 
and elected offices. As a consequence, members of Congress had no incentives to 
monitor executive agencies (Ugalde 2000).
3
 A congressional investigation of an 
executive agency could have been seen as a challenge to the president and the PRI. 
Furthermore, this action could have put legislators‘ political careers in jeopardy.  
Therefore, as documented below, PRI legislators almost always used their ample majority 
in Congress to block the opposition‘s efforts to investigate federal agencies. The PRI‘s 
protection of executive agencies from congressional investigations contributed to the 
gradual increase of bureaucratic autonomy.    
                                                 
2
 The constitution establishes that Congress may delegate its power to the executive branch in only two 
specific situations: in case of an emergency situation that requires the suspension of constitutional 
guarantees (article 29), and to regulate commerce (article 131). 
3
 A survey given to deputies of the LVI Legislature (1994-1997) revealed that PRI legislators considered 
the oversight and control of the executive branch as the least important motivation behind their actions.  
PRI deputies gave a score of 2.4 to the motivation: to oversee and control the executive branch, where 1 






Evidence of the lack of effective checks over executive agencies during the PRI 
era is found in the Chamber of Deputies‘ investigative committees. It was not until the 
constitutional reform of 1977 that Congress was empowered to create special committees 
to investigate wrongdoings of decentralized agencies and state-owned enterprises.
4
 
However, the PRI majorities in Congress either blocked the opposition‘s efforts to form 
investigative committees or minimized the impact of the committees‘ final reports.  
According to Ugalde (2000), between 1979 and 1996, opposition legislators tried to form 
eight investigative committees. PRI legislators impeded the formation of five of these 
committees, and while three were ultimately created, only one produced sanctions on 
public servants (Ugalde 2000: 66-91; 158-159).   
Furthermore, congressional oversight of public expenditures was not effective 
during the PRI era.  Even deputies themselves during this period recognized that the 
results of congressional oversight were either poor or average (see Ugalde 2000: 162-
163). Ugalde also reports that the Contraloría Mayor de Hacienda, which was the 
auditing agency that helped the Chamber of Deputies to carry out the supervision of 
government spending, had a poor record of performance between 1972 and 1988.  
Although the Contraloría found 17 thousand irregularities in this period, there were only 
257 sanctions (1.5 percent) on public servants that committed illegal actions (Ugalde 
2000: 47).
5
  Additional evidence that Congress decided not to use its control powers is 
                                                 
4
 Yet the constitutional amendment (article 93) did not grant legislators the authority to investigate the 
government‘s central sector, which is made up mainly of the secretarías de estado (executive ministries). 
5
 Another factor that hindered effective legislative oversight over the bureaucracy is that the congressional 
sessions were very short. Until 1986, the legislative session only lasted four months (from September to 
December). The limited time to perform congressional activities was a fact that took away political power 





the fact that legislators did not impeach any cabinet member despite numerous cases of 
unlawful actions by top-level officials. The constitution grants Congress the power to 
start the impeachment of public servants who committed acts against the public interest 
(article 110).  Although Congress has ample discretion to determine what constitutes a 
bureaucrat‘s action against the public interest, to date, Congress has not sanctioned any 
public official since 1946 (Casar 2002: 132).
6
 Congress‘ reluctance to use its control 
powers allowed the bureaucracy to implement public policies and programs with ample 
leeway.   
The balance of power between the legislative and executive branches started to 
change, however, when the PRI lost its absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 
1997.  Due to the PRI‘s inability to approve constitutional and secondary laws by itself, 
the party and its president were forced to negotiate the passing of several bills with the 
opposition (see Table 3.2 below).  Consequently, the PRI was forced to include some of 
the opposition‘s demands in government policies and accept the establishment of 
bureaucratic constraints and checks in the drafting of new laws.  Similarly, since 1997 
opposition legislators have been able to have more of their own bills enacted and political 
parties in Congress can now either block the president‘s bills or modify them 
substantially. In terms of oversight, the emergence of divided government has made it 
more difficult for the president‘s party to impede the formation of investigative 
committees.  Moreover, the old Contraloría was dissolved and a new auditing institution 
                                                                                                                                                 
Currently, there are two congressional sessions; the first one runs from September 1
st
 to December 15 (or 
December 31 when a new president takes office), and the second one takes place from February 1
st
 to April 
30 (Articles 65 and 66 of the Mexican constitution).      
6
 Article 110 establishes that the sanctions are the dismissal and the prohibition to work in any position of 





(Auditoría Superior de la Federación) with more supervision power was created. Also 
since 1997, the executive branch has faced more legislative controls and its discretion to 
carry out policies has diminished, at least in formal terms.  
In sum, the establishment of a democratic regime produced a change in the 
balance of power between bureaucrats and legislators, at least in terms of the number of 
bills approved by members of Congress vis-à-vis the president.  The bureaucratic 
autonomy approach cannot explain this new configuration of power since this framework 
claims that members of Congress have marginal influence on the policymaking process.  
If the bureaucratic autonomy approach cannot account for the relationship between 
bureaucrats and legislators in the democratic era, can legislative dominance theories 
better explain this dynamic?                   
 
APPLYING THE LEGISLATIVE DOMINANCE APPROACH TO MEXICO‘S RECENT DEMOCRACY 
Rational choice institutionalist scholars claim that the legislative dominance 
approach can be generalized and applied across a wide array of political systems, 
regardless of their constitutional structure (e.g. Huber and Shipan 2002: 10).  If this were 
the case, bureaucratic officials would face significant and increasing constraints given 
that the hypothesized conditions for stricter legislative control of the bureaucracy have 
been continuously present in Mexico at least since 2000.    
If, for example, Huber and Shipan‘s framework—which synthesizes previous 





explanatory factors (policy conflict, bargaining environment and legislative capacity)
7
 
were either insignificant or did not exist in Mexico during the PRI era, but have appeared 
with democratization. Therefore, this approach predicts that there is now a significantly 
higher level of legislative control over the bureaucracy. 
Democratization in Mexico activated the variables that, according to 
institutionalists, should reduce bureaucratic discretion.  The emergence of policy conflict, 
for instance, has increased the motivation for legislators to hold bureaucrats accountable. 
Legislative studies usually associate policy conflict between Congress and the executive 
branch with the existence of divided government.  The logic is that when the legislature is 
controlled by one party and the executive branch by another, the preferences and policy 
goals of executive agencies and Congress tend to differ to a greater extent than when just 
one party is in control of both branches (Huber and Shipan 2002; similar Sundquist 1988; 
Cox and Kernel 1991; Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999).   
The absence of divided government in Mexico from 1929 to 1997 suggests that 
policy conflict between Congress and the president was low. The legislative data 
available from the PRI era shows that once the president introduced a bill in Congress it 
was very likely to be enacted (see Table 3.1 above).  Table 3.2 illustrates, however, how 
the initiation and approval rates gradually changed during the process of democratization 
                                                 
7
 The fourth factor mentioned by Huber and Shipan, non-statutory factors, is not as powerful in Mexico as 
in other developed countries.  For instance, the Mexican Congress has no veto power over agencies‘ 
internal regulations.  When legislators consider that an agency‘s internal rule (reglamento) is in conflict 
with a law enacted by Congress they submit a constitutional controversy to the Supreme Court.  
Accordingly, the Court rules whether the internal regulation is, in fact, exceeding the limits or violating the 
federal law.  But, although the Supreme Court can act as a non-statutory institution that might constrain 
bureaucratic leeway, members of Congress do not rely on the Court –at least in the first place- to get the 
policies they want.  It seems that submitting a constitutional controversy is the legislators‘ last option in 





that occurred between 1997 and 2006. The emergence of divided government in 1997 
represented a shift of power between the executive and legislative branches, at least in 
terms of the number of executive bills approved by Congress. By 2006, for example, only 
4 percent of the approved bills in the Chamber of Deputies were initiated by the 
president, while 86 percent of the bills passed were deputy-sponsored. Moreover, the 
emergence of divided government in the democratic period has made the approval of the 
executive agenda more difficult.  Structural reforms such as the transformation of the oil 
industry or fiscal reform, for example, were stalled in Congress for years until their recent 
approval during the Calderón administration. Congressional gridlock in key legislation 
indicates that the level of policy conflict between the president and Congress has 











                                                 
8
 It is important to mention that until the LIX Legislature (2003-2006), the chance of a presidential bill 
finding approval did not diminish much.  In the LII Legislature (1982-1985), for instance, 151 out of 155 
presidential bills (or 97.4 percent) were approved. During the LVIII Legislature (2000-2003) the 
president‘s approval rate was 91.9 percent.  This was due, in part, to ―anticipated reaction‖:  Presidents only 
introduced bills that (based on prior negotiation) had a high chance of finding approval. It seems that this 
pattern changed since 2003 due to the fact that the president‘s approval rate decreased to 58.3 percent 




























































Total 705 215 1343 355 2891 563 
 
Source:  Based on Casar (2001); Weldon (2003, 2004); and 
http://sitl.diputados.gob.mx/LIX_Legisltura/CONCENTRADO%20INICIATIVAS.pdf 
* The number between parentheses indicates the percentage of approved bills. 
 
Whether divided government occurs in unicameral or bicameral systems also has 
an effect on the level of bureaucratic discretion allowed in laws (Clarke 1998; Huber and 
Shipan 2002). In a bicameral system, two legislative chambers must pass initiatives 
before bills receive the required consent of the executive branch. In this setting, if the 
president‘s party controls one of the chambers (i.e. the legislature is divided) she may 
block opposition attempts to reduce bureaucratic discretion. In contrast, when the 
opposition has the majority in both legislative chambers (i.e. when there is a unified 
legislature) it would be easier to rein in public servants. Hence, given divided 
government, it is harder to constrain bureaucrats‘ discretion with a divided legislature 









 In some ways, this rational choice institutionalist argument applies to the 
Mexican case. Divided government has been the norm in Mexico since 1997.  
Nevertheless, up until now the legislature has only been divided during one legislative 
term (1997-2000). During this period, the PRI still had an ample majority in the Senate 
but did not win a plurality in the lower chamber.  President Zedillo used his PRI majority 
in the Senate to block important initiatives, such as the opposition‘s efforts to decrease 
the rate of the value-added tax (Weldon 2004: 145). Thus, even though the process of 
democratization produced the first divided government in the post-revolutionary era, the 
fact that the legislature was divided helped the PRI to maintain the status quo in 
important economic and political areas. In contrast, the president‘s party has not had 
control of either chamber of Congress since 2000. This political context has allowed 
opposition parties to enact laws that, in principle, limit the policies of the president and 
his agencies.  Divided governments with unified legislatures, then, have increased the 
level of policy conflict between Congress and the president.                   
Legislators‘ technical knowledge also affects the level of control over the 
bureaucracy.  The legislative branch in Mexico never developed a high level of expertise 
during the PRI era because Congress had a limited role in proposing and passing bills.  
Given that the president was the main sponsor of bills, legislators did not need to become 
                                                 
9
 In the words of Huber and Shipan: ―A unified government will produce fewer constraints, divided 
government with a divided legislature will produce more constraints, and divided government with a 





experts on policies or obtain the assistance of professional bodies to discharge their 
congressional duties. Nevertheless, when the PRI started to lose control of Congress, 
legislators began to create research centers within the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate that provide technical support to committees and lawmakers (see Table 3.3).    
 
Table 3.3: Legislative Research Centers 
Research Center Year of Foundation Number of 
Analysts 
 





Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas 1997 40 
Centro de Estudios de Derecho e Investigación 
Parlamentaria 
1999 18 
Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública 1999 21 
Servicios de Investigación y Análisis 2000 8 
Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable 
y la Soberanía Alimentaria 
2004 26 
Centro de Estudios para el Adelanto de las Mujeres y 
Equidad de Género 
2005 16 
 
Source:  Data taken from the www.camaradediputados.gob.mx and http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx 
 
The amount of money allocated to these research centers, and to legislative 
assistance in general, has significantly increased during the last decade. In 2001, for 
instance, the Chamber of Deputies allotted 94.7 million dollars to oversight activities.  By 





million to pay for personal advisors and legislative staff.  Likewise, the lower chamber 
allocated 2 million dollars to contract external institutions to carry out specialized studies 
for their committees. In addition, each one of the 500 deputies is given roughly 49 
thousand dollars per year to spend on legislative assistance (Pensamiento 2007a).
10
  
The adoption of the civil service system in both chambers of Congress has also 
strengthened legislators‘ technical capacity.  In 2000, the Chamber of Deputies approved 
the creation of a civil service system for the administrative and legislative staff, and the 
Senate implemented its own civil service system in 2005. Although the Mexican 
Congress has not reached the level of professionalization that developed country 
legislatures have attained, the creation of research centers and the establishment of civil 
service systems are considered to be two important steps in increasing its technical 
capacity.  
In sum, the PRI defeat in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997 and the PAN‘s 
electoral success in the 2000 presidential election modified the relational dynamic 
between Congress and the executive branch.  In other words, democratization seems to 
have activated the variables that, according to institutionalist scholars, should reduce 
bureaucratic discretion, but that were not present during the PRI era.  Democratization, 
then, has allowed for the emergence of divided government, which intensified the level of 
policy conflict between Congress and the president.  Furthermore, divided governments 
with unified legislatures have allowed legislators to enact laws that seem to give them 
greater control over the bureaucracy.  In the same vein, competitive democratic elections 
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 In 2007, deputies spent 52.8 thousand dollars per year on legislative assistance. In addition, legislators 





have produced a plural party composition of Congress that has increased the level of 
legislative capacity.   
If, according to Huber and Shipan‘s theory, divided governments with unified 
legislatures—combined with a high level of legislative capacity—produce low-discretion 
legislation and, consequently, greater legislative control of bureaucracy, public officials 
under democratic rule should be more constrained, given that the above factors have been 
continuously present at least since 2000. In the next section, I assess whether the 
expected effects of democratization on bureaucratic behavior have occurred in Mexico by 
analyzing one of the most important congressional mechanisms of legislative oversight: 






 As part of the political reform of 1977, article 93 of the Mexican constitution was 
amended to give Congress the authority to form investigative committees that can probe 
the mismanagement or wrongdoings of decentralized agencies and public enterprises.  In 
order to form an investigative committee, the constitution requires that either half of the 
members of the Senate or one-fourth of deputies request the committee‘s formation.  The 
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 Other oversight mechanisms considered in the Mexican constitution are: the legislative veto; the 
president‘s obligation to submit an annual report (informe presidencial) to Congress; the cabinet ministers‘ 
obligation to annually report to Congress on the state of the respective agencies; the Congress‘ power to 
summon ministers and other public officials whenever their knowledge and information are necessary or 
useful for legislative activities; the Congress‘ power to require information from government agencies, the 
Congress‘ approval of the revenue bill; the Chamber of Deputies‘ approval of the annual budget and the 
public account; the Senate‘s confirmation of certain public officials such as the General Attorney; and the 





duration of the investigative committee is transitory and the results of the investigation 
should be sent to the president. As mentioned earlier, during the PRI era it was very hard 
for opposition legislators to form an investigative committee since the PRI used its 
majority in Congress to block any effort to create one.
12
 Consequently, between 1977 and 
1996 just three investigative committees were formed in the Chamber of Deputies, only 
one of which produced sanctions on public officials. Since the PRI lost the absolute 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997, however, the number of investigative 
committees has significantly increased.  The LVII Legislature (1997-2000) alone formed 
twice as many investigative committees as had been created in the previous nineteen 
years. Between 1997 and 2006, a total of 13 investigative committees were created by 
deputies from all political parties, with no single party having the majority of committee 
members (see Table 3.4).  In contrast to the investigative committees formed during the 
PRI era, since 1997 there has not been a single political party that has controlled and 
approved by itself the agenda and final reports of the investigative committees.  
Although investigative committees are required to prepare a final report based on 
their activities, there are only seven available in the Gaceta Parlamentaria, the official 
register of the Chamber of Deputies‘ bills and resolutions.
13
 While the unavailability of 
final reports hindered the assessment of the efficacy of the investigative committees, it 
was possible to determine whether the creation of investigative committees led to either 
the imposition of sanctions on public officials or to a modification of the public policy by 
                                                 
12
 In the case of the Senate it was practically impossible to form an investigative committee given that the 
PRI had almost 100 percent of the seats until 1988. 
13






analyzing information in newspapers, special reports, and other legislative documents 
found in the Gaceta Parlamentaria. As Table 3.4 shows, only three out of thirteen 
investigative committees (or 23 percent) proposed sanctions or required changes to public 
programs. Two of the investigative committees that imposed sanctions or demanded 
modifications of policies were formed during the LVII Legislature (1997-2000), when the 
PRI controlled the executive branch but did not command a majority of seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies. The other committee that produced a change in a government 
policy was formed during the LIX Legislature (2003-2006) when Vicente Fox headed the 
executive branch. Hence, although more investigative committees have been formed 
since the emergence of divided government, the effectiveness of those committees has 
not significantly improved under democracy.  This fact suggests that the legislature is far 
from establishing dominance over the bureaucracy, contrary to rational choice 
institutionalist claims.   
In the next section, I examine one ―most-likely case‖ for congressional oversight.  
This case shows that although members of the investigative committee wanted to punish 
public officials, the committee‘s final report did not result in sanctions or modifications 
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 In 1995 the federal government announced a plan to build a salt evaporation plant in a protected area in Baja California. The construction of the plant 
would be carried out by Exportadora de Sal, a state-owned company.  Since the announcement of the salt plant, Mexican and international 
environmental NGOs protested against the project. Scientists, intellectuals, and artists around the world also made statements in The New York Times 
and other media against the building of the salt plant. The investigative committee functioned until 1998 when plans to build the plant were halted due 
to pressure by the NGOs. President Zedillo announced the cancellation of the project on March 2, 2000, before the investigative committee made its 
final report (probably this is the reason of why there is no final report in the Gaceta Parlamentaria). Since the pressure of the Mexican and international 
NGOs was decisive for the cancellation of the project it cannot be claimed that the investigative committee was responsible for President Zedillo‘s 
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 In its final report, the investigative committee made multiple recommendations to the IPAB and asked the next Legislature to conduct further 
investigations.  Regarding the irregularities found in IPAB‘s functioning, the committee ambiguously stated that IPAB should sanction those responsible 
for violating financial laws.  For its part, the PRD was the only party that asked for the specific sanctioning of public officials; these bureaucrats, 
however, were not sanctioned.   
16
 The final report of this investigative committee is not available in the Gaceta Parlamentaria, but a report of a Research Center of the Chamber of 
Deputies states that it exists (see Gamboa 2006: 32-33).  
17
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 The committee only made recommendations to PEMEX and SEMARNAT, and did not establish sanctions for the violation of environmental laws. 
19
 In fact, this was the deputies‘ third effort to investigate the IPAB. During the previous Legislature (2000-2003), the supervisory committee created a 
subcommittee to continue the investigations of the IPAB.  For its part, the Senate formed another investigative committee with the same purpose during 
the LIX Legislature (2003-2006).   
20
 The final report of this investigative committee is not available in the Gaceta Parlamentaria, but a report of a Research Center of the Chamber of 
Deputies states that the report was presented to the Junta de Coordinación Política (see Gamboa 2006: 51-52). 
21
 See in the Gaceta Parlamentaria ―Punto de acuerdo, por el que se exhorta a la comisión de ciencia y tecnología de esta soberanía a integrar un grupo 
de trabajo encargado de revisar las actividades del IMPI, a cargo del diputado José Alfonso Suárez del Real y Aguilera, del grupo parlamentaria del 





THE BRIBIESCA BROTHERS’ INFLUENCE-PEDDLING CASE 
On April 28, 2005 one hundred and sixty five deputies requested the formation of 
an investigative committee before the Junta de Coordinación Política (JCP)—the 
legislative body that proposes the formation of legislative committees.
22
 The objective of 
this committee was to investigate the possible influence-peddling of President Fox‘s 
stepsons, Manuel and Jorge Bribiesca. Based on accusations in journalistic books and 
reports (e.g. Hernández and Quintero 2005; Wornat 2005), deputies alleged that the 
president‘s stepsons used their stepfather and mother‘s positions to obtain contracts worth 
millions of dollars with decentralized agencies and state-owned companies through 
Construcciones Prácticas, a construction company. While the official owner of 
Construcciones Prácticas was Miguel Khoury, deputies claimed that Manuel Bribiesca 
was the true proprietor who used Khoury as a cover.
23
 Several journalists asserted that 
Manuel Bribiesca took advantage of his privileged position to obtain government housing 
credits and construction licenses, among other perks.
24
 Additionally, the Bribiesca 
brothers were accused of acting as brokers between entrepreneurial groups and executive 
agencies (Wornat 2005).  
The Bribiesca Brothers scandal is a ―most-likely case‖ for effective congressional 
oversight because opposition legislators had at least two political incentives to sanction 
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 The Junta de Coordinación Política is formed by each one of the party leaders in the Chamber of 
Deputies.  Among other functions, the JCP promotes agreements on the content of bills and resolutions.   
23
 Khoury acknowledged that Manuel Bribiesca was his partner, but in other companies (Jiménez 2006).  
24
 Among other accusations, deputies affirmed that Construcciones Prácticas bought 1,700 houses from the 
Institute for the Protection of Banking Savings (IPAB), which is the government institution that, among 
other functions, takes charge of the management and financial administration of debt derived from Support 
Programs for Bank Savers and Debtors. Construcciones Prácticas, deputies affirmed, paid 600 thousand 





Fox‘s stepsons and the public officials involved in this case.
25
 First, Fox was a lame duck 
president at that point, as he was in his fifth year of office when the accusations began.  
Fox had already lost political influence on the Chamber of Deputies, given that the PAN 
lost an important number of seats in the 2003 midterm elections.
26
 This setback reflected 
people‘s disenchantment with the way in which Fox was running the government, 
especially the economy (Jaime 2004: 36). The electoral defeat in Congress also lowered 
President Fox‘s chances to advance his political and economic agenda.  Furthermore, his 
lack of political leadership to reach agreements with Congress had provoked multiple 
criticisms among analysts and the citizenry in general (Reforma, November 30, 2006).  
Opposition parties also disapproved of Fox‘s open confrontations with lawmakers (del 
Valle 2006). A noteworthy dispute between the executive and legislative branches 
occurred in 2005 when President Fox submitted a constitutional challenge to the Supreme 
Court arguing that the executive branch had authority to veto certain items of the 2005 
federal budget. The antagonism between the executive and legislative branches grew in 
May 2005 when the Supreme Court ruled that the president could veto the budget.  In 
sum, given Fox‘s enmity with Congress and the fact that he was a lame duck president, 
the Bribiesca brothers‘ case provided a great opportunity for opposition legislators to 
embarrass the president by imposing sanctions on his stepsons and the public servants 
involved in the scandal.  In the same vein, this case gave deputies the perfect occasion to 
diminish the PAN‘s chances in the 2006 presidential election.   
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 A ‗most-likely case‘ is defined as ―a case that is strongly expected to conform to the prediction of 
particular theory‖ (Seawright and Collier 2004: 297).  
26
 In 2000 the PAN won 207 seats out of 500 in the Chamber of Deputies.  In the 2003 midterm elections 





Second, the Bribiesca influence-peddling case provided the perfect occasion for 
the Chamber of Deputies to punish the abuse of power that panistas promised to 
eliminate. Abuses of power were rampant during the Fox years.  In 2001, for instance, the 
―toallagate‖ was a famous scandal that involved Fox‘s wife, Marta Sahagún.  In this case, 
the press revealed that over one million dollars was spent on the remodeling of Fox and 
Sahagún‘s log cabin at Los Pinos, the presidential residence.
27
 Although some public 
officials involved in the scandal quit, none of them were severely sanctioned (Aguirre 
2007).  Sahagún was also accused of committing other acts of corruption. In 2004, for 
instance, it was revealed that the director of ―Lotería Nacional‖ (National Lottery- federal 
government agency) made donations to the Vamos México Foundation, a non-profit 
organization headed by Sahagún.  When donations were publicized, the Lotería Nacional 
director was removed from her position, but neither she nor any other official was 
sanctioned (Pantin 2007).
28
  In addition to accusations of abuse of power and corruption, 
politicians—including some panistas—disliked Marta Sahagún for her interference in 
politics, and for her presidential ambitions in particular.  In fact, politicians from diverse 
parties thought that Sahagún caused instability in the Fox government given that she used 
to make political decisions (La Jornada, July 6, 2004).  In this context, it was expected 
that the congressional investigation of the Bribiesca brothers would punish the abuse of 
power and end Sahagún‘s presidential aspirations.                    
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 The name of the scandal, ―toallagate‖, is due to the fact that the press revealed that approximately 400 
dollars were spent on towels for the presidential log cabin.   
28





THREE INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEES: INEFFICIENT RESULTS 
On June 21, 2005 the legislative committee to investigate Construcciones 
Prácticas was approved and formally established just seven days later. The investigative 
committee consisted of twelve deputies from six political parties in Congress.
29
 PAN 
deputies, however, did not participate in the investigation, despite attending the 
committee meetings (Merlos 2005).  The committee had a mandate to function until 
December 31, 2005.  After several meetings, however, committee members asked for an 
extension to continue the investigation. On October 25, 2005 the JCP decided to extend 
the duration of the committee until the end of the Legislature (August 31, 2006).  The 
JCP reversed its position, however, on December 13, 2005 and proposed that the 
committee finish its activities by the original deadline.
30
  The proposal was approved by 
the floor due to the abstention of the PRI deputies, who at that time formed the biggest 
grouping in the Chamber of Deputies.
31
   
Deputies from the investigative committee requested information from 114 
different agencies (executive, state, decentralized, and state-owned enterprises). Members 
of Congress also asked six top-level officials to appear before the committee to explain 
the agencies‘ relationship with Construcciones Prácticas and to answer other questions. In 
order to analyze and synthesize the myriad of government information related to the 
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 The investigative committee was comprised of four members of the PRI; three PAN deputies; and two 
deputies from the PRD (including the chair of the committee). PVEM, PT and Convergencia had one 
member each on the committee.   
30
 According to the chair of the investigative committee, a PRI deputy and committee member, Wintilo 
Vega, made a deal with President Fox‘s wife, Marta Sahagún, and the PAN. The deal consisted of giving 
Vega political support for his gubernatorial candidacy for the Guanajuato governorship in exchange for 
reducing the duration of the investigative committee (Escalante 2006).   
31
 In fact, there were more deputies that abstained and did not vote for the JCP proposal than those that 
approved it. The roll call votes were as follows:  125 votes in favor, 119 against, and 158 abstentions (see 





investigation, the investigative committee hired an external consultancy.  However, the 
JCP only paid 18 thousand dollars out of the 38 thousand that the consultancy charged for 
its services.  The PRD, which was the political party most interested in punishing Fox‘s 
stepsons and the officials involved in this case, paid the rest.      
Before the committee released its final report, President Fox publicly stated that 
the committee was politically biased and that neither his family nor any public official 
had ever transgressed the law (Reforma, January 24, 2006). In its final report, the 
committee stated that two agencies of the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Tax 
Administration Service and Banking and Securities Commission) and the Secretaría de la 
Función Pública (SFP)
32
 did not provide the information required.  Given this limitation, 
and the fact that the members of the investigative committee did not have enough time to 
complete the investigation of the case, the committee proposed that the president, the 
Auditoría Superior de la Federación (ASF),
33
 and Congress should either initiate or 
continue specific investigations on certain government agencies to resolve the case.  
Moreover, the committee demanded that the president, through the SFP, present charges 
against public officials that either lied or refused to provide information as required by 
the deputies (see Informe de la Comisión de Investigación, Gaceta Parlamentaria, 
February 3, 2006). 
The committee‘s final report was sent to President Fox on February 1, 2006. Two 
days later, President Fox sent the report to the SFP to continue the investigation.  In order 
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 This executive agency supervises and sanctions the administrative procedures and processes of the 
central public administration.  
33
 The Auditoría Superior de la Federación is the technical body that helps the Chamber of Deputies with 





to guarantee independence, the ministry delegated the investigation and related audits to 
private firms.  On February 16, a second investigative committee was created to continue 
the inquiry on the influence-peddling case.
34
 Paradoxically, PRI members—who months 
earlier abstained from voting on the extension of the committee‘s investigation until the 
end of the Legislature— promoted the creation of the second investigative committee.   
The new committee asked the heads of the Institute for the Protection of Banking 
Savings (IPAB), SFP and the Procuraduría General de la República (PGR)
35
 to appear 
before the investigative committee. On April 6, members of the investigative committee 
presented charges at the PGR offices against Manuel and Jorge Bribiesca, their partners, 
and IPAB officials for irregularities in the auction of properties in diverse regions of the 
country.  On this occasion, deputies argued that the IPAB, which is an executive agency, 
sold Construcciones Prácticas housing complexes for 800 thousand dollars when, 
according to an external valuation, their real value was about100 million dollars (Velasco 
2006; Estrop and Barajas 2006).    
In response to these charges, Manuel Bribiesca claimed that the investigative 
committee violated his constitutional rights since article 93 of the constitution authorizes 
deputies to investigate decentralized agencies and state-owned enterprises, but not 
individuals.  The Bribiescas subsequently sought court protection from the related 
accusations, charges and legislative inquiries.  After several failed attempts, on May 26 a 
federal court provided protection to Manuel Bribiesca, and ordered the provisional 
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 In this case, a deputy from Convergencia was the chair of the committee.  The rest of the committee was 
formed by 4 PRI members, 3 panistas, 2 from the PRD, and one each from the PVEM and PT.  The JFC 
approved that the investigative committee should finish its investigation by July 30, 2006.    
35






suspension of the SFP and the investigative committee‘s inquiries.  Notwithstanding, a 
higher court revoked the protection and the court orders regarding the inquiry four days 
later.  The chair of the committee, Jesús González Schmal, accused the president‘s wife, 
Marta Sahagún, of allowing her sons to commit illicit activities. For her part, Sahagún 
repeatedly told the press that the committee did not have any evidence of her sons‘ 
alleged illicit activities.  In response, deputy Sofía Castro (PRI), another member of the 
committee, stated:  ―If we do not have evidence, why have they asked for protection of 
the PGR, why does their friend (the Attorney General) Cabeza de Vaca not act according 
to the rule of law, why have they not won a single legal process if they have evidence to 
prove their innocence?‖ (Estrop 2006).  
The second investigative committee‘s final report presented advances in the 
inquiry but stopped short of making any final conclusions, since it stated that the next 
legislature should form another committee to continue the investigation.  An important 
development based on the committee‘s preliminary findings, however, was that deputies 
accused the general auditor of the ASF of covering up the illicit dealings between 
Construcciones Prácticas and other executive agencies.  The auditor denied the 
accusation (Barajas 2006), and on September 15, the SFP announced that—based on the 
documents that it received from the investigative committee—it did not find any evidence 
of illicit acts in the twenty eight audits that were conducted on government agencies that 





other executive agencies likewise decided that there was not enough evidence to imprison 
the Bribiescas or any other top-level bureaucrat.
36
 
A third investigative committee was formed on April 25, 2007, during the LX 
Legislature (2006-2009).  Just before the creation of this new committee, the Bribiesca 
brothers submitted another request for judicial protection from the actions and inquiries 
of the two past investigative committees. This time, a federal court granted their request 
on June 10.  Although the court ruling was definitive, it did not include the findings and 
actions of the third investigative committee. While the committee continued its 
investigations, it too was unable to indict the Bribiesca brothers or any other public 
servant.   In fact, the chair of the third investigative committee claimed that it was useless 
to present charges against public officials that had dealings with the president‘s stepsons 
since the PGR deliberately did not exert its authority (Salazar 2008).  The third 
committee presented its final report in September 2008.  The report was similar to the 
previous ones, in that it asked the president to sanction the IPAB officials who allowed 
for the sale of the housing complexes at very low prices (Salazar and Estrop 2008).  No 
public official, however, has ever been indicted.  
In sum, deputies created three investigative committees that worked during thirty-
two months. The committees‘ final reports, according to legislators, contain documents 
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 The INFONAVIT, a government agency in charge of giving housing credits, acknowledged that since 
2003 Construcciones Prácticas has been registered as a company that offers houses to INFONAVIT 
beneficiaries. Furthermore, the agency admitted that it gave credits for the acquisition of 91 houses built by 
Construcciones Prácticas. This company received 2.1 million dollars for the houses. The INFONAVIT, 
however, stated that there was not any illegal action in this transaction (see Chamber of Deputies Nota No. 








that prove that the Bribiescas, along with certain public officials, were guilty of 
influence- peddling and other illicit activities.  The results of the first two committees led 
to further investigations conducted by the ASF, the SFP, and other government agencies.  
In the end, the investigations conducted by these government agencies absolved the 
public officials who allegedly committed illegal activities.  Despite their efforts, deputies 
were unable to indict either the Bribiesca brothers or any public official since the 
government authorities believed that not enough evidence was provided.  
Why were investigative committees unable to indict any public official involved 
in the case? Opposition deputies made at least two mistakes during the investigation of 
the case. First, legislators based their accusations on statements of journalistic reports and 
books without verifying whether such statements were true.
38
 Second, and most 
important, there was no unanimous opposition support throughout the investigation.  As 
mentioned above, PRI deputies, who accounted for the biggest grouping in the Chamber 
of Deputies, changed their position on the case during the investigation. In the beginning, 
priístas gave support to the investigative committee, but several months later they 
abstained and allowed the Junta de Coordinación Política to finish the committee work 
earlier. Similarly, opposition party leaders did not strongly support the committee‘s 
results and failed to press authorities to take actions against those bureaucrats responsible 
for the illicit acts.  While it is unclear why priistas and other opposition party leaders 
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 For instance, based on Wornat (2005) deputies accused President Fox of giving the 2003 National 






changed their position, it is clear that their actions caused the investigative committee to 
lose legitimacy and credibility. 
 Furthermore, it seems that government authorities were neither willing to conduct 
in-depth investigations nor sanction public officials implicated in the case. Although the 
investigative committees presented documents that showed irregularities in the operation 
of Construcciones Prácticas, executive agencies did not punish any bureaucrat. The most 
representative case is the IPAB‘s auction of the housing complexes.  Despite the fact that 
legislators were able to prove that the complexes were worth much more money than 
what was paid for by Construcciones Prácticas, authorities decided that there was no 
illicit activity involved in the transaction. In sum, deputies‘ mistakes, along with federal 
authorities‘ unwillingness to sanction public officials, impeded the successful resolution 




  Mexico‘s democratization did have an impact on the bureaucratic-legislative 
relationship. Although the bureaucratic autonomy approach is useful to explain Congress‘ 
subordination to the executive branch under the PRI era, it cannot account for lawmakers‘ 
new power in contemporary Mexico.  In contrast, legislative dominance theories are able 
to explain the emergence of congressional influence since 1990s. Applying this approach 
to the Mexican case, it can be argued that democracy brought about new political 





legislative professionalization) that did not exist in the PRI era.  These factors have given 
more power to Congress vis-á-vis the executive branch. The chapter illustrated this 
change by showing how such institutional factors and political contexts allowed deputies 
to become the main sponsors of bills as the process of democratization advanced. At the 
same time, the president‘s influence weakened as the number of executive bills debated 
in the Chamber of Deputies significantly declined after the PRI lost its majority in 1997.        
The chapter also assessed whether the legislative dominance approach can explain 
one specific oversight mechanism.  Specifically, the chapter analyzed the effectiveness of 
the Chamber of Deputies‘ investigative committees.  Since opposition parties reached a 
majority in the lower chamber, it has been much easier to create investigative 
committees. Consequently, since 1997 more committees were created by opposition 
parties than had been created in the previous twenty years.  The increase in the number of 
investigative committees is in accordance with the theoretical expectations of the 
legislative dominance approach. The poor results of the investigative committees, 
however, cannot be accounted for by legislative dominance theories. That is, this 
approach would predict greater efficacy to indict public officials that commit 
wrongdoings since most of the conditions for bureaucratic control have existed in Mexico 
since 1997.  However, the deficient results of investigative committees show that 
institutional factors and political contexts are necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
the effective control of the bureaucracy.           
The case of Vicente Fox‘s stepsons shows that, even when the investigative 





very interested nor gave their full support to the investigation. Similarly, even when it 
seems that there was enough evidence to indict the Bribiesca brothers and public officials 
with whom they had dealings; government authorities were unwilling to punish these 
actors.  Hence, in the case of the investigative committees, while legislators have the 
mandate to investigate and press authorities to sanction the bureaucracy, in practice their 
effectiveness is questionable.  But what happens in the actual decision-making process?  
In the following chapters I use the mutual influence approach to assess the 
bureaucratic-legislative relationship in two specific policy areas (fiscal and public health 
policies). In contrast to the bureaucratic autonomy and legislative dominance frameworks 
that assume unilateral control from one actor over the other, the mutual influence 
approach better captures how democratization produced a ‗balance‘ in the relationship 
between officials and legislators.  In this vein, this approach explains why bureaucrats 
and legislators have means and resources to influence each other and why they are 
















CHAPTER 4:  BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 
 
 
Which theoretical approach can best explain the budget process in democratic 
Mexico? In this chapter I apply the mutual influence theory to account for budgetary 
decision-making which involves bureaucrats of the Hacienda ministry and legislators of 
the Budget and Hacienda committees. The case study documents the ample discretion 
enjoyed by bureaucrats to allocate public funds at their convenience before 1997.  The 
chapter also shows how the process of democratization allowed legislators to transform 
the rules governing the budget after the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies.  
Specifically, I examine three components of congressional oversight: the definition of 
budget terms, the financial information that the Secretaría de Hacienda makes available 
to legislators, and the rules regarding the government‘s capacity to allocate federal funds.    
The chapter is organized in four sections. The first section explains why the 
bureaucratic autonomy and the legislative dominance approaches fail to explain the 
budget process under democracy in Mexico. Section two describes how, since the late 
1990s, deputies have established diverse constraints and controls in three areas.   
Appropriations laws, for instance, required Hacienda officials to provide detailed 
quarterly reports to Congress about the country‘s economic situation. Similarly, budget 
legislation formally reduced bureaucrats‘ leeway to reallocate funds from one agency to 
another. In formal-legal terms, these modifications significantly constrained Hacienda 
officials‘ discretion in the budgetary process. But, the third section shows why, despite 





significant margin to allocate public funds. Accordingly, this section documents 
Hacienda‘s multiple transgressions to budgetary laws. Finally, the chapter explains why 
legislators tolerated bureaucratic leeway in budget operations. 
 
 
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY AND LEGISLATIVE DOMINANCE APPROACHES APPLIED TO 
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 
 
Budgets are of vital importance for countries. Through budgets, public officials 
determine, for example, which taxes to collect, how much money is spent on social 
programs, and what policies are going to be funded or cut. These decisions are discussed 
and later ratified or modified by legislators. Both actors (bureaucrats and legislators) 
want to establish policies and allocate funds that will benefit their constituents and 
interest groups that support them. In the same vein, both sides want to avoid causing 
economic burdens for some regions.  Because budgets‘ stipulations have great impact on 
the citizenry and the economy, bureaucrats and legislators enter into  intense negotiations 
about every budget item. Therefore, the budget process reflects the political struggle 
between legislators and bureaucrats.  Accordingly, the analysis of the budgetary process 
uncovers the extent to which each actor exerts influence over the other. 
The two main approaches used to explain the congressional-bureaucratic 
relationship in the U.S. and other First World countries cannot account for the budget 
process in democratic Mexico.  The bureaucratic autonomy approach might, however, 
help explain legislative submission to the executive branch in the past. For instance, 





the president introduced the appropriations bill to the Chamber of Deputies there was 
little debate and deputies‘ amendments were minor (Wilkie 1967; Weldon 1997; 2002; 
Ugalde 2000; Sour 2007). In fact, before 1982 deputies did not know the entire content of 
the revenue and appropriations bills until the secretary of Hacienda appeared before 
Congress a few days before the end of the legislative term (Hernández 1998: 344).   
According to Bailey, the budgetary processes between 1958 and 1982 were ―dominated 
by the presidency and the relevant agencies with very little participation by congress, 
other government agencies, or the public‖ (1984: 77).
1
 The executive branch‘s hegemony 
over Congress was so strong that an opposition deputy in 1984 stated that ―in terms of 
fiscal policy, everything is up to the president‘s personal judgment‖ (Hernández 1998: 
356).    
In the same vein, Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (1998) state that Congress  made no 
important modifications to the appropriations bills between 1960 and 1980.  Similarly, 
Sour (2007) asserts that between 1939 and 1996 legislators rarely changed the budget and 
never modified more than 0.1 percent of  federal expenditure.  Chávez Presa (2000) states 
that before 1996, appropriations laws allowed ample discretion to executive agencies to 
manage federal funds since public officials were not compelled to establish specific goals 
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 Bailey illustrates the great power of Hacienda over the budget during the heyday of the PRI regime by 
mentioning an anecdote of one prominent Hacienda secretary, Antonio Ortiz Mena (1958-1970).  The 
anecdote describes how Ortiz Mena prepared all of the budget parameters (income, expenditure by sectors, 
borrowing requirements, etc.) and did not divulge them until the annual budget presentation to Congress 





for many public programs.
2
   Weldon (2002: 393) describes the budgetary process before 
1997 as follows: 
 
What we observe is that, most of the time, the Chamber of Deputies has usually 
acted as if it had totally abdicated its authority over the budget to the executive 
branch.  Only minor changes are made in committee, always with the approval of 
Hacienda… The Chamber of Deputies appears to give the budget only a cursory 
look and approves the appropriations in short order.  Even in the first legislature 
of Zedillo, when both chambers of Congress modified, delayed, or froze some 
major presidential bills, the Chamber of Deputies barely touched the budget. 
 
Members of Congress did not strongly challenge the agencies‘ actions, since 
legislators‘ political careers depend, to a great extent, on the president and the PRI.  
Therefore, it can be said that before 1997 executive agencies dominated the policy arena.  
Notwithstanding, the bureaucratic autonomy approach cannot satisfactorily account for 
the Mexican case after substantial modifications to the budget were made following the 
PRI‘s failure to reach a majority in the lower chamber in 1997.  Since then, deputies have 
made important changes to the president‘s appropriations bill (see figure 4.1).  
Lawmakers have significantly redistributed federal resources channeled to public 
programs and agencies (Ugalde 2000; Sour 2007).  Similarly, deputies have fought 
                                                 
2
 The most remarkable example of a program that public officials used without restraint was the ―AA 
Administración‖. This program concentrated 40 percent of the government‘s programmable expenses and 





strongly for additional resources to benefit their districts, states, population sectors and 
certain interest groups. The bureaucratic autonomy approach is unable to explain 
Congress‘ modifications to the appropriations bill since these changes negatively affect 
the agencies‘ leverage to allocate funds and implement policies at their convenience.
3
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3
 Jorge Chávez Presa, a former top-level official of the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público and chair 
of the Hacienda committee in the Chamber of Deputies in the LVIII Legislature (2000-2003), argues that 
many modifications to the appropriations bill made by deputies were not objectively and fully justified 





The legislative dominance approach does not completely account for the 
bureaucratic-legislative relationship in the fiscal area either.  If this were the case, 
Hacienda‘s public officials should be significantly more constrained under democracy 
than in the PRI era.  That is, members of Congress should exert significant control over 
the allocation of federal funds given that the pertinent legislation has become stricter 
since the beginning of the process of democratization.  However, while some scholars 
consider deputies‘ influence on the budgetary process since 1997 as an example of 
effective legislative control over the executive branch (Casar 2001; Weldon 2002; Sour 
2007), empirical research does not support this conclusion. As is documented below, 
public officials—in practice—have huge leeway to implement public programs and 
reallocate funds, even after legislators have modified appropriations bills and other 
formal rules in an effort to constrain such actions by bureaucrats of executive agencies.  
In other words, there is now a huge gap between the constraints imposed on bureaucrats 
in formal rules and officials‘ effective discretion to carry out public programs. Hence, the 
legislative dominance approach, which states that bureaucrats can be reined in through 
legislation, cannot account for the congressional-bureaucratic relationship in the 
democratic era. The mutual influence theory better explains the interaction between 
public officials and legislators in the fiscal area since it describes how members of 
Congress have gained authority through the enactment of stricter laws.  At the same time, 
the theory explains how bureaucrats neutralize legislative checks by distributing 





In the next section, I will first analyze how the principal rules governing fiscal 
legislation have changed since the nineties. In particular, I analyze how the rules 
concerning financial information and the allocation of funds have become more detailed 
and strict.  I then go on to assess the divergence between those rules and their capacity to 
constrain bureaucratic behavior in practice. Overall, I show how democratization did 
have an effect on the legislation regarding the budgetary process but, at the same time, I 
explain how the transformation of legislation has been insufficient to allow legislators to 
exert significant control over the bureaucracy.  Specifically, I analyze two components of 
legislative control:  the financial information that the Secretaría de Hacienda makes 
available to legislators, and the legislation regulating the government‘s capacity to 
allocate and reallocate federal funds.
4
        
 
 
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 
The federal budget contains at least three documents:  the Ley de Ingresos 
(revenue bill), the Criterios Generales de Política Económica (a document that provides 
the economic and financial guidelines for the next fiscal year), and the appropriations (or 
budget) bill.
5
  The Ley de Ingresos and other tax laws are approved by both chambers of 
                                                 
4
 Both areas are important in the bureaucratic-legislative relation.  While Hacienda provides information to 
Congress about the finances of the country, legislation establishes the extent of authority delegated to 
bureaucrats in the distribution of federal resources.  In democracy, there should be higher constraints in 
both areas.  That is, bureaucrats should provide legislators with complete and transparent information about 
the financial state of the nation.  Similarly, officials should respect the constraints established in legislation 
regarding the allocation of resources. 
5
 With great frequency, the Ley de Ingresos is accompanied by the Miscelánea Fiscal which amends tax 





Congress.  In contrast, the Chamber of Deputies is the only body that approves the 
appropriations bill (Mexican Constitution, article 74).  I will focus my analysis mainly on 
the appropriations bill.  
As mentioned before, during the PRI era top-level bureaucrats, especially those 
middle and high-level officials of the Hacienda ministry, had ample control over the 
budgetary process.  That is, bureaucrats planned, elaborated and executed annual budgets 
with scarce influence from other political and societal actors. However, officials‘ power 
over the budget started to decrease in 1997 when the PRI did not reach the majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies which, as mentioned above, is the only chamber of Congress in 
charge of approving the appropriations bill.  Since then, executive agencies have had to 
negotiate the approval of several budget items with opposition legislators.   Subsequently, 
opposition parties have been able to introduce items that benefit them by modifying or 
changing the president‘s budget.  Given these changes, the budgetary process has become 
extremely important in the democratic era because parties have transformed the way in 
which resources are distributed. Recent appropriations laws, for instance, included 
policies that benefited societal groups and interests that were not considered in the non-
democratic period. 
As regards legislative control over public programs, democratization allowed 
members of Congress to gradually establish several constraints and limits to the way in 
which bureaucrats distribute and spend federal funds.  Opposition legislators have thus 
been able to introduce restrictions in the annual budget in an effort to control the 





with several transparency requirements and other accountability stipulations.  A way to 
observe this process is by measuring the length of the appropriations laws‘ content as 
Huber and Shipan (2002) do.  Figure 4.2 shows how the content of appropriations laws 
from 1991 to 2006 became larger, especially after 2000. The figure illustrates the length 
of each appropriations law, as measured in pages contained in the Diario Oficial de la 
Federación (DOF), the official publication for all the governmental laws, agencies‘ 
internal rules, notifications, and decrees, among other documents.  Why does the length 
of the budget‘s content matter?  In principle, the larger the appropriations law‘s content, 
the more regulations, constraints and checks bureaucrats face in the allocation of funds. 
In other words, the larger the appropriations law (in pages), the less discretion 
bureaucrats have when implementing the budget.
6
   
Accordingly, it can be observed that, from 1991 to 1999, the length of the 
appropriations laws did not exceed twenty-three pages.  In the budget of 1993, for 
instance, the entire appropriations law for the three branches of power, other 
governmental agencies, and all public programs amounted to 29.9 billion dollars. The 
disbursement of this amount was explained in only ten pages.  In 2000, the appropriations 
law‘s length increased to thirty-five pages of the DOF, and then sixty-three and 126 
pages for the 2003 and 2005 budgets respectively.  In 2006, the appropriations law added 
up to 200 billion dollars. The distribution of this amount was explained in 124 pages.  
Although the number of pages is a rough measure to assess the level of legislative control 
                                                 
6
 Huber and Shipan (2002) used a similar method in their study.  According to these scholars, the best way 
to measure discretion in legislation is by counting the number of words contained in laws.  As Huber and 
Shipan state ―[the] total number of words is inversely related to the concept of discretion; that is, as the 





over the bureaucracy, it gives a good idea of how legislators have gradually established 
more constraints on Hacienda bureaucrats in the allocation of federal funds.  
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Another way to assess how the allocation of federal funds has become stricter is 
by examining the subjects and issues that each appropriations law regulates.  
Appropriations laws are divided into titles (sections) and the latter are subdivided into 
chapters.  Each chapter contains a certain number of articles.  Titles regulate diverse 
subjects of the budget, while chapters regulate specific issues.
7
  Examples of these issues 
include the amount of money allotted to executive agencies, states, or public programs; 
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 For instance, Title IV of the 2006 appropriations law deals with Information, Transparency and 
Evaluation.  It has two chapters; the first one stipulates, in six articles, provisions about the budget 






rules of how federal funds should be distributed and spent; and procedures that agencies 
should comply with in the implementation of programs and policies.   
Between 1991 and 1994, appropriations laws included only two chapters.
8
  The 
first chapter concerned general regulations. This chapter established the aggregate 
amount of money to be spent throughout the year and the allocation of funds given to 
each executive agency and public enterprise. Additionally, other articles gave great 
budgetary power to Hacienda over other governmental agencies. Articles 10 and 13 of the 
1991 appropriations law, for instance, authorized Hacienda to evaluate the programs‘ 
outcomes and to supervise the agencies‘ spending. In a similar vein, article 11 allowed 
Hacienda to stop the delivery of funds to agencies when the latter did not comply with 
special requirements.  The second chapter established general administrative stipulations 
that bureaucrats had to follow in order to take advantage of the federal funds in an 
efficient way. Furthermore, this chapter included general guidelines to reduce 
unnecessary expenditures and maintain fiscal equilibrium.  Articles in this chapter, for 
example, prohibit agencies to create new positions, rent additional offices or vehicles, 
make donations, or hire external advisors without Hacienda‘s consent.         
Since 1995 the number of chapters in the appropriations law has gradually 
increased.  While the 1995 appropriations law included six chapters, for example, the 
1996 budget contained the double. The 1999 appropriations law contained fourteen 
chapters, and the 2000, 2002 and 2006 budgets each contained sixteen.  The maximum 
number of chapters was eighteen in 2004. In addition to the chapters on general 
                                                 
8
 Before 1996, titles were not part of the appropriations law structure.  Consequently, these laws bundled 





regulations and general administrative stipulations, appropriations laws have included 
other chapters that regulate a host of issues such as expenditures; bureaucrats‘ 
responsibilities; budgetary exercise and control; economic transfers to agencies and 
states; rules regarding public programs; additional government income, acquisitions, 
subsidies and transfers; and information and transparency (see table 4.1 below).   
In addition to the increase in chapters, the number of articles in each chapter has 
also increased significantly since 1995. What does the number of articles say about the 
allocation of a budget? The great majority of articles in the annual budget establishes 
limits, constraints, checks, procedures, stipulations, and deadlines, among other rules, 
that bureaucrats should follow in the implementation of the budget. The logic of the 
number of articles is similar to that of the number of pages: the more articles in the 
budget, the less room of maneuver officials have since each additional article establishes 
a constraint in the distribution of funds.  Figure 4.3 shows the total number of articles in 
each annual budget.
9
 As the figure illustrates, until 1995 the number of articles contained 
in the appropriations laws barely reached fifty.  From 1996 on, the number of articles 
increased significantly.  For instance, the 1998 appropriations law, the first one when the 
PRI did not have a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, included 108 articles.  The 




                                                 
9
 The figure shows the number of regular articles plus the artículos transitorios. The latter only have effect 
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Articles Transitorios    
 
The inclusion of more chapters and articles in appropriations laws increased the 
level of legislative control over the bureaucracy given that, since 1995, budgets regulate 
issues that were previously left to bureaucrats‘ discretion. Attempts to reduce 
bureaucratic leeway can be observed in several budget items.  I will focus on three 
aspects of the budgetary process: definition of budget terms, financial information, and 





DEFINITION OF BUDGET TERMS.  The clear definition of key economic concepts is 
fundamental for the precise allocation of funds and an efficient implementation of 
policies. The inaccurate definition of certain economic terms leaves room for 
bureaucratic misuse of office.  In other words, public officials could take advantage of 
ambiguous terms to interpret them at their convenience.  For instance, bureaucrats can 
interpret certain concepts in ways that justify their refusal to execute certain policies.  
Until 1994, appropriations laws and other budget legislation did not include definitions of 
any economic terms. The 1995 appropriations law was the first to include four definitions 
at the beginning of the text. Rather than explain key economic concepts that impose 
limits on bureaucratic discretion, however, these definitions simply described terms that 
would facilitate the reading of the law.
10
  While subsequent appropriations laws increased 
the number of economic concepts, it was not until 2000 that annual budgets included 
definitions of important financial terms.  Accordingly, these definitions reduced the room 
for bureaucratic interpretation.  For example, the term ―programmable spending‖ was 
defined in fraction XII in article 2 of the 2000 appropriations law.  This specific section 
listed all the types of governmental expenditures that should be considered as part of 
programmable spending.  Consequently, this definition prohibited the Secretaría de 
Hacienda y Crédito Público to include other expenditures in this item.  Other important 
terms defined in the 2000 appropriations law were priority programs, ramos 
administrativos, ramos generales, non-programmable spending, and total spending.      
                                                 
10
 For instance, section III of article 2 of the 1996 budget defined the term ―Secretaría‖ as the Secretaría de 





The number of terms defined in annual budgets increased until reaching forty-five 
in 2006.  Several financial concepts that could have diverse meanings, and could 
consequently be interpreted by bureaucrats to advance their interests, were precisely 
defined.  Examples of these terms include:  budgetary adjustment, budgetary saving, 
financial balance, efficiency in the execution of public spending, additional income, and 
transfers.   These definitions diminished bureaucrats‘ ability to interpret such concepts at 
their convenience.  
Moreover, certain definitions became more detailed over time.  The term 
―subsidies‖, for instance, first appeared in the 2003 budget where it was defined in forty- 
six words.  By 2006 legislators approved a more detailed definition (seventy-six words).   
In contrast to the 2003 definition, the 2006 term includes two types of allocations that can 
be used as subsidies:  those that aim to foster priority activities and those that are 
distributed to local and municipal governments (see table 4.2 below).  Other definitions 
that were clarified over time include: programmable spending, non-programmable 












Table 4.2: Definitions in Appropriations Laws  
2003 Appropriations Law  
Article 2, fraction XXI  
Subsidies:  
Allocations of federal funds planned in this 
budget that are distributed to different 
society actors or to states through federal 
agencies to foster the development of 
priority activities of general interest, such as 
the distribution of goods and services to 
consumers below market prices, among 
others. 
2006 Appropriations Law 
 Article 2, fraction XLIII 
Subsidies: 
Allocations of federal funds planned in 
this budget that are distributed to different 
society actors or states through federal 
agencies, or states to foster the 
development of priority activities of 
general interest, such as the distribution of 
goods and services to consumers below 
market prices, among others. Furthermore, 
subsidies are federal funds that the Federal 
Government grants to different society 
actors and to state and municipal 
governments, such as economic supports 




FINANCIAL INFORMATION.  Since the administration of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) 
appropriations laws have included an article that instructs the Secretaría de Hacienda y 
Crédito Público (hereafter Hacienda) to send quarterly financial reports to the Chamber 
of Deputies (Hernández 1998: 350).    However, it was not until the 1995 appropriations 
law (hereafter AL) that there was a specific chapter regulating the content of the financial 





reports should assess the implementation of public programs and policies according to the 
objectives and goals previously approved.  In addition, Hacienda‘s reports must include a 
study of the financial situation of the country and explanations of agencies‘ wrongdoings, 
if any.  Furthermore, it is stipulated that Hacienda‘s reports must be turned in to the 
Chamber of Deputies forty-five days, at most, after the quarter.   
Although these reports were designed as a mechanism to oversee the 
implementation of public policies, they did not represent a significant constraint on 
bureaucrats since ALs did not stipulate what type of information bureaucrats should send.  
That is, legislators failed to specify what kind of economic information (requirements, 
parameters, criteria, results) Hacienda should include in such reports.  Therefore, even 
though Hacienda bureaucrats had to deliver the financial reports, the information 
contained in them was very general and superficial.  It was not until 1997 that legislators 
started to establish specific information requirements for reports concerning ALs.  In this 
year, legislators established that, in addition to the regular assessment of the 
implementation of the budget and the evaluation of the country‘s finances, Hacienda 
should give an account of nutrition, health, and education programs.  In the 1999 AL, 
legislators were stricter by stipulating that the financial information had to be provided in 
disaggregated form. That is, Hacienda had to deliver disaggregated economic information 
by agency.  Moreover, legislators demanded that the report should describe advances 
made on the main budget programs, as well as any changes to their objectives and goals.  
 Since the PAN‘s 2000 victory in the presidential election, legislators have 





provide in each quarterly report.  Accordingly, article 79 of the 2000 AL detailed, for the 
first time, nine types of information that Hacienda bureaucrats must include in their 
reports. The number of data requested increased every year until reaching twenty in 
2006.
11
  Table 4.3 shows the most important financial information requirements that the 
2006 AL mandated Hacienda to include in their reports.   
In addition to these requirements, Hacienda reports must detail the difference 
between the amounts approved and actually expended for every single budget item (for 
instance, see the 2004 AL, article 66, section I). In addition to Hacienda‘s economic 
reports, in 2004 deputies introduced a stipulation to compel each executive agency to 
send quarterly reports to their respective legislative committees about the execution and 
results of their main public programs (2004 AL article 55, fraction IV).  In the same vein, 
deputies established that Hacienda must send an additional report regarding the 
reallocations of funds channeled to states and municipalities (2005 AL, article 73, 
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Table 4.3: Selected Information Requirements that should be included in Hacienda‘s 
Quarterly Reports  
 
      2006 Appropriations Law, Article 70 
 Advances in the implementation of the main public programs 
 Modifications to policies‘ objectives and goals 
 Government‘s income surplus and its use 
 Program  funds not used 
 Agencies‘ savings 
 Public debt payments 
 Expenditures on government‘s publicity 
 An assessment of the investment projects 
 Information about government‘s donations (provided or received) 
 An account of the federal funds allocated to states 
 Modifications to or cancellation of public program expenditures that exceed 1.5 
billion dollars  







Since 2000, another important stipulation regarding the financial information of 
ALs establishes that Hacienda bureaucrats are obliged to respond to deputies‘ inquiries 
regarding the execution of public spending within thirty days of the request‘s submission.  
Failure to provide complete, opportune and truthful information is sanctioned according 
to both the constitution and secondary laws regulating bureaucrats‘ responsibilities.
12
  
Furthermore, deputies established in the 2001 AL that the Hacienda and Budget 
committees, as well as the Chamber of Deputies‘ Financial Research Center, should have 
open, complete and permanent access to the Sistema Integral de Información de los 
Ingresos y Gasto Público, which is an information system formed by Hacienda, Secretaría 
de la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo
13
 and Banco de México that compiles all of 
the country‘s economic information.
14
  In 2002, legislators also reduced the time in which 
Hacienda should send its quarterly reports from forty-five to thirty-five days after the end 
of the three-month period.  Similarly, as of 2002 Hacienda is required to provide a report 
about the meetings of the Comisión Intersecretarial de Gasto Financiamiento, which is a 
body formed by secretaries of diverse agencies that coordinates all the policies on public 
spending and governmental financing.
15
   
                                                 
12
 Deputies have to ask for information through the Budget Committee. That is, they cannot request 
information from Hacienda by themselves. All information requests have to be processed and approved by 
the Budget Committee (2006 AL, article 69, section II). 
13
 During the Fox administration, the Secretaría de la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo changed its 
name to Secretaría de la Función Pública.  This institution is the executive agency that internally controls 
and evaluates the government‘s public spending and diverse administrative processes.   
14
 Article 75 of the 2002 AL established that the Oversight committee (comisión de vigilancia) should also 
have access to the Sistema Integral de Información de los Ingresos y Gasto Público. The 2003 AL, 
however, stipulates that the president may classify information from the system as reserved.   
15
 Until 2005, the members of this commission were the secretaries of Hacienda, Desarrollo Social, de la 
Contraloría and Comercio y Fomento Industrial (see Diario Oficial de la Federación 06/13/2000).  After 
2005, this commission merged with another commission to form the Comisión Intersecretarial de Gasto 





Moreover, the 2005 AL (article 75) required that the Auditoría Superior de la 
Federación
16
 (Federal Auditing Office, or ASF) analyze Hacienda‘s Informe de Avance 
de la Gestión Financiera (a financial report about government spending) during the first 
semester of the fiscal year.  The ASF reports to the Chamber of Deputies about the results 
of the evaluation of such reports.  In the same vein, ASF must analyze other Hacienda 
and Secretaría de la Función Pública reports regarding the implementation and execution 
of public policies and programs,
17
 including the Cuenta Pública (Public Account), which 
is the official annual record of the government‘s financial operations and accounting 
records from the previous fiscal year (Ugalde 2000: 39).     
Another important modification was that each agency must contract external 
academic institutions to evaluate the efficiency of their programs.  Such evaluations had 
to be sent to both the ASF and the Chamber of Deputies, as well as uploaded to the 
agencies‘ websites.  Legislators must then consider these studies when developing the 
next year‘s budget (2001 AL, articles 70 and 88; 2006 AL, article 55, fraction IV).  
Similarly, the 2001 AL instructed all executive agencies to upload to their websites all 
information regarding their main programs. All modifications to programs and their 
progress must also be uploaded within fifteen days of any changes.
18
  In addition, since 
                                                                                                                                                 
the commission‘s meetings.  For instance, Hacienda must report the members‘ attendance at the meetings 
and their agreements (see 2002 AL, article 74, fraction XIII).     
16
 This institution is the technical body that supports Congress in the oversight and review of government 
spending.  It is the equivalent to the General Accounting Office (GAO) in the United States.      
17
 Since 2005, in addition to the financial quarterly reports, Hacienda and the Secretaría de la Función 
Pública have to elaborate reports about the execution and implementation of public policies and programs.  
These quarterly reports are meant to assess the efficiency, costs and overall quality of the public 
administration. The ASF should analyze them (2006 AL, article 76).  
18
 Article 7 of the Transparency law enacted in June 2002 also compels executive agencies to upload to 
their websites information about their policies and programs.  Furthermore, this law obliges that these 





2002 bureaucrats have included appendixes in the budget that contain detailed financial 
information regarding the amount of federal funds that executive agencies, states and 
municipalities receive; the public programs implemented by agencies; data about the 
public debt; the bureaucrats‘ salaries by position; and the amount of money invested in 
long-term infrastructure projects, among other information. The number of appendixes 
increased from two, in the 2002 budget, to twenty-four in 2005. Last, but not less 
important, since 2001 the AL has instructed Hacienda to apply the same accounting 
methodology in all its quarterly reports in order to analyze the execution of federal funds 
throughout the fiscal year.  Hacienda is required to outline the details of this methodology 
to the Chamber of Deputies before the delivery of the first quarterly report.    
 The amount of economic data requested in the economic reports, as well as the 
legislative controls of bureaucratic behavior, has increased as the process of 
democratization has advanced (see table 4.4 for a summary). Therefore, some analysts 
maintain that bureaucrats‘ obligation to send economic reports to the lower chamber has 
produced greater legislative control over the way in which officials carry out public 
policies (Ugalde 2000; author‘s interviews: August 16; November 23, 2006; November 
24, 2008).  These changes are consistent with legislative dominance theories in the sense 
that under certain political contexts, such as divided government with unified legislatures, 
Congress tends to make bureaucrats accountable through the establishment of procedures 
and instructions in legislation. The next section examines budget modifications in 






Table 4.4: Summary of Changes to Financial Information available to Legislators 
Budget 1991 1996 2001 2006 







Number of information 
requirements on Financial 
Reports 
NONE NONE 13 21 
Number of days allowed to turn 
in the financial reports to the 
Chamber of Deputies 
45 45 45 35 
Hacienda‘s obligation to 
respond to deputies‘ inquiries 
NO NO YES YES 
Deputies‘ access to the Sistema 
Integral de Información de los 
Ingresos y Gasto Público  












Agencies‘ obligation to make 
evaluations of their policies 
and programs 






Agencies‘ obligation to upload 
public programs‘ information 
to their websites  
NO NO YES YES, 
transparenc
y law also 
forces 
agencies 
Information appendixes in 
appropriations laws 










CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER GOVERNMENT INCOME AND SPENDING. The process of 
democratization also had an effect on legislative control over government income and 
spending.  During the PRI era, Hacienda did not have to report any reductions or changes 
to the federal income caused by unexpected contingencies.  The 1984 appropriations law 
(AL), for instance, did not establish one single provision about possible reductions of 
government income during the fiscal year (see Diario Oficial de la Federación 
12/29/1983). By 1991, however, the AL (article 14) compelled Hacienda to report 
income modifications to the Chamber of Deputies in the event that there was an income 
reduction that exceeded 12.5 percent of the total approved by Congress. In 1993, deputies 
established that Hacienda bureaucrats must report any reduction that surpassed 10 percent 
of the approved income. Since 2005, budget requirements establish that Hacienda 
bureaucrats have to report to deputies, within fifteen days, any modification to the 
income that reaches 1.5 billion dollars, regardless of the percent of total income approved 
by Congress.
19
 Moreover, if the modification exceeds 1.5 billion dollars, the 2005 AL 
instructed Hacienda to prepare a plan that specifies the reductions and cuts to be made to 
policy programs and agencies. The plan must then be approved by deputies within fifteen 
days of its submission.   
During the PRI era, bureaucrats could make use of budget surpluses with hardly 
any legislative control, as ALs did not impose effective constraints on Hacienda and other 
agencies in the allocation of additional resources. That is, ALs specified only a few 
possible sources of income surplus and very general rules on the distribution of these 
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resources.  The 1991 AL (article 13), for instance, only stipulated four vaguely described 
sources of income surplus
20
 and there were no clear rules given regarding how this 
additional income should be used.  Moreover, the article did not explicitly mention how 
the additional income obtained through oil sales (the main source of income) should be 
allocated.
21
  By contrast, the 2006 AL stipulated the specific items to which Hacienda 
should channel the income surplus obtained during the year.  In this way, article 25 of 
this budget established fourteen possible sources of income surplus and the exact funds 
and programs to which Hacienda should allocate such surpluses.  For example, according 
to subsection J of this article, the additional income obtained through a hydrocarbon tax 
should be allocated to the oil stabilization fund (Fondo de Estabilización de los Ingresos 
Petroleros).  
A similar process occurred in the case of government expenditures, as the 
president‘s power to modify or cancel the amount of funds allocated to agencies and 
programs has been significantly constrained in ALs since 1997.  Until the mid 1990s, 
there were no legal limits to the president‘s power to reduce, defer, or cancel the money 
allocated to public programs, even when deputies had approved it previously.  The only 
requirement needed to make a modification was that the reduction, deferral, or 
cancellation of funds produced savings to the government‘s treasury.  Since 1997, 
however, when the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the president— 
through Hacienda—has been required to send a report to the Budget Committee when his 
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 The article only mentioned that the additional resources should be used either in productive projects, to 
reduce public debt, to create new public enterprises, or for the recovery of public finances. 
21
 In fact, the name of the most important government company (PEMEX) appears only one time 
throughout this appropriations law.  By contrast, the 2005 AL includes an entire chapter that regulates the 





modifications exceed 10 percent of the amount authorized by deputies (1998 AL, article 
51). In the 2005 AL (article 34), deputies established a stipulation that instructed 
Hacienda to report any changes to the programs‘ or agencies‘ budgets that surpass 1.5 
billion dollars.
22
    
Similarly, in terms of expenditures, agencies had to use their allotted funds 
according to an annual expenditure calendar established by Hacienda. In order to 
continue receiving federal funds for the implementation of their programs, agencies had 
to follow this calendar and report any modification in their spending to Hacienda. Until 
1997, Congress did not have access to these calendars. Beginning in 1998, however, the 
ALs instructed Hacienda to send the calendars to the Budget Committee thirty days after 
being established (article 32).  Additionally, agencies and Hacienda were ordered to 
upload such expenditure calendars and their modifications, if any, to their websites.       
 Regarding the allocations of funds during the non-democratic era, budgets were 
very vague in terms of the amount of money allotted to different sectors. Thus, deputies 
granted full discretion to officials to manage and control important funds such as those 
channeled to social expenditures and the federal transfers to states and municipalities. 
While the 1991 AL, for example, allocated 5.1 billion dollars to social expenditures 
(solidaridad y desarrollo regional), it did not establish any rules regarding how this fund 
should be distributed.  The law only stipulated that the fund should be spent on social 
investment projects, such as housing, public water, education, and health, among others.  
In this way, ALs granted ample discretion to bureaucrats to decide which projects, 
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 In this case, however, Hacienda only had to send a report to the Budget committee. In this way, the 





regions, or populations should receive money.  In other words, deputies granted officials 
the freedom to manage funds at their discretion. With great frequency, bureaucrats used 
this discretion for clientelistic purposes, granting strategic favors, for example, that would 
influence votes and tip the balance towards PRI candidates (Dresser 1991; Magaloni, 
Díaz-Cayeros and Estévez 2007; Greene 2007). 
 The bureaucrats‘ huge discretion to manage federal funds became constrained in 
1996 when the funds began to be disaggregated in the AL.  Accordingly, bureaucrats lost 
their power to distribute funds at their discretion.  Following the previous example, in 
1996 deputies specified that the social expenditure fund should be subdivided into three 
areas (see 1996 AL, article 16).  Additionally, legislators introduced a formula—based on 
poverty indexes and population, among other parameters—to determine the distribution 
of one of these funds. The formula was published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación 
(DOF) and sent to three committees of the Chamber of Deputies.  Subsequent ALs were 
even more detailed and explicitly established for what specific purposes federal funds 
should be used. For instance, the 2001 AL instructed that the fund for the states‘ 
strengthening (Programa de Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Federativas) should only be 
used for the financial assistance of states, their pension systems, and local infrastructure 
projects (see 2001 AL, article 5). Similar constraints were imposed on other budget items 
such as public health, education, security, poverty alleviation, public services, and federal 
funds transferred to states.       
Another action that, in principle, reduced bureaucrats‘ discretion to allocate 





programs in ALs.  Since 2000, ALs have included an entire chapter that provides general 
guidelines about how operating rules should be formulated. These rules established the 
precise objectives, instructions, procedures and formulas that executive agencies have to 
follow in the execution of policies and programs. This AL chapter also specified the 
federal programs that need to abide by operating rules. Although executive agencies 
formulate these rules, officials are obliged to consult with legislative committees before 
publishing such rules in the DOF (2000 AL, article 73).
23
   
 While in the past, Hacienda had ample leeway to transfer federal resources to the 
states, recent ALs and the Ley de Coordinación Fiscal have established—based on 
objective parameters—the amount of federal resources to be distributed among the 
states.
24
 Similarly, PRI administrations used to allow bureaucrats to freely reallocate 
funds from one agency to another. Since 2000, however, the Chamber of Deputies has 
defined clear limits on the amount of money that can be transferred from one agency to 
another (see, for instance, AL 2002, article 26). ALs require that Hacienda notify the 
Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies if the transfer exceeds either 10 percent 
of a budget item or surpasses 1 percent of the programmable expenditures.  
Regarding oversight of government expenditures during the PRI era, 
appropriations laws stipulated that Hacienda was the institution in charge of overseeing 
the execution of the budget.  ALs further established that the Contraloría, which was an 
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 In 2000 the AL (article 74) listed 43 federal programs that had to be regulated by operating rules.  By 
2006, 107 federal programs had to follow such rules (see 2006 AL, annex 16).     
24
 The Ley de Coordinación Fiscal regulates and establishes the formulas used to determine the annual 
amount of money that each state will receive from diverse federal funds. This law was first enacted in 1978 





executive agency, would evaluate the efficiency of public programs.
25
 Consequently, ALs 
did not explicitly instruct the Contaduría Mayor de Hacienda (Treasury Accounting 
Office), which was the Chamber of Deputies‘ oversight institution, to revise the public 
finances. Since 2003, however, the very first article contained in the AL explicitly 
ordered the ASF to supervise approved government spending in the budget and verify the 
accomplishment of goals and objectives.   
Another important change came in 1999 when the constitution was amended in 
order to create the Auditoría Superior de la Federación (ASF), which replaced Contaduría 
Mayor de Hacienda, the previous oversight institution.
26
 This constitutional reform, along 
with the enactment of the Ley de Fiscalización Superior de la Federación (LFSF) in 2000, 
granted more authority to the ASF to supervise public spending -ex post-, as well as to 
audit federal transfers to states and municipalities.
27
 The LFSF further requires that 
Hacienda officials deliver the Public Account (or Cuenta Pública, the government‘s 
annual record of all financial operations) to the Chamber of Deputies forty days earlier 
than in the past.  In the same vein, Hacienda is now obliged to send legislators a progress 
report on financial performance (Informe de Avance de la Gestión Financiera) that 
describes how the budget was implemented during the first six months of the fiscal year.  
The ASF must also deliver its final report (Informe del Resultado de la Revisión y 
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 To cite an example, article 70 of the 1996 AL established that Hacienda should periodically assess the 
execution of the annual budget. Additionally, this article stated that the Contraloría should evaluate the 
agencies‘ goals and objectives.  There was not any mention of the Contaduría.  By contrast, article 1 of the 
2006 AL stipulates that ASF should supervise the implementation of public expenditures. 
26
 For a description of the inefficient work of the Contaduría Mayor de Hacienda see Ugalde (2000: 20-61).  
27
 The Ley de Fiscalización Superior de la Federación, enacted in December 29 of 2000, replaced the old 
Ley Orgánica de la Contaduría Mayor de Hacienda originally enacted in 1896. In May 2009, a new law,  
regarding the oversight of public expenditures (Ley de Fiscalización y Rendición de Cuentas de la 
Federación) was enacted.  This law grants more auditing and sanctioning powers to the Auditoría Superior 





Fiscalización Superior de la Cuenta Pública), which examines Hacienda‘s Public 
Account, to the Chamber of Deputies almost seven months earlier than was previously 
required. Even more important, the new legislation instructs the Chamber of Deputies to 
vote on a dictamen legislativo of the Public Account after the examination and discussion 
of the ASF‘s final report (see figure 4.4).
28
 In theory, these changes significantly 
improved the ASF‘s oversight powers (Ugalde 2000: 44, 54-55).   
Finally, the enactment of the Ley Federal del Presupuesto y Responsabilidad 
Hacendaria (LFPRH) on March 30, 2006, is one of the most significant changes in 
budgetary legislation. This law replaced the 1976 Ley de Presupuesto, Contabilidad y 
Gasto Público Federal. The new law provides guidelines, limits, and rules of what 
deputies should include and specify in each annual budget.  Hence, every annual budget 
has to be elaborated following the LFPRH‘s guidelines.  Financial analysts state that this 
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 Once the dictamen is approved it becomes a decreto and is published in the Diario Oficial de la 
Federación. Until 2000, the Chamber of Deputies approved a dictamen about the Public Account based on 
a preliminary report by the ASF. Thus, deputies discussed and approved decretos without knowing the 
results of the ASF‘s final report. After the resolutions, deputies did not release any official assessments 
about the Public Account.      
29
 This study does not analyze the effects of the LFPRH since it was enacted in 2006, and the great majority 






Figure 4.4: Oversight Cycle 
Before the 1999 Constitutional Reform 
 
 
   
December 31: Fiscal year ends.                      January                                                                           
                     June 10: Hacienda delivers the Public  
                               Account of the previous fiscal year to deputies. 
                               Deputies send the Public Account to           
                               the Contaduría Mayor de Hacienda.         
              September 10: The Contaduría submits its 
Final Report of the Public Account to the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
        November 10: The Contaduría prepares a  
                         Preliminary Report of the Public Account 
                         and sends it to the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
 
     
                          December: Based on the Contaduría‘s preliminary report,  
              deputies prepare a dictamen legislativo of the Public  









               December 31:                    January  
            Fiscal year ends. 
       
      February 20: 
        The ASF submits its Final Report of the  
       Public Account to the Chamber of Deputies. 
                                             April 30: 
                      Hacienda delivers the Public Account of the previous  
                      fiscal year to the Chamber of Deputies. Legislators send 
                      the Public Account to the Auditoría Superior de la Federación. 
         September 30: 
Based on the ASF‘s Final Report 
of the Public Account, deputies 
prepare a dictamen  legislativo. 







 As this section described, from 1997 to 2006 the process of democratization 
brought important changes to the budgetary laws (see summary of changes in table 4.5).  
Legislators have transformed formal rules to force Hacienda and other agencies to 
consistently report detailed information about the way government resources are being 
spent, as well as the effectiveness of the public policies and programs they fund.  
Regarding bureaucrats‘ discretion to assign, reallocate and manage the budget, members 
of Congress have established many constraints that, in principle, reduce officials‘ leeway 
to manage federal funds for their own purposes.   All these changes seem to indicate that 
the dominant rational choice institutional theory applies very well in Mexico.  But does 
this theory hold when the analysis goes beyond formal rules?  What happens in real 



















Reduction of funds:   
 
Hacienda only had to report to deputies modifications that passed 12.5% of 




AL specified few possible sources of income surplus and very general rules 









AL stipulated the specific items to which Hacienda should channel the income surplus 














Allocation of funds:  
 
Deputies granted full discretion to officials to manage, control and 
manipulate federal funds   
 
Reduction, deferral and cancelation of expenditures: 
 
The president did not have any legal limits to reduce, defer, or cancel funds 




Hacienda elaborated agencies‘ expenditures calendars without granting 




AL did not specify which federal programs should have operating rules 
 
Transfers to states: 
 
AL gave ample discretion to Hacienda to transfer federal resources to states 
 
Reallocation of funds from agency to agency: 
 
Hacienda could freely reallocate funds from agency to agency 
 
 
Deputies disaggregated federal funds and established formulas for the distribution of 









Hacienda sent expenditures calendars to deputies; agencies had to upload such calendars 




AL provided guidelines for the formulation of operating rules; AL listed 107 federal 
programs that must have operating rules  
 
 




Hacienda had to report to the Chamber of Deputies if the transfer exceeded 10% of a 






The AL did not explicitly mention that the Contaduría should revise 
government expenditures 
 






BUDGET POLITICS IN PRACTICE 
Despite the fact that democratization has allowed legislators to enact stricter 
appropriations laws, in practice, not much has changed at all.  The main reason for this is 
that there is a breach between the formal rules and what really happens with their 
implementation in the budgetary process.  In this section, I illustrate why the financial 
information that Hacienda is required to submit is not an effective mechanism for 
legislator to exert control over bureaucrats.  I also present evidence of how, in practice, 
legislative constraints on government income and expenses do not effectively reduce 
bureaucratic leeway.           
 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION.  As previously mentioned, legislators have included a 
provision in appropriations laws (ALs) that forces Hacienda to send quarterly financial 
reports to Congress.  Moreover, the constitution and other secondary laws enjoin the ASF 
to send its final report of the Public Account and other financial reports to the Chamber 
of Deputies for analysis.  Although these requirements may look like effective tools for 
exerting legislative control over the Hacienda bureaucracy, in practice their effects on 
controlling the bureaucracy are very limited.  Interviews with legislators and their staff 
reveal that they analyze neither the Hacienda nor the ASF reports.  Two former 
secretarios técnicos
30
 of the Budget and Hacienda committees in both legislative 
chambers stated that there is no systematic review of these documents (Author 
interviews: August 30; November 10, 2006), and that committee members neither read 
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 Secretarios técnicos are congressional public servants in charge of providing non-partisan technical and 





the reports nor asked legislative staff to examine them.  Hence, reports are usually 
received and promptly stacked in congressional archives.  Fourteen members of the 
Hacienda and Budget committees (including five chairs between 1982 and 2006) 
confirmed the secretarios técnicos‘ statements
31
 (Author interviews: May 4, 18, 19, 23; 
August 2, 16, 23, 30; September 5, 2006).   
Moreover, the quality of the information contained in the reports and the Public 
Account is very poor.  The information is not well synthesized, raw economic data is 
included, and the amount of information is excessive.  Underscoring this situation, a 
secretario técnico said, ―even if deputies were interested in analyzing the reports, they 
would not know what the information is for‖ (Author interview: August 30, 2006).  A top 
Hacienda official in charge of elaborating the economic reports argued that, in the 
beginning, Hacienda was very careful in the development of the reports.  An entire 
department within the agency, he asserted, worked very hard to compile and synthesize 
all the economic information requested by legislators.  However, the quality of the 
reports declined once officials noticed that members of Congress did not pay attention to 
them (Author interview: October 31, 2006).  In interviews, fifteen more legislative staff 
and Hacienda officials made similar statements about the quality of the government‘s 
financial information available to legislators.  Furthermore, agencies very rarely receive 
comments, complaints, or requests for explanations from Congress about the content of 
the economic reports (Author‘s interviews: May 5; July 19, 27; August 2, 16, 23, 25, 30; 
October 31; November 23, 2006 and November 24, 2008).    
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 Secretarios técnicos from six other different legislative committees also stated that there is no systematic 





During the period under investigation (1991-2006), deputies—either by 
themselves or through the ASF—denounced the low quality of Hacienda‘s information 
and the agency‘s infringements on both the ALs‘ provisions and other fiscal legislation 
regarding financial information.  That is, before democratization every single Chamber of 
Deputies‘ Decreto about the Public Account disclosed that the government information 
was incomplete or deficient.
32
  In 1991, for instance, deputies denounced the low quality 
of information contained in the Public Account and complained that agencies did not turn 
in the financial reports on time (DOF 12/09/1992).The lack of complete information 
hindered the transparency of important government information such as taxpayer 
revenue, bureaucrats‘ salaries, federal transfers to local states, new positions created by 
executive agencies, the amount of resources spent by executive agencies, the evaluations 
of social programs, or data about income and public expenditure (Decretos relativos a la 
revisión de la Cuentas de la Hacienda Pública Federal correspondiente al ejercicio fiscal 
1991-1997).
33
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 See in the Diario Oficial de la Federación the Decretos relativos a la revisión de la Cuentas de la 
Hacienda Pública Federal correspondiente al ejercicio fiscal 1991-2001.  As mentioned earlier, deputies 
should discuss and vote on a dictamen based on the ASF‘s final report about the Public Account of every 
fiscal year. Once approved, the dictamen becomes a Decreto and is published in the DOF. Until January 
2009, deputies had not approved the Dictámenes for the 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 Public Accounts 
despite the fact that the ASF sent its final reports to deputies on time. More important, deputies deliberately 
violated the constitution‘s order to conclude the review of these Public Accounts by not voting on the 
Dictámenes before the end of 2008 (see artículo cuarto transitorio del decreto que reforma, adiciona y 
deroga diversas disposiciones a la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, DOF 
05/07/2008). According to the newspaper Reforma, the dictámenes were ready to be discussed and voted on 
the Chambers‘ floor since November 2008, yet disagreements on the dictámenes’ content among parties‘ 
leaderships hindered the fulfillment of this constitutional mandate (Simmonet and Salazar 2008).  The 
constitution stipulates that deputies have to complete the revision of the 2007 and 2008 Public Accounts by 
2009 and 2010 respectively. 
33





Even when opposition legislators reached a majority in the Chamber of Deputies 
in 1997, thereby allowing them to demand greater adherence to the budgets‘ stipulations, 
Hacienda continued to depart from the information requirements established in ALs. The 
1998, 1999 and 2000 Decretos, for instance, decried that Hacienda continued not to 
provide disaggregated taxpayer information.  In particular, the 1998 Decreto asserted that 
the Chamber of Deputies had protested this failure to comply with the AL‘s requirement 
since 1996, but that Hacienda systematically ignored the deputies‘ complaint.  Without 
this information, legislators affirmed, it is impossible to evaluate the government‘s 
taxation policy (DOF 12/31/1999; 01/04/2001; 12/31/2001).
34
 Deputies further 
denounced that Hacienda violated the 1998 AL since quarterly reports during that fiscal 
year did not include complete information about the transfers allocated to the Public 
Security System (DOF 12/31/1999). Another government violation of the law during 
1998 was that not all federal agencies sent their annual savings plans to the Budget 
committee, as required in article 50 of the AL.  The 1999 and 2000 ALs reveal that there 
were inconsistencies between Hacienda and other agencies‘ information regarding 
income surplus (DOF 01/04/2001; 12/31/2001).   
For its part, the Auditoría Superior de la Federación has also found that Hacienda 
has continuously infringed the information requirements established in ALs and other 
budgetary rules. In 2001, the ASF found that Hacienda failed to report in the Public 
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 The 2001 Decreto about the Public Account, which was the first evaluation of the performance of a non-
PRI administration made by deputies, is very short and ambiguous. This Decreto only states that the 
Chamber of Deputies analyzed the Public Account and confirmed that such results did not comply with 
provisions and objectives established in the 2001 AL (see article 3 of the 2001 Decreto, DOF 07/21/2005).  
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that deputies violated the constitution, which at that time commanded 
the Chamber of Deputies to approve the 2001 Decreto the year following the end of the fiscal year (i.e. in 





Account that 0.26 percent of the total budget was not used during the fiscal year (ASF 
Informe del Resultado de la Revisión y Fiscalización Superior de la Cuenta Pública
35
 
2001 Tomo Ejecutivo: 68). Moreover, the ASF pointed out that Hacienda did not follow 
their own internal rules (budget manuals and reglamentos) to report the government‘s 
annual public investment in the 2001 Public Account.  The ASF stated that Hacienda did 
not disaggregate the resources spent in this budget item and, consequently, it was 
impossible to make an in-depth examination of how this money was spent.  In particular, 
there were no accounting records to justify why 3.5 percent of the public infrastructure 
funds were not used during the fiscal year (ASF IRRFSCP 2001 Tomo III, Vol. 1: 440-
476). Also in this year, the Sistema de Administración Tributaria (SAT) did not 
explain—despite ASF‘s requests—why there was a 2 billion dollar difference between 
two accounting records regarding fiscal credits (ASF IRRFSCP 2001Tomo III Vol. 4: 
400-407).  In 2002, the ASF found that Hacienda did not report in the Public Account 1.1 
billion dollars of external credits that the federal government obtained to fund its projects. 
This accounting error made it impossible to identify, in a precise way, the allocation of 
the international organization funds and whether these funds were used in social activities 
(ASF IRRFSCP 2002 Tomo III Vol.1: 193-216).  In the same year, Hacienda failed to 
make public, in both  the Public Account and in the quarterly reports, that the federal 
highway trust had liabilities of 14.3 billion dollars (ASF IRRFSCP 2002 Resumen 
Ejecutivo: 6).  More important, the ASF detected through their audits that Hacienda had 
either not registered or inaccurately reported 15.9 billion dollars in the public account.  
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This amount represents 10.89 percent of the total budget for that fiscal year (ASF 
IRRFSCP 2002 Resumen Ejecutivo: 29-30).   
In 2003, Hacienda failed to obey several budgetary laws, such as the Ley de 
Ingresos de la Federación (article 29), by not revealing a list of the financial trials lost by 
the agency in the quarterly financial reports. The ASF‘s final report states that the amount 
of money lost by Hacienda in these trials reached 627 million dollars. Moreover, 
Hacienda and its agencies refused to give the ASF information regarding these lost trials 
(ASF IRRFSCP 2003 Resumen Ejecutivo: 7; ASF IRRFSCP 2003Tomo III Vol. 3: 252-
254).
36
 Also in this year, Hacienda either did not report, or registered wrongly, 23.5 
billion dollars (15.46 percent of the total budget) (ASF IRRFSCP 2003 Resumen 
Ejecutivo: 38).     
In 2004, the ASF‘s final report noted that Hacienda changed its own performance 
indicators in the Public Account to assess the efficiency of the government‘s 
expenditures.  According to the ASF, Hacienda changed such indicators every year since 
2000 despite the ASF‘s caveats that this action hinders transparency in public finances, as 
it makes it impossible to compare and evaluate the performance of public spending across 
different  fiscal years (ASF IRRFSCP 2004 Tomo Ejecutivo: 71-73, 76; ASF IRRFSCP 
2004 Tomo III Vol. 2: 72-75).  Furthermore, Hacienda violated the reglamento of the 
prior budget law (Ley de Presupuesto, Contabilidad y Gasto Público Federal) by not 
reporting the total debt of the decentralized government agencies and public enterprises 
in the 2004 Public Account (ASF IRRFSCP 2004 Tomo III Vol. 2: 37-38). Similarly, in 
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 The ASF‘s final report also stated that 8 trials were lost because of the Hacienda‘s official‘s negligence 





2005 the ASF denounced that Hacienda violated fiscal regulations by not presenting 
financial information of the Public Account in accordance with the basic government 
accounting principles stipulated in article 87 of the reglamento of the budget law. Among 
other omissions, Hacienda failed to report the complete information about the 
government‘s debt from infrastructure projects (Proyectos de Infraestructura Productiva 
de Largo Plazo, PIDIREGAS), and also failed to account for significant variations in the 
spending of certain budget items.
37
 Furthermore, the ASF found significant differences 
between the information presented in Hacienda‘s quarterly reports and the Public 
Account (ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo III Vol. 1: 56-62). These infringements, the ASF 
stated in the 2005 final report, ―hindered the possibility to check whether the financial, 
budgetary, programmatic and patrimonial information was presented in a reasonable and 
complete form‖ (ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo III Vol. 1: 57).       
Finally, in 2006, the ASF reported that the Tax Administration System (Servicio 
de Administración Tributaria, or SAT, a Hacienda agency) violated several articles of the 
reglamento of the current budget law (Ley Federal del Presupuesto y Responsabilidad 
Hacendaria) by not reporting in the Public Account the complete revenue information 
obtained through customs taxes.  Furthermore, the SAT refused to disclose, despite four 
requests from ASF, the financial procedures used to calculate the annual customs taxes 
(ASF IRRFSCP 2006 Resumen Ejecutivo: 16-17; Tomo III Vol. 5: 434-446).  In 
addition, the ASF has noted a series of irregularities in the operation of the customs 
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 For instance, the ASF‘s final report revealed that the budget item ―pasivos en administración‖ had a 
variation of 1.3 billion dollars.  This variation was not explained in the 2005 Public Account (ASF 





service since 2001. According to the ASF, between 2001 and 2004, over 1 billion dollars 
of customs revenue were not deposited in the Treasury, a failure that violated the Ley de 
Ingresos and other fiscal regulations that stipulate that tax revenue should be deposited in 
the Federal Treasury.  Despite the ASF‘s repeated attempts to audit customs operations, 
the SAT systematically refused to disclose its information, arguing that the customs 
service was exempt from such oversight because it was operated by a private firm 
(ISOSA) through a private trust fund (Aduanas 1).
38
 In their final reports, the ASF 
alleged that the SAT allowed the involvement of this private firm in its operations as a 
means to manage customs revenue at its discretion.  In order to halt further investigations, 
Hacienda submitted a constitutional challenge to the Supreme Court in 2004.  During the 
analysis of whether the ASF had the authority to review the customs revenue, the 
Supreme Court found diverse irregularities in the foundation of the Aduanas 1 trust fund.  
One of the most noteworthy irregularities discovered was that 99.99 percent of ISOSA‘s 
stocks (which was the company responsible for operating Aduanas 1) were owned by 
Nacional Financiera, a government development bank (ASF IRRFSCP 2001 Tomo 
Ejecutivo: 85-86).  Aduanas 1, then, was a private trust fund managed by a government 
company and the SAT.  In other words, Aduanas 1 was a de facto public entity despite 
the fact that it was deliberately founded as a private fund.
39
  Notwithstanding, in 2006 the 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hacienda‘s prohibition of the ASF‘s right to audit the 
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 According to the Ley Superior de Fiscalización de la Federación and other regulations, the ASF can only 
audit public entities. 
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 In 2004 Hacienda liquidated Aduanas 1 and ISOSA and founded a new public fund trust (Fideicomiso 
para Administrar la Contraprestación del artículo 16 de la Ley Aduanera, FACLA) that, given its public 
nature, can be supervised by the ASF. This public trust has also been charged for diverse wrongdoings in 







 (Controversia Constitucional 84/2004; Flores 2006; Sandoval 
2007). Table 4.6 shows a summary of the infringements that Hacienda committed to 
appropriations laws and other fiscal legislation between 1991 and 2006, as registered in 
the Decretos and the ASF‘s final reports about the Public Account.  
The previous findings by both the deputies and the ASF are consistent with 
evaluations made by external institutions.  The Latin American Budget Transparency 
Index assesses the degree of transparency in public expenditures and the budget cycle in 
general.  This index gave Mexico a score of 50.4 and 53.7 in 2003 and 2005 respectively, 
where 0 indicates ―not transparent‖ and 100 ―totally transparent‖.  In 2007, despite the 
enactment of the new 2006 budget law, Mexico received a score of 49.7 (Fundar 2007).  
Similarly, the Open Budget Index evaluates the governmental provision of budget 
information and opportunities to participate in the budgetary process.  In 2006, this Index 
gave Mexico a score of 50 percent out of a possible 100 percent.  The score indicates that 
―the government provides citizens with some information on the central government‘s 
budget and financial activities, but that there is much room for improvement‖.
41
  Finally, 
a 2006 OECD survey to assess budgetary practices and procedures revealed that budget 
transparency in Mexico is at an intermediate level (Curristine and Bas 2007).  
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 The Supreme Court stated that, although the Aduanas 1 trust fund had irregularities in its foundation, the 
object of study in this case was whether the ASF has the authority to oversee private resources.  
Furthermore, the Court stated that there was no constitutional challenge to determine the legality of this 
trust fund (Controversia Constitucional 84/2004). 
41
 Emphasis in original (http://openbudgetindex.org/files/CountrySummaryMexico.pdf ). In 2008 Mexico 





Table 4.6: Summary of Hacienda‘s Infringements to Appropriations Laws 1991-2006 




































 No information about the 2.5% of the budget not spent  




 No information about external credits and highway trust fund‘s liabilities 




 Hacienda failed to reveal information about the fiscal trials lost 




 Budget‘s performance indicators changed 




 No adherence to government‘s accountability principles  
 No information about government‘s debt in infrastructure projects 
 No explanations about variations in public spending 
2006  Incomplete information about customs revenue 





CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER GOVERNMENT INCOME AND PUBLIC SPENDING 
 As described earlier, the process of democratization allowed legislators to 
establish stricter budgetary laws.  Yet, in practice, bureaucrats deliberately ignore the 
limits established in appropriations laws regarding government income and the 
distribution of federal funds.  Hacienda officials, for example, frequently make 
unauthorized increases or cuts to budget items.  Furthermore, bureaucrats often reassign 
or transfer funds from one agency or program to others without congressional approval.  
In the same vein, Hacienda does not report all of its financial operations.  Although 
budgetary legislation allowed bureaucrats to make certain modifications, investigations 
by the ASF and various think tanks, as well as personal interviews with Hacienda 
bureaucrats, revealed that such changes either transgressed budgetary laws or were not 
justified.  The following section documents Hacienda‘s deviations from budgetary rules 
between 1991 and 2006.   
Between 1991 and 1997, Hacienda and other executive agencies violated diverse 
budgetary laws, as documented in the Chamber of Deputies‘ Decretos about the Public 
Account.  Among the most important transgressions were: agencies‘ unauthorized budget 
modifications, changes in programs‘ objectives during the fiscal year, excessive variation 
between the implemented and approved budget, discretionary distribution of income 
surplus, lack of transparency and control in the allocation of subsidies and economic 









Despite the opposition‘s triumph in the 1997 midterm congressional election, 
legislators were not able to exert effective control over the bureaucracy, and Hacienda‘s 
violations of budgetary regulations persisted.  In terms of public financing, for instance, 
each year deputies grant Hacienda the authority to finance long–term infrastructure 
projects (PIDIREGAS) proposed by private companies.  In order to be financed, these 
projects have to comply with several technical requirements established in ALs.  
Hacienda must evaluate and provide a technical report about the viability of the projects 
that follows a specific methodology.  Despite the strict rules regulating the infrastructure 
projects, the ASF uncovered that, from 1997 to 2000, Hacienda funded 83 out of 105 
projects that did not have a positive technical rating (ASF IRRFSCP 2000 Tomo 
Ejecutivo).
43
 In the same vein, public officials from diverse agencies continued to either 
overspend or underspend budget funds allocated to public policies and programs.  In 
1998, for instance, two decentralized agencies (IMSS and Luz y Fuerza del Centro) 
managed to overspend 286 million dollars.
44
   
Moreover, Hacienda bureaucrats repeatedly failed to respect budget stipulations 
regarding the allocation of funds. Congressional Decretos about the Public Account, for 
example, denounced the fact that, in every fiscal year between 1996 and 2000, Hacienda 
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 See DOF 12/09/1992; 12/13/1993; 12/20/1994; 12/11/1995; 12/12/1996; 12/26/1997, and 12/24/1998.   
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 This Auditoria‘s final report was reviewed through the ASF‘s website: 
www.asf.gob.mx/trans/Informes/IR2000i/ir2000/Ejecutivo/Ejec.htm#_Toc18555892. This electronic 
version does not have page numbers. 
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 The overspending of some agencies was much bigger. In 1999, for instance, one office of the Secretaría 
de Agricultura, Ganadería y Desarrollo Rural overspent 892.3% of the amount authorized by the Chamber 





used funds from annual budgets to pay previous fiscal debts. The funds for these 
payments were neither considered in annual budgets nor authorized by deputies.  In the 
same vein, between 1998 and 2000 Hacienda transferred funds and made donations and 
subsidies to states and private or public institutions.  Hacienda neither registered these 
operations in its accounting records nor justified them in the Public Account.  Deputies 
also stressed that Hacienda continued to fail to comply with government accounting 
principles and other budgetary stipulations that regulate financial operations (Decretos 
relativos a la revisión de la Cuentas de la Hacienda Pública Federal 1998-2000).
45
            
The change of regime that came with the PAN‘s victory in the 2000 presidential 
election did not significantly increase the level of effective legislative control over 
Hacienda and other bureaucratic agencies.  Since 2001, the ASF‘s final reports have 
revealed the agencies‘ continued lack of adherence to budgetary laws. Figure 4.5 shows 
the federal agencies‘ infringements of the main budgetary laws
46
 between 2001 and 2006.  
As can be observed, far from having a decrease in the number of violations of budgetary 
laws, the ASF has detected more infringements committed by federal agencies every 
year.      
Interviews with Hacienda officials confirmed the persistence of high bureaucratic 
discretion in the democratic era.  A former top-level Hacienda official asserted that the 
agency makes over 1000 modifications to the budget every year without the consent of 
Congress.  Moreover, he claimed that neither Congress nor the ASF has noticed any of 
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 See DOF 12/31/1999; 01/04/2001, and 12/31/2001. 
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 These laws are: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación (appropriations law), Ley de Presupuesto, 
Contabilidad y Gasto Público Federal (Budget, Accounting and Federal Public Spending Law), and 





these modifications (Author interview: August 2, 2006). Hacienda chooses not to disclose 
all of the important financial information to legislators so that bureaucrats can make 
modifications to the budget without the approval of Congress (Author interview: October 
31, 2006).  Hence, even in the case that deputies or the ASF could find certain unlawful 
activities in the Hacienda reports, officials can still cover up their maneuverings.    
 


























Appropriations Laws Budget Law Reglamento Budget Law  
 
The statements made by legislators and bureaucrats in interviews have been 
corroborated by ASF audits and by investigations made by both think tanks and the 
media.  In 2001, the first year of Vicente Fox‘s administration, Hacienda deliberately 





private infrastructure projects (PIDIREGAS) as direct public debt.  The ASF stated that 
this omission distorted the information on the public debt and, consequently, had an 
important impact on public finances.  Also in 2001, Hacienda was involved in an 
unlawful activity when one of its offices, the General Administration Collection Office, 
failed to deposit customs revenue in the Federal Treasury, thereby ignoring diverse 
accounting manuals and legislation (ASF IRRFSCP 2001Tomo III Vol. 1: 320-399).  
Similarly, in 2002 and 2003, Hacienda did not adhere to article 24 of the AL since the 
agency allowed the overspending of diverse decentralized agencies.
47
  The total 
unauthorized amount was 317.2 and 127.8 million dollars in 2002 and 2003 respectively 
(ASF IRRFSCP 2002 Tomo Ejecutivo: 133-134; ASF IRRFSCP 2003 Tomo Ejecutivo: 
146-147). The Mexico City newspaper Reforma detected that, in 2006, certain 
government agencies spent more money than the amount approved in the annual budget.  
According to Reforma, the agencies whose spending exceeded the amount authorized by 
the Chamber of Deputies in 2006 were: Secretaría de Energía: 194 percent; Hacienda: 38 
percent; Gobernación: 33.6 percent; Relaciones Exteriores: 20.9 percent; and the Office 
of the President: 17.6 percent.  Hacienda bureaucrats explained that these increases were 
possible due to the oil surplus and that such modifications were allowed in the 2006 AL.  
However, analysts from FUNDAR, a Mexican think tank, argued that Hacienda neither 
clearly explained such increases, nor accounted for the allocation of the oil surplus to 
these specific agencies (Almanza 2007). Hacienda further infringed on budgetary 
legislation by not spending Congress‘ authorized budget resources.  In 2002, for instance, 
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29.8 percent of funds allocated to operating expenditures (gasto corriente), which is 
equivalent to 424.2 million dollars, were not spent due to Hacienda‘s deficient planning 
to disburse federal resources (ASF IRRFSCP 2002 Tomo III Vol. 1: 275; 253-309).
48
   
Regarding Hacienda‘s transfers to states, the PRI administrations were not the 
only ones that committed irregularities to benefit their party, as the National Action Party 
(PAN) committed similarly suspicious actions in the democratic period. On the last day 
of the 2003 fiscal year, for example, Hacienda transferred 260.6 million dollars to the 
Infrastructure Investment Fund (FINFRA).  This amount surpassed the original resources 
authorized for this fund by 290.7 percent.  Furthermore, Hacienda did not establish in the 
fund‘s operating rules the specific objectives and goals on which the resources should be 
spent. Therefore, the fund‘s technical committee, which is composed of Hacienda and 
other government officials, had ample leeway to manage these resources (ASF IRRFSCP 
2003 Tomo III, Vol. 1: 537-551).  There were other financial wrongdoings committed by 
Hacienda in 2003. One of its greatest failings was that the agency infringed the Ley de 
Ingresos de la Federación by not disclosing important fiscal credit information to 
Congress. In addition to not revealing the number of lost fiscal trials and its impact on 
public finances, Hacienda failed to register and validate 1.48 billion dollars obtained 
through taxpayer penalties and fines (ASF IRRFSCP 2003 Tomo III Vol. 3: 236-273). 
The control over the management of public finances did not increase significantly 
with the arrival of democracy in Mexico.  Since its creation in 2000, the ASF has 
repeatedly protested the government‘s lack of objective indicators and parameters to 
                                                 
48
 The ASF report pointed out that while some agencies obtained an increase in their budgets, they did not 





assess the efficacy of budget implementation. Hacienda, for instance, modified the 
budget‘s programmatic structure several times. Such modifications hindered the 
possibility to evaluate and compare the performance and efficacy of public expenditures 
across different fiscal years.  As a consequence, it was impossible to assess whether the 
agencies used public finances efficiently.  Furthermore, Hacienda has ignored numerous 
recommendations by the ASF to establish financial indicators that relate program goals 
with public expenditures. The ASF stated in its reports since 2000 that the lack of 
indicators produced opacity and uncertainty in the management of public resources (ASF 
IRRFSCP 2004 Tomo Ejecutivo: 71, 59- 76; ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo Ejecutivo: 101-
103).     
Other financial agencies also violated congressional norms.  In 2003, for instance, 
the Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal, a Hacienda development bank in charge of providing 
housing subsidies, infringed articles 51 and 52 of the budget and the Ley de Presupuesto, 
Contabilidad y Gasto Corriente, by perpetrating several wrongdoings.  Among the most 
flagrant misdeeds were: the granting of subsidies by larger amounts than  allowed in the 
operating rules; the subsidization of groupings that did not qualify for government 
assistance; and the targeting of financial support to certain regions of the country, leaving 
aside other areas where subsidies that also deserved subsidies (ASF IRRFSCP 2003 
Tomo III Vol. 3: 523-596).  
Another Hacienda agency that operated with lack of transparency was the 
Tesorería de la Federación (Federal Treasury).  In 2005, the ASF audit found diverse 





and accounting manuals. Among the most important wrongdoings were that the agency 
did not have a systematized accounting system to control and register the federal 
government‘s economic transfers and that the Tesorería made inappropriate transfers into 
its accounts. Consequently, the Tesorería incorrectly registered 218.7 billion dollars in 
2005 alone (ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo III Vol. 1: 568-609). In 2006, the Tesorería again 
violated the Ley del Presupuesto and other fiscal legislation by making irregular transfers 
(ASF IRRFSCP Tomo III Vol. 2: 133-162).   For its part, the SAT (another Hacienda 
agency) likewise has managed federal resources with opacity.  In 2005, the ASF detected 
that 27 percent of the SAT‘s resources were transferred to a public trust (FIDEMICA)
49
 
that did not have specific operating rules or guidelines.  More important, the money 
transferred to the FIDEMICA was neither used by the trust nor returned to the Federal 
Treasury; an action that infringed the Ley de Ingresos, which stipulates that all public 
funds not used during the year should be returned to the Treasury (ASF IRRFSCP 2005 
Tomo III Vol.5: 515-524). 
The lack of adherence to regulations was no different in Hacienda‘s 
administration of the external debt. In 2001 and 2003, the ASF found diverse 
irregularities due to a lack of transparency in the management of a specific external debt 
category (Brady Bonds).  Despite the ASF‘s repeated requests to clarify the accounting 
records of this item, in 2004 the ASF detected that 47.3 percent of the government‘s debt 
had irregularities equivalent to 1.2 billion dollars (ASF IRRFSCP 2004 Tomo III Vol. 2: 
169-184).            
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  Despite the enactment of stricter rules regarding the implementation of the 
budget, in practice, public officials still had great discretion to operate, given that they 
either ignored the new legislation or modified the programs‘ operation rules at their 
convenience in order to continue managing public funds at their will. For example, the 
management of the Oil Stabilization Fund, or FEIP (whose resources come from the oil 
income surplus) has been severely criticized by various think tanks, the media, and 
opposition legislators because of the great discretion with which it is used (e.g. Moreno 
and Dávila 2004; Shields 2005; Barranco 2007).  These assertions have been confirmed 
by the ASF‘s audits.  In 2004, the ASF detected that Hacienda, through the fund‘s 
technical committee, enjoyed ample leeway to use the resources, which amounted to 1.1 
billion dollars. The audit also revealed that the FEIP‘s technical committee used 61.3 
percent of the resources to contract and pay for (in advance) an oil insurance policy for 
the 2004-2005 period. According to the ASF, the 2004 appropriations law only 
authorized the use of the FEIP resources in the event of a reduction in oil revenue during 
the year, and not for the purchase of oil insurance. In response, Hacienda said that the 
fund‘s operating rules, which were made by its officials, granted Hacienda authority to 
withdraw resources from the fund to pay for the oil insurance coverage. The ASF replied 
by stating that the operating rules violated article 25 of the 2004 AL, given that the law 
did not explicitly authorize the use of the FEIP‘s money for this purpose (ASF IRRFSCP 
2004 Tomo III Vol. 2: 118-136).
50
  There were also irregularities in the administration of 
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 Furthermore, the ASF also claimed that the AL has greater legal hierarchy over the funds‘ operating rules 
due to the fact that the former was approved by the Chamber of Deputies while the latter was a secondary 
regulation derived from a congressional act.  Hence, the ASF concluded that the operating rules cannot 





the FEIP in 2005 and 2006.  In 2005, the ASF once again found contradictions between 
FEIP‘s operating rules and the budget provisions that allowed the discretionary 
management of the fund, while in 2006 Hacienda was accused of not transferring 1.2 
billion dollars to the FEIP as stipulated in the Ley del Presupuesto and other regulations 
(ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo III Vol. 2: 37-62; ASF IRRFSCP 2006: 210-235).   
Hacienda also has huge discretion in the management of additional resources not 
considered in the appropriations law, such as the confiscation of goods coming from 
criminal activities.  In a 2006 audit, the ASF reported that there was no control over the 
illegal goods that Hacienda impounds. Thus, there were no official records listing all of 
the goods confiscated during the year. According to former Hacienda officials, the 
agency uses these resources for clientelistic purposes (Author‘s interview: September 17; 
October 31, 2006). For instance, Hacienda offers confiscated goods such as tons of 
clothing or electronic devices to legislators in exchange for passing certain stipulations in 
laws or for maintaining the status quo. Members of Congress distribute these goods to 
their cronies or constituents.   
 Hacienda has also failed to respect congressional rules on how extra money 
obtained from the oil surplus should be allocated (Author interview: August 16, 2006). 
Although the new budget law established a formula to distribute the oil surplus among 
states and social policies, Hacienda did not specify in detail how the money should be 
channeled to public programs (Author interview: May 31, 2006).  Even a PAN deputy, 





surpluses between 2000 and 2006, and that deputies did not know the exact way in which 
the agency allocated the money (López 2006). 
 The previous statements coincide with the findings of the ASF audits.   In the 
democratic era, Hacienda has systematically ignored budget stipulations regarding the 
distribution of oil surplus revenues. In 2003, for instance, the ASF detected diverse 
irregularities in the distribution of 8.34 billion dollars (ASF IRRFSCP 2003 Tomo III 
Vol. 1: 446-470). In 2004 there were several wrongdoings; the most relevant was that 
Hacienda did not present any accounting record or financial document to prove that 25 
percent of excess revenue (1.1 billion dollars) was allocated to improve the government‘s 
budgetary balance (ASF IRRFSCP 2004 Tomo III Vol. 2: 216-246).
51
 According to the 
ASF‘s 2005 report, between 2003 and 2004 Hacienda took 2.9 billion dollars from the oil 
surplus revenue to pay debts from diverse public enterprises. This action was not 
stipulated in the 2003 and 2004 appropriations laws, and deputies never approved this 
change.  And while Hacienda also transferred 7 million dollars from the oil revenue fund 
to pay previous fiscal debts in 2003, the ASF report revealed that there were no financial 
records that corroborated this operation (ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo III Vol. 2: 62-63). 
Hacienda continued to infringe several articles of the appropriations law and other 
legislation regarding the oil surplus fund in 2005.  Among the most significant violations 
were that Hacienda did not present enough evidence to prove the transfer of 487.7 million 
dollars from the oil surplus to the natural disasters fund, and that officials used 
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 This omission infringed articles 81 and 82 of the reglamento of the Ley de Presupuesto, Contabilidad y 
Gasto Público.  In 2003 there was a similar irregularity for 622.7 million dollars (ASF IRRFSCP 2004 





Hacienda‘s internal rules to invest the oil money in non-profitable financial operations.  
In fact, the ASF stated that an additional 3 billion dollars could have been earned had 
Hacienda invested the oil money in government bonds.  Furthermore, the ASF stated that 
Hacienda continued to have significant leeway to transfer money from this fund to others, 
and subsequently asked deputies to set more constraints in the AL (ASF IRRFSCP 2005 
Tomo III Vol. 2: 62; 72-80).  Finally, in 2006 Hacienda infringed article 25 of the AL by 
not providing evidence that 4.89 percent of the excess revenue was allotted to 
investments in infrastructure, and by using 9.45 percent of the resources to cover the 
federal taxes of other government agencies.
52
  In both years, the ASF denounced that, in 
practice, Hacienda had ample discretion to manage the excess revenue, and urged 
Congress to enact more detailed legislation to prevent future abuses (ASF IRRFSCP 2006 
Tomo III Vol. 2: 290-321).                   
Although fiscal legislation has been stricter since 1997, in practice, significant 
bureaucratic leeway has persisted in governmental subsidies and public financing.  Stated 
differently, government agencies have great discretion to make donations (contributions) 
to private and public institutions.  In contrast to the previous examples where there were 
detailed regulations for the disbursement and allocation of funds, there are no specific 
guidelines to grant and control transfers in the case of donations.  Similarly, there are no 
internal rules to verify that donations are used to accomplish pre-established goals. The 
lack of specific regulations has allowed executive agencies to make donations with great 
discretion. In 2000, for instance, Hacienda spent 1.9 billion dollars more than the original 
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amount approved in the annual budget on contributions to diverse non-governmental 
institutions (ASF IRRFSCP 2000).  Hacienda made donations mainly during the last 
three months of the fiscal year to ―cover‖ the underspending of various agencies 
(Martínez 2008a).  The ASF, think tanks, the media, and NGOs have constantly 
denounced the huge leeway enjoyed by bureaucrats to grant donations and have asked 
Hacienda and legislators to establish specific guidelines to control them.  
Notwithstanding, Hacienda and members of Congress have systematically ignored these 
requests (ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo Ejecutivo: 96-97; Marí 2007; Pirker, Arias and Ireta 
2007; Garduño 2008; Martínez 2008b).  Table 4.7 summarizes Hacienda‘s main 
infringements to budgetary laws in terms of the allocation and reallocation of funds.      
In sum, as regards the budgetary process, the rule of law in Mexico is deficient.  
Whereas Hacienda bureaucrats do not respect the procedures established by legislators, 
deputies do not effectively use their oversight powers.  Thus, although deputies have 
reduced bureaucratic discretion in laws, in practice, bureaucrats still have ample room to 
manage the budget according to their interests. What explains the lack of effective 
legislative control over the budgetary process in democratic Mexico?  Why do legislators 







Table 4.7: Summary of Hacienda‘s infringements to appropriations laws in terms of allocation and reallocation of funds 
























 Misuse of money allocated for public programs 
 Agencies‘ unauthorized budget modifications 
 Changes in programs‘ objectives during the fiscal year 
 Excessive variation between the implemented and 
approved budget  
 Failure to comply with legal accounting principles 




 Funding of infrastructure projects without positive 
technical rating 
 Overspending and underspending of budget funds        
 Unauthorized disbursement of budget funds to pay 




 Unauthorized budget modifications 
 No disclosure of financial information 
 Failure to comply with diverse accounting manuals 
 Agencies‘ overspending and underspending 
 Unauthorized transfers to public trusts 




 Partial fulfillment of agencies‘ goals  
 Discretionary distribution of income surplus 
 Lack of control in the allocation of subsidies 
and economic transfers to states 






 Unauthorized economic transfers, donations 
and subsidies 
 Failure to comply with government accounting 
principles and other budgetary stipulations that 




 Irregular subsidies and donations to public and 
private institutions 
 Lack of transparency in the managing of the 
public debt 
 Contradiction between operations rules and 
budget‘s stipulations 
 Lack of adherence to budget‘s stipulations to 





APPLYING THE MUTUAL INFLUENCE THEORY TO FISCAL POLITICS 
The mutual influence theory explained in chapter 2 states that bureaucrats and 
legislators interact in all stages of policymaking.  This interaction is observed in the 
relationship between Hacienda officials and members of the Hacienda and Budget 
committees.  Hacienda bureaucrats pay great attention to what is proposed and discussed 
by the Hacienda and Budget committees of Congress.
53
  In fact, there is a special office 
within the agency that oversees all legislators‘ bills.  This office monitors those bills 
made in the Hacienda and Budget committees as well as those initiatives elaborated by 
the rest of the committees.
54
 Hacienda officials have access to committee meetings.  They 
take detailed notes of what bills or resolutions are being discussed, who proposed them, 
and which legislators are against and in favor.  Using this information, Hacienda officials 
make daily reports to a coordinator, who synthesizes the information and sends weekly 
reports to the Secretary of Hacienda and other top-level officials about what is happening 
in Congress. This information is used to protect the agency against congressional actions 
that may affect the agency‘s interests.  In the same vein, Hacienda‘s information about 
the committee meetings allows bureaucrats to plan political strategies to pass or block 
important legislation (Author interviews: July 19, 2006; November 24, 2008; February 
10, 2009).              
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 Since the Chamber of Deputies is the only body that discusses and approves the AL, there is no budget 
committee in the Senate. 
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 The Secretaría de Gobernación also has a specialized office that monitors Congress‘s activities. This 
office also has a team of officials that attend committee meetings.   However, according to a former 
Gobernación official, Hacienda exerts more influence on legislators than Gobernación (Author interview: 





Hacienda bureaucrats and members of Congress also interact in the discussion of 
the appropriations and other fiscal bills. With frequency, legislators invite top-level 
bureaucrats to committee meetings to ask for technical advice. In fact, information 
obtained from interviews revealed that legislators from the president‘s party introduced 
bills that had been developed by Hacienda officials. That is, although members of 
Congress claim that they elaborated fiscal bills, in reality, these bills were planned and 
written by Hacienda bureaucrats (Author interviews: July 19, 27, 2006; February 10, 
2009).
55
 In the specific case of the appropriations bill, although the president has the 
exclusive power to prepare it, bureaucrats occasionally consult with legislators regarding 
some budget items before the bill is submitted to the Chamber of Deputies (Sour 2007).     
 Once bills are introduced into Congress and discussed in committees, officials 
and legislators enter into a bargaining process whereby both actors influence each other.   
Legislators, for example, seek to increase, cut, or reallocate funds of the appropriations 
bill.  For their part, officials either try to avoid significant changes or seek to increase 
certain budget items (Sour 2007).  In both cases, officials persuade legislators to comply 
with their requests through diverse methods.
56
  In the two-step method, for instance, 
Hacienda first offers various goods (such as food, clothing or money) to legislators so 
they can distribute them among their constituents for political gain.  Lawmakers return 
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 According to some informants, Hacienda also prepares bills for opposition legislators; especially for 
those opposition legislators that are chairs of important legislative committees (Author interviews: July 19, 
27; September 23; 2006; January 7, 2007). 
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 The Budget committee and the Junta de Coordinación Política, which is formed by the party leaders in 
the Chamber of Deputies, are the two legislative bodies that concentrate the budgetary negotiation with 
Hacienda.  Accordingly, the rest of the committees have indirect participation and influence on the budget 
process (Caballero y Dávila 2007).  The Budget committee and the Junta de Coordinación Política‘s 
monopoly over the budget negotiation favor Hacienda since the agency has to deal only with two 





the favor either by maintaining the status quo or by passing diverse provisions that 
Hacienda wants to have included in fiscal laws.  In the case that some legislators refuse to 
accept Hacienda‘s requests, in a second step, bureaucrats threaten them with audits to 
their personal finances or companies.  Ultimately, ―legislators end up doing what 
Hacienda wants‖ (Author interviews: July 19; August 23, 2006; July 1
st
, 2007).  Another 
bureaucratic method to manipulate lawmakers‘ behavior is to grant special fiscal 
treatment to interest groups or companies that support politicians‘ careers.  Legislators, 
then, frequently meet with bureaucrats to ask for favors for themselves or their 
constituents.  Upon legislators‘ requests, Hacienda postpones or calls off audits to those 
local companies that infringed fiscal laws.  In the same way, Hacienda, if asked by 
legislators, breaks its own rules and offers tax breaks, renegotiates debts or fails to 
penalize individuals that infringed fiscal legislation (Author interviews July 19, October 
31, 2006).   
The previous statements are consistent with the fiscal privileges that Hacienda 
grants to some private companies. During the PRI era, Hacienda established a fiscal 
system that included tax exemptions and privileges for companies and entrepreneurs that 
supported the regime (Nuño 2008).  Although divided government has prevailed since 
1997 and the PRI lost the presidency in 2000, the fiscal privilege system continues. That 
is, despite democratization, members of Congress have tolerated special fiscal treatment 
that benefits certain business groups and individuals.  The ASF has documented this 
inequity in the fiscal system.  According to a 2005 ASF audit, fiscal laws exempted some 





were involved in the stock market, agriculture, and department stores, among others. 
Moreover, the ASF noted that billions of pesos were disbursed to companies and tax 
payers in tax refunds.  These tax refunds were highly concentrated.  In other words, 
Hacienda disproportionally gave huge tax returns to a few business sectors such as the car 
industry, private financial companies and department stores.  Between 2000 and 2005, 
67.9 billion dollars were refunded to these companies.  Just in 2005, Hacienda returned 
14.9 billion dollars.  This figure was equivalent to 15 percent of the total taxes collected 
during the fiscal year.
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  Furthermore, 76.5 percent of the 14.9 billion were refunded only 
to 398 taxpayers.  It was noteworthy that 100 entrepreneurs, who had an annual income 
of at least 5 million dollars, ended up paying  Hacienda less than 7 dollars after tax 
refunds (ASF IRRSCPF 2005 Tomo Ejecutivo: 103-104; ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo III 
Vol. 1: 364-392).   
Special treatment was also given to some individuals and companies that have 
fiscal debts with Hacienda.  In 2005, for instance, Hacienda registered 49.5 billion dollars 
in fiscal debts. This amount represented 98.5 percent of the central public 
administration‘s programmable spending.  The ASF detected that 0.04 percent of the 
debtors owed 48.3 percent of the total fiscal debt.
58
 One bank, for example, owed 
Hacienda 2.4 billion dollars, while three other banks were responsible for 2.8 billion. The 
latter figure surpassed the federal funds allocated to public health or social development.  
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 The ASF stated that this money could have afforded 84.6 percent of the government‘s pension system 
(ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo III Vol. 1: 365) 
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 The total number of debtors was 668,545. Hence, while only 298 debtors were responsible for 48.3% of 
the debt (each debtor owed, on average, 11 million dollars), 668,247 debtors owed 51.7 % of the total fiscal 






Moreover, the ASF found that Hacienda recovered only 1.7 percent of this money by the 
end of the fiscal year, and that Hacienda did not take any action to recover the debts.  
Finally, the ASF uncovered that fifty-one individuals and companies received tax refunds 
despite the fact that they had significant fiscal debts with Hacienda.  The ASF concluded 
that the low recovery rates were due to the fiscal privileges and preferential systems 
established in laws and urged Congress to enact stricter legislation to counter this trend 
(ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo Ejecutivo 144-145; ASF IRRFSCP 2005 Tomo III Vol. 5: 
172-210).  
Why do members of Congress tolerate the existence fiscal privileges for certain 
private companies?  Why do legislators not modify legislation to impede fiscal inequity?  
If these special tax systems were established in the PRI era, why do legislators tolerate 
them under democracy? Put differently, why has democracy not eradicated these 
privileges?  Information from interviews revealed that legislators allow the persistence of 
fiscal privileges in exchange for diverse benefits for themselves or for political groups 
that support them.  As mentioned earlier, these resources can range from money to 
material goods or favors.  In this way, bureaucrats ―buy‖ discretion for implementing a 
special tax system (Author interviews: July 19; October 31; December 15, 2006; July 1
st
, 
2007). Without the exchange of handouts for discretion, it is very hard to understand why 
legislators continue to allow Hacienda‘s inequities in the fiscal system.  
Once fiscal bills and the AL are approved, the implementation of the budget 
stipulations, programs and policies is delegated to bureaucrats.  In this stage, officials and 





scarce interest in exercising their oversight functions.  Once the AL is approved, 
legislators from the financial committees do not systematically monitor whether 
Hacienda is financing social programs.  In fact, legislators give more priority to other 
legislative activities such as the initiation of bills and the elaboration of non-binding 
resolutions than to the oversight of policies.  A parliamentary survey given to Mexican 
deputies in 2003 revealed that only 1.6 percent considers ―controlling government 
activities‖ as their main legislative function (Universidad de Salamanca and Centro de 
Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública 2006: 95).  Accordingly, there was no systematic 
effort to ascertain whether bureaucrats, in fact, implemented the federal budget exactly as 
it was approved by deputies.  In the best scenario, legislators either ask public officials to 
appear before committees or propose puntos de acuerdo in order to solve program 
failures.  However, in both actions legislative control is inefficient and very superficial. 
In the case of comparecencias (officials‘ appearances before congressional committees) 
90 percent of the legislators and bureaucrats interviewed said that they are not very 
helpful in solving problems or correcting agencies‘ mistakes.  During these meetings, 
lawmakers ask bureaucrats many questions and demand actions but, once the 
comparecencia is over, they do not supervise whether bureaucrats solved the problem.  
With regard to the puntos de acuerdo, these are non-binding resolutions to which 
agencies do not necessarily pay attention.  Members of Congress exert their control 
powers over the bureaucracy only in cases when there is a media scandal on corruption or 





Why do legislators not exert their control powers over Hacienda?  Lawmakers 
allow bureaucrats to carry out policies and programs with great discretion in exchange for 
diverse handouts or favors.  As it was explained above, officials implicitly or explicitly 
provide legislators with different resources that the latter need for their political careers.  
Hacienda officials, for instance, exert leverage over key legislators from the financial 
committees by promising them positions within the agency or other governmental 
institutions once they finish their legislative terms.  Given the no reelection rule, chairs 
and secretarios of the Hacienda and Budget committees are aware that once they leave 
Congress, Hacienda may hire them.  As a consequence, these legislators maintain a 
friendly relationship with top-level officials by approving (or excluding) certain fiscal 
provisions that Hacienda would like to have integrated in legislation, or by not exerting 
their control powers (Author interviews: August 2; 23, 2006).         
 The close relationship between Hacienda and the financial committees is also due 
to the fact that some key legislators previously worked as public officials.   That is, some 
high-ranking Hacienda officials leave their posts to become legislators.  Information from 
interviews indicates that top-level Hacienda officials frequently designate one or two of 
their subordinates and ask the president‘s party to include them in its proportional 
representation lists.  Once these public servants become legislators, they occupy key 
positions within the Hacienda and Budget committees.  In this way, every legislative term 
the agency has close allies that protect its interests in Congress.  As soon as the 
congressional term is over, some of these individuals are rehired by Hacienda or by one 





An analysis of the political trajectories of the financial committees‘ chairs reveals 
that there are two main career paths followed by these politicians: either government 
officials leave their posts and get important positions within Congress‘ financial 
committees, or legislators become government officials once the legislative term is over.  
In some cases, there is a revolving door between Congress and Hacienda.  That is, top-
level bureaucrats go to Congress, occupy relevant positions in the Hacienda or Budget 
committees and, once the legislative term ends, are rehired by Hacienda or other 
government financial institutions.  These career paths were followed by most chairs of 
the Hacienda and Budget committees in the Chamber of Deputies between 1991 and 
2006 (see Tables 4.8 and 4.9).
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 Specifically, 42 percent of the committee chairs followed 
the first career path (government official → chair of financial committee), while another 
42 percent followed the second career path (chair of financial committee → government 
official).  In the case of the revolving door (government official → chair of financial 
committee → government official), 21 percent of the chairs in this period pursued this 
path.
60
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 While the Hacienda committee was headed by a former Hacienda official during the LX Legislature 
(2006-2009), the chair of the Budget committee was a member of three governing boards (NAFIN, IMSS 
and INFONAVIT). Furthermore, four members of the Hacienda committee (including 3 key positions) 
previously worked for Hacienda while five members of the Budget committee (including 3 secretarios) 
were public servants for the same agency. Additionally, a member of the Budget committee left his seat in 
the Chamber of Deputies and became chief advisor of the Hacienda secretary (Reforma, February 26, 
2008). 
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 The 21 percent of the committee chairs that followed the revolving door path is included in the 84 
percent that pursued one of the two other paths.  It is remarkable that with the exception of Ángel Aguirre 
Rivero, chair of the Budget Committee in the LIX Legislature (2003-2006), all legislators that headed the 
financial committees in this period got their seat in the Chamber of Deputies through the proportional 
representation system.  This fact is consistent with information from some interviewees who stated that 
political parties include experienced public officials in their proportional representation lists in order to put 





Table 4.8: Career Paths of the Chairs of the Hacienda Committee in the Chamber of Deputies 1991-2006 
Legislature 
 
Chair Previous public administration experience 
(most relevant positions) 














Researcher, Office of Fiscal Studies, 






Special Advisor, PEMEX 
  1971 Chief of advisors, Industry and Commerce 
Ministry 
 
1996-1997 General Director of Federal 
Entities  (SHCP) 
  1988-1989 General Coordinator of Basic Provisions and 
Distribution, Federal District Department 
 
  











1982-1988 Undersecretary of Hacienda 1999-2000 Mexican Ambassador to the 
OECD 
  1988-1991 General Director of Banco Mexicano 
SOMEX 
  
  1992-1994 General Director of Banco Obrero   
LVII 
1997-2000 
Ángel Aceves Saucedo  
(1997-1999) 
PRI 
1995 Special Advisor, PEMEX 1999-2003 President of the National 
Commission for the Protection 
of Users of Financial Services 
(CONDUSEF, SHCP) 
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 Aceves was federal deputy in the LI Legislature (1979-1982) and Senator in the LII and LIII Legislatures (1982-1988).  With the exception of the 
years 1982-1985, he was the chair of the Hacienda Committee.  
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  1996-1997 General Director of Federal Entities  (SHCP) 2003 Commissioner of Inter-
institutional Relations (SHCP)  
 






1980 Director of the Foreign Affairs Office 
(SHCP) 
2001-2005 Advisor, Banco de México 
  1983-1988 General Director of Fiscal Promotion 
(SHCP) 
2005-2006 Undersecretary of the Ministry 
of Interior (SEGOB) 
 
  1989-1992 Director of the Department of Services, 










1977-1979 Chief of advisors of the secretary of 
Hacienda 
2003-2006 President of the Commission 




  1979-1982 General Director of Credit (SHCP) 2006-2008 General Director, Casa de la 
Moneda (Mexican Mint, 
SHCP) 
 




 Jorge Chávez Presa 
(2003) 
PRI 




Member of the Governing 
Board of the Institute for the 
Protection of Banking Savings 
(IPAB, SHCP) 
 
  1996-1998 Chief of the Unit of Policy and Budgetary 
Control (SHCP) 
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 Meade worked as secretario técnico of the Hacienda committee during the LVI Legislature (1994-1997). 
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 Levín Coppel was federal deputy in the LVI Legislature (1994-1997) and local deputy between 1997 and 2000. In the LXI Legislature (2009-2012) 
















1997 Secretary of Planning and Evaluation, 
Government of Chihuahua 
 
  
  1997-1998 Coordinator of Planning and Evaluation, 
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Table 4.9: Career Paths of the Chairs of the Budget Committee in the Chamber of Deputies 1991-2006 
Legislature Chair Previous public administration experience 
(most relevant positions) 
















Undersecretary of Programming and Budget 
of Social and Rural Development,  Ministry 
of Programming and Budget 
  








1985-1988 Chief of Advisors of the Undersecretary of 
Planning and Budgetary Control (SHCP) 
1997-1998 Undersecretary of Social 
Development and Housing 
(Social Development Ministry, 
SEDESOL) 
 
  1988-1994 Major Official (SHCP) 1998-
2002? 










1977-1979 Secretary of the Ministry of Programming 
and Budget 
2000-2006 Advisor to the Mexico City 
Mayor  
  1982-1991 General Director of the Mexican Institute of 
Social Security (IMSS) 
2008-
present 












 2003 Spokesman of Hacienda 
    2003-2006 General Director of 
BANOBRAS 
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 Moreno was Senator in the LVI and LVII Legislatures (1994-2000) and local deputy (Mexico City) between 2000 and 2003.  Since 2006 she has been 
a Senator and member of the Hacienda Committee.  
68
 García Sáinz Lavista was a PRI member until 1993. He changed his affiliation to the PRD in 1997. 
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    2006-
present 
President of the Commission 









1979-1982 General Coordinator of Management 
Control, Ministry of Programming and 
Budget 
  
  1983-1987 Secretary of the Contraloría de la Federación 
 
  
  1987-1994 General Director of PEMEX 
 
  
 Ángel Augusto 





NA General Project Coordinator, BANOBRAS   
  NA Secretary of Social Development of the 
Government of Tabasco 
 
  






1989-1990 Secretary of the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Labor of the Government 
of Guerrero 
  
  1990-1991 Regional Coordinator of the National 




  1996-1999 Interim Governor of Guerrero 
 
  
Source: Laura Sour (2007: 146); Musacchio (2002); http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx.  
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 Buendía was also federal deputy in the LI Legislature (1979-1982). In 2005 he was removed from his position because of diverse irregularities in the 
management of the Budget Committee funds (Jiménez, 2005).  
71
 Aguirre was also deputy in the LV Legislature (1991-1994). Since 2006 Aguirre has been a Senator and chair of the Communications and 





The case of Ángel Aceves is representative of the close ties between Hacienda 
and the financial committees in Congress.  Between 1963 and 1979 Aceves worked for 
Hacienda and other government agencies.  From 1979 to 1999, Aceves served three times 
as federal deputy (1979-1982, 1991-1994, and 1997-1999) and once as senator (1982-
1988).  With the exception of the years 1982-1985, he was chair of the Hacienda 
committee either in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate.  In his years out of Congress, 
Aceves returned to public administration and occupied top-level positions, such as 
adjunct director of a development bank (NAFIN 1989-1990) and general director of 
federal entities in Hacienda (1996-1997).  After serving in the Chamber of Deputies for 
two years, Aceves left his seat in 1999 and became president of a Hacienda agency that 
defends customers‘ rights against banks and other financial institutions (CONDUSEF).  
Although he was a priista, Aceves‘ position was ratified during the Fox administration.  
In 2003, the secretary of Hacienda appointed Aceves as commissioner of inter-
institutional relations.  During his Hacienda years (he died in 2003), the agency also 
granted Aceves a customs office in Mexicali, Baja California (see DOF 03/22/2007).        
The political career of Luis Pazos reveals how Hacienda rewards legislators who 
defend its interests. Until 1998 Pazos did not have any political party affiliation.  He was 
a university professor and author of numerous political books.  In 1998, the PAN chose 
him to run for the Veracruz governorship.  Although Pazos lost the state election, the 
PAN offered him a proportional representation seat in the Chamber of Deputies in the 
LVIII legislature (2000-2003).  As deputy, Pazos was chair of the Budget committee. 





legislative term ended, despite diverse accusations of authorizing federal funds for private 
organizations and his lack of experience in the public administration, Pazos was 
appointed Hacienda‘s spokesman (del Valle 2005). Some weeks later the secretary of 
Hacienda appointed Pazos as director of a development bank (BANOBRAS); he held that 
position until President Calderón chose him to head the CONDUSEF in 2006.   
Finally, Jorge Chávez Presa exemplifies how top-level officials leave their posts 
to occupy key positions in the Chamber of Deputies‘ financial committees.  In the 
nineties, Chávez Presa was a young technocrat who occupied diverse top-level positions 
within Hacienda such as general director of budgetary policy (1992-1995), and chief of 
the unit of policy and budgetary control (1996-1998). In 1998, Chávez Presa left 
Hacienda and was appointed undersecretary of the Energy Ministry.  Two years later the 
PRI offered him a proportional representation seat in the Chamber of Deputies.  In 
Congress, Chávez Presa occupied important positions in relevant committees:  secretario 
and, later, chair of the Hacienda committee; and member of the Budget, Foreign Affairs 
and Federal District committees.  In 2007, after being out of the public administration for 
four years, President Calderón designated Chávez Presa as member of the governing 
board of the Institute for the Protection of Banking Savings (IPAB).
72
            
Frequently, Hacienda officials and committee chairs belong to the same political 
faction; they have the same degree of education, and have had parallel careers.  Even 
though they may be affiliated with rival political parties, bureaucrats and legislators share 
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 According to the IPAB‘s law (article 75), members of the governing board are designated by the 
president and approved by two thirds of the members of the Senate, and in its recesses by the same fraction 





economic ideologies.  These common factors produce empathy and closeness between 
these actors.  Talking about this relationship, a former chair of the Hacienda committee 
stated that he could negotiate important fiscal stipulations with the agency because of his 
personal relationship with Hacienda‘s Secretary (Author interview: August 23, 2006).   
Given the close relationship between Hacienda bureaucrats and high-ranking 
legislators in the financial committees, it is very hard for the latter to hold the former 
accountable. In addition to resources controlled by Hacienda, legislators‘ careers 
depend—to great extent—on the agency.  Thus, if lawmakers ‗cooperate‘ with Hacienda 
during their term, the likelihood that they will get a job within the government is much 
higher than if they tried to exert control over top-level bureaucrats.   
There is additional indirect evidence that members of Congress receive benefits 
from Hacienda in exchange for acquiescing to bureaucratic discretion.  This evidence is 
found in the puntos de acuerdo (PA).  As explained earlier, these legislative instruments 
are non-binding resolutions that legislators approve and send to the executive agencies.  
The subjects of the PA are varied; legislators frequently use them to request concrete 
actions from agencies or to denounce specific problems.  For instance, in 2003, a PRI 
deputy requested that the Ministry of Agriculture allocate funds to the drought in the state 
of Sonora.  In the same year, a PRD deputy asked the Ministry of the Interior to release 
funds for the victims of a tornado in Baja California Sur.  Another PRD deputy urged the 
Environmental Ministry to implement a program to reduce pollution on the coast of 
Veracruz. As these examples illustrate, legislators approve PA to try to satisfy 





the rest of the government agencies are not forced to comply with them.  Stated 
differently, public officials will meet legislators‘ demands only if they want to.  
Therefore, the fulfillment of lawmakers‘ PA depends on the willingness of bureaucrats.   
Since satisfying constituents and interest groups‘ demands is important for politicians‘ 
careers, legislators establish informal contacts with officials to try to convince them to 
take notice of their PA.
73
 Given that officials are not legally obliged to satisfy lawmakers‘ 
demands, bureaucrats will give what legislators need only if the latter do not cause 
trouble to the former.  According to information from interviews, lawmakers are aware 
that if they start serious investigations or exert frequent supervision of public policies, 
they will not receive resources for their constituents or interest groups (Author 
interviews: April 20, 26; May 3, 11, 15, 25; June 1
st
, July 12, 19; August 2, 23; 
September 5; November 3; December 12, 15, 2006; January 7, 2007; February 10; July 
24, 2009).   
Since 1998, the number of PA has increased significantly.  During the LVII 
(1997-2000), LVIII (2000-2003) and LIX (2003-2006) Legislatures, members of 
Congress proposed 762, 2435 and 5260 puntos de acuerdo respectively.
74
 In the same 
vein, the number of PA about budgetary issues has also increased since 1998 (Figure 
4.6).  By using these instruments, legislators try to increase or reallocate certain budget 
items, as well as request additional funds for the construction of public pools, parks, or 
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 Politicians do not necessarily approve PA in order to ask bureaucrats for the accomplishment of a 
petition. That is, member of Congress also request the fulfillment of demands through personal 
communications or informal meetings.    
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 The number of puntos de acuerdo introduced in the Chamber of Deputies is bigger than the number of 
bills. In the LIX Legislature (2003-2006), for instance, while there were 2891 bills initiated, 5280 puntos de 





bridges, among other services in their states or districts.  Table 4.10 shows the number of 
PA in the Chamber of Deputies that dealt with budgetary issues between 1998 and 2006.  
As the table shows, individual deputies and senators initiated a majority of the PA.   The 
increasing number of PA suggests that at least a good part of PA were satisfied by 
Hacienda. Although there is no direct evidence to confirm that bureaucrats satisfy 
legislators‘ demands in exchange for legislators‘ lack of supervision of public programs, 
the repetitive use of PA suggests the existence of an implicit deal between these actors.             
 













1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Puntos de Acuerdo



















1998 4 2 1      7 
1999 3 2      5 10 
2000 12 9 4 1   1  27 
2001 18 1 6 14 8 5  37 89 
2002 21 3 10 9 2 8 1 13 71 
2003 24 1 4 17 20 16 1 17 100 
2004 70 5 6 12 34 39 7 19 192 
2005 76 3 7 20 17 19 2 29 173 
2006 104 1 1 5 9 39 2 10 171 
Total 332 27 39 78 90 126 14 130 840 
 




This investigation of the budget process in Mexico shows that, in contrast to the 
assumptions underlying the dominant institutionalist approach, principals in developing 
countries exert leverage over agents, but the latter also have the means to influence or 
retaliate against the former.  Since democratization started, Mexican legislators have been 
able to constrain bureaucratic leeway at least in formal rules.  The chapter shows how the 
rules regarding Hacienda‘s financial information available to legislators and the 
government‘s capacity to allocate federal funds were modified in an effort to reduce 
officials‘ discretion in the implementation of appropriations laws.  The chapter also 
documents how Hacienda officials continued to have ample margin to implement fiscal 
policies by continuously transgressing budgetary legislation.  The reason why legislators 





because there was an informal agreement in which lawmakers allowed bureaucratic 
discretion in exchange for handouts for their constituents and interests groups.  
Bureaucrats also offered lawmakers positions in government agencies in exchange for 
allocating or reallocating funds at their convenience.              
Bureaucratic leverage over legislators is not taken into consideration in principal-
agent theory.  As previously mentioned, this framework assumes unidirectional authority 
from principal to agents.  In other words, the principal controls the agent, but the agent 
cannot control the principal.  The budget process in Mexico shows that, in developing 
countries, there is bidirectional authority whereby principals have formal rights to control 
the agents, and agents have informal leverage over principals.  These informal 
mechanisms of influence neutralize the formal control powers that legislators have over 
bureaucrats.  Put differently, by distributing resources for handouts, bureaucrats obtain 
legislators‘ consent to design and implement programs as they wish.  The next chapter 
examines whether the mutual influence theory is able to account for health public policy 









Chapter 5: Bureaucratic Leeway in the Public Health Sector 
 
 Chapter 4 discussed the lack of effective legislative control over the Hacienda 
bureaucracy.   As the chapter documented, the arrival of democracy brought formal 
changes in fiscal legislation but limited effective congressional control over budgetary 
politics.  What happened in public health policy? Did Congress restrain bureaucratic 
discretion in this area more than in budgetary politics? This chapter finds that 
democratization did not have a significant effect on the level of congressional control and 
monitoring over the public health bureaucracy either. During the PRI era, the health 
system functioned with minimal congressional supervision. Although democratization 
allowed Congress to enact multiple modifications to the health system, the great majority 
of public health policies continued to be designed and implemented without 
congressional consent. In the same vein, legislators, as in the non-democratic period, 
failed to supervise and monitor the public health bureaucracy. The reason why members 
of Congress do not oversee health programs and do not pressure authorities to sanction 
those officials that have committed illegal acts lies in the fact that legislators need favors 
from bureaucrats.  By distributing resources for states and municipalities and granting 
favors to politicians‘ friends, relatives or constituents, bureaucrats obtain informal 
consent to implement health policies as they wish. Accordingly, there is an implicit 
agreement by which bureaucrats do special favors in exchange for bureaucratic 





The chapter is organized as follows: the first section provides a brief overview of 
the evolution of the health sector in Mexico. The question of whether democracy allowed 
more participation by Congress in the public health sector is examined in section two.  In 
addition, this part analyzes which important aspects of health policy are decided by law, 
and which are decided by internal rulings. Section three examines whether legislators set 
clearer and stricter guidelines regarding those issues that are decided by Congress.  
Finally, the last section of the chapter analyzes the extent to which Congress supervises 
the execution and control of health policy implementation, and then documents the 
informal system in which legislators obtain benefits in exchange for discretion in the 
implementation of health policies.  
 
 
EVOLUTION OF MEXICO’S HEALTH SYSTEM 
 During the twentieth century, the Mexican health system evolved from being a 
welfare service to a basic right stipulated in the constitution.  The evolution of the system 
advanced through three main reforms.
1
  In 1943 the first reform, considered to be the 
foundational moment of the national health system, established three important health 
institutions: the Department of Health (Secretaría de Salud y Asistencia), the Mexican 
Institute for Social Security (IMSS), and the first national institute of health (Hospital 
Infantil de México).  While the Department of Health (hereafter DH) was designed to 
provide medical assistance to peasants and people working in the informal sector, the 
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 The following description of the evolution of the health system is based on Frenk, Sepúlveda, Gómez 





IMSS was, and still is, in charge of providing social security to salaried workers and 
employees who contribute to the social security system.  At the time of the reform, the 
government expected that workers in the informal economy would enter the formal sector 
in due course. Therefore, it was assumed that the IMSS would eventually provide 
coverage to the entire population (Frenk and Gómez Dantés 2008: 24).  This goal, 
however, could not be achieved and the DH, as well as the IMSS, subsequently expanded 
their health coverage to great extent.  While the DH built numerous hospitals and medical 
clinics throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the IMSS only covered 17 percent of the 
Mexican population by 1964.  In 1963, the federal government created another pillar of 
the Mexican health system, the Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los 
Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE), which provides social and medical assistance to 
government employees.     
 Although the establishment of the DH, the IMSS, and the ISSSTE guaranteed 
medical assistance and coverage to millions of Mexicans, by the 1980s this model was 
failing to meet health demand in the country, as increasing strain developed in an already 
stressed system.  For example, the cost of medical services rose as demand increased; the 
majority of the rural population still did not have access to medical attention; new 
diseases appeared; and the quality of medical services in general was deficient.
2
 Given 
these conditions, a second generation of reforms started in the early 1980s. In 1983, the 
constitution was amended to grant every Mexican the right to the protection of her health.  
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 In 1980 and 1983, Mexico spent 0.4 and 0.1 percent of the gross domestic product on health care, 
respectively. These percentages were below the public spending on health of Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica 





The old sanitary code was replaced in 1984 by a new General Health Law.  Additionally, 
health services began to be decentralized from the federal government to the states.   And 
in 1984 the National Health System was created.  Headed by the DH, this system was 
charged with coordinating health policies with the IMSS, ISSSTE and other local and 
federal public agencies.
3
 Similarly, diverse national health programs were implemented 
such as oral rehydration and universal immunization programs.  Among the results of the 
second-generation reforms was the reduction of health inequalities across states, the 
increase of life expectancy at birth, and the decrease in the mortality rate.  In general, 
medical attention for all citizens expanded significantly following the reforms.  
According to Frenk and Gómez Dantés, by 1990, 90 percent of the Mexican population 
was officially entitled to government health assistance, either through the IMSS, ISSSTE 
or the DH (Frenk and Gómez Dantés 2008: 26-27).   
 A worldwide movement for health reform in the 1990s promoted the third 
generation of health reform in Mexico.  The objective of this generation of reforms was 
to reorganize the system by functions: provision, financing, and stewardship.  
Additionally, the reform was designed to improve the efficiency of medical services; to 
offer medical attention at reasonable costs; to establish new health programs aimed at 
increasing the quality of health services; and to promote citizen participation in the health 
system (Frenk and Gómez Dantés 2008: 27).  In order to accomplish these objectives, the 
Mexican government implemented the Coverage Extension Program, which provides 
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 Article 7 of the Health Law stipulates that the Department of Health is the agency that coordinates the 
National Health System. The authority of the DH over the rest of the health agencies, however, has been 
more formal than real given that these agencies receive more public funding from the federal government 





twelve basic medical interventions for people living in extreme poverty. Similarly, an 
incentive-based welfare program was implemented and has been functioning since the 
Zedillo administration.
4
 This program gives subsidies to people in need in exchange for 
compliance with diverse education, health and nutritional policies (Frenk, Sepúlveda, 
Gómez Dantés and Knaul 2003: 1669-1670).   
 Although the right to the protection of health has been stipulated in the 
constitution since 1983,  in practice there was a gap between the constitutional mandate 
and the real health coverage provided (Brachet-Márquez 2007: 338; Haber, Klein, 
Maurer and Middlebrook 2008: 161-162). Accordingly, in 2000, about half of the 
Mexican population did not have effective coverage by health insurance (Frenk, 
Sepúlveda, Gómez Dantés and Knaul 2003: 1670).  In order to fulfill this constitutional 
mandate, in 2003 the General Health Law was amended to provide universal health 
insurance through the implementation of a system of Social Protection in Health (SPH).  
This system was built to reorganize and separate the functions of the health system and to 
provide medical insurance mainly to people in poverty, the unemployed, self-employed, 
or employees of the informal sector, who—in the best of cases—may have some access 
to medical assistance but lack formal health insurance.  The operational arm of the SPH 
system is the Popular Health Insurance. This insurance began to operate in 2004 and, by 
the end of 2006, covered 15.6 million Mexicans.
5
 Overall, by 2006, 60 percent of the 
Mexican population had effective health coverage either by the IMSS, ISSSTE, Popular 
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 The first name of this program was the Program for Education, Health and Nutrition (PROGRESA).  The 
program continued in the Fox administration under the name of the Human Development Program 
―Oportunidades.‖  
5
 The Popular Health Insurance was implemented as a pilot program in 2001.  However, it was not until 





Health Insurance, or by other federal government agencies such as Petróleos Mexicanos 
(PEMEX).
6
 The remaining 40 percent of the population (approximately 43 million 




 As regards the resources invested in health care, Mexico has significantly 
increased its spending as a percentage of GDP during the last few years.  Accordingly, 
the total spending on health (public and private) was raised from 5.6 to 6.5 percent 
between 2000 and 2006.
8
  This figure, however, is still below the Latin American average 
(6.7 percent) and also below the average health care spending of the member countries of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (9 percent).  In terms of 
total spending on health, federal and state governments have managed to increase public 
expenditure during the last twenty years, but not at a significant rate.  In 1990, public 
spending accounted for 40.4 percent of the total resources invested in health care.  By 
2006, this percentage increased to 46.8 percent.  In other words, the majority of the 
money spent on health in 2006 (53.2 percent) went towards private medical services.  
This figure is almost the double of the private spending average of other OECD member 
states (Frenk and Gómez Dantés 2008: 59-63).  For instance, due to the poor quality of 
government agencies‘ medical services, one quarter of the population that has IMSS or 
ISSSTE health coverage refers to pay for private physicians rather than seeking 
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 This figure also includes those citizens that either have private medical insurance or make use of private 
medical services. Twenty-five percent of the population that has government medical coverage also 
regularly utilizes private health services (Frenk and Gómez Dantés 2008: 54).     
7
 In theory, this population receives medical services provided by the Department of Health, the Program 
IMSS-Oportunidades, or by states.  
8





assistance at one of the public institutions (Frenk and Gómez Dantés 2008: 54; Haber, 
Klein, Maurer and Middlebrook 2008: 168). In sum, while Mexico‘s public health system 
has extended its coverage to the majority of the population through diverse governmental 
institutions (IMSS, ISSSTE, and Popular Health Insurance), there are still millions of 
Mexicans without effective access to health assistance. Furthermore, the quality of 
services is deficient.        
 
 
CONGRESSIONAL LEVERAGE ON HEALTH POLICY  
 Has democratization prompted more active participation by Congress in the 
design and implementation of health policies and programs?   What important aspects of 
health policy does Congress decide on through the creation of laws?  What relevant 
policies are delegated to bureaucrats?  This section discusses whether democratization 
increased the involvement of legislators in the drafting of health policies that were 
decided by top-level bureaucrats through reglamentos and other administrative rulings 
during the PRI era.  Additionally, the section analyzes the distribution of authority among 
the Department of Health, state governments, and Congress.    
The legal instrument used to set health policy for an entire administration is the 
National Health Program (Programa Nacional de Salud).  At the beginning of each 
administration, the Department of Health (DH) organizes several forums and round-
tables with academics, non-governmental health organizations, health sector workers, 





Health Program (NHP).  The DH, thus, should base the objectives of NHP on the 
opinions, recommendations and input collected from the forum participants.  Although 
the involvement of societal actors in the NHP is well established, legislators‘ contribution 
is ambiguous since the Planning Law (Ley de Planeación), which regulates the national 
planning system of the federal government, does not clearly establish whether members 
of Congress should take part in the formulation of this program.  Even when the opinions 
and recommendations of legislators are considered in the NHP, the constitution does not 
allow Congress to modify or reject the program.
9
   
In fact, Congress had no real participation in the formulation of the NHP between 
1989 and 2006.  In none of the NHPs covered in this study (1989-1994, 1995-2000, and 
2001-2006) are there records that show that Congress, its health committees, or 
individual legislators participated in the creation of these legal instruments.
10
  
Furthermore, although the DH claimed that the NHPs were formed with societal input, 
health analysts affirm that top-level health officials imposed the programs without taking 
into consideration social demands (Leal 2002; Leal y Martínez 2002).  For instance, in 
the case of the 2001-2006 NHP, the system of Social Protection of Health (SPH, the core 
component of the program) was developed based on the agenda of a Mexican think-tank 
(FUNSALUD) that created this system following World Bank and World Health 
Organization guidelines (Leal 2002: 103; 106).  Given that the SPH neither originated 
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 The Planning Law only establishes that Congress should examine the National Development Plan (not the 
National Health Program), which is the framework used to establish national objectives, strategies, and 
socio-economic priorities that guide the government throughout an administration. Congress may make 
observations about the National Development Plan but it cannot modify or reject it.  
10
 See Programa Nacional de Salud 1990-1994; Programa de Reforma del Sector Salud 1995-2000; 





from citizens‘ demands nor from discussions with NGOs, academics or other societal 
actors, it seems that the DH‘s forums and round-tables were a mere façade to give the 
impression that the federal government creates its main health care programs based on 
citizen petitions and needs. For this reason, analysts have stated that the Fox 
administration did not bring real change in the way that the federal government 
formulates health policies (Leal 2002: 109).  Currently, however, there seems to be more 
participation of Congress, at least in formal terms, given that the 2007-2012 NHP stated 
that, in addition to societal actors and organizations, deputies and senators from the 
health committees contributed in the crafting of this program.   
As regards the legal framework of the health system, the main legislation on this 
subject is the General Health Law (hereafter GHL).  This law regulates the organization 
and administration of the health system and sets the guidelines that public and private 
institutions should follow in the implementation of health services.  In particular, the 
GHL regulates the medical services that the DH and state governments—through the 
Popular Health Insurance—provide to the population in poverty, the self-employed, and 
the unemployed.  In other words, the GHL does not regulate the medical attention 
provided to the population working in the formal sector and federal government 
agencies.
11
 Article 4 of the GHL designates the president, the General Health Council, the 
Department of Health, and state governments as public health authorities.  Therefore, the 
GHL does not recognize Congress as a health authority despite the fact that many policies 
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 The IMSS is in charge of providing health insurance to the employees working in the formal sector and 
the ISSSTE provides health attention to the government‘s employees. Both institutions are regulated by 
their own laws. This chapter examines the DH‘s public policies oriented to people in poverty, the 
unemployed, the self-employed and those working in the informal sector, as well as the legislative 





in this area have to be approved by the Legislature. This exclusion is striking since 
legislators can initiate, modify and reject bills that have an effect on the entire national 
health system. The GHL (article 7) also establishes that the DH is in charge of 
coordinating the national health system
12
 and is responsible for the administration of 
national health policy.  Additionally, the GHL delimits what attributions the DH has at 
the federal level and what health areas and subjects are delegated to states.
13
     
Despite the decentralization of the health system, the GHL requires that the DH 
coordinate with state governments to provide medical services and carry out health 
programs.  The GHL (articles 17-22) stipulates that, in order to carry out such services 
and policies, the DH should establish coordination agreements (acuerdos de 
coordinación) with states.  In this vein, each state signs a coordination agreement with the 
federal government to address the particular health needs of the state population. These 
legal instruments specify in detail the resources that each part (states and federal 
government) should provide as well as the rights, responsibilities and obligations that 
each one has in the implementation of health services. Given that the GHL grants 
authority to states to implement policies in many health areas, the DH cannot carry out, 
by itself, many types of health programs across the country. Therefore, although the DH 
is the highest authority within the national health system, its influence is limited in the 
implementation of many health policies at the state level.                   
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 The national health system is formed by federal and state government agencies as well as by private 
institutions that offer medical services (GHL, article 5).  
13
 As a consequence of the decentralization process, Mexican states had to create their own departments of 
health to administer hospitals, medical clinics and programs transferred from the federal government to 





Despite the importance of the coordination agreements, and the fact that the 
majority of the health resources allocated to states come from federal taxes and are 
approved by Congress, legislators do not have any leverage over these legal instruments 
since they are negotiated and signed only between state governments and the DH. That is, 
at least in formal terms, members of Congress cannot get involved in the negotiation, 
monitoring, or review of the agreements. The lack of legislative oversight of the 
coordination agreements gives ample discretion to the federal and local governments in 
the health area (Author interviews: May 18; June 26, 2009).  The only formal mechanism 
available to legislators to control the health resources allocated to the states is the federal 
budget. Thus, members of Congress‘ budget committee can determine the overall amount 
of resources allocated to health that will be transferred from the federal government to the 
states.
14
 However, once legislators approve the budget there is no legislative mechanism 
to monitor the states‘ usage of the resources (Author‘s interview: June 26, 2009).
15
            
Among the health areas that the DH is entirely responsible for are: the programs 
related to the attention of AIDS and drug addiction; the sanitary control of products and 
services; and the control and regulation of the exportation and importation of medicines, 
medical equipment, and products. Additionally, the GHL grants the DH the exclusive 
authority to establish normas oficiales mexicanas (NOM), which are specific policy 
instructions that every health agency must follow in the implementation of a medical 
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 The federal resources allocated to health care are transferred to states through a federal fund (Fondo de 
aportaciones para los servicios de salud para la comunidad).  The Auditoría Superior de la Federación, 
which is the congressional auditing office, cannot audit these resources since they are spent by regional 
governments.  
15
 In contrast to the federal Congress, state legislatures have the authority to audit and supervise the 





service. The DH is also responsible for the assessment and oversight of federal health 
programs, as well as the supervision of compliance with health laws.
16
 Given that the DH 
has the exclusive power to create the NOM, legislators are not able to propose, modify or 
rescind these regulations.  Consequently, members of Congress do not have control over 
the specific stipulations of health policies. 
Although the GHL stipulates that the DH has to design and implement policies 
and regulations concerning many health areas, the law is not precise in many sections 
since it does not set the limits or parameters that officials have to follow in the design of 
such programs and directives. Consequently, despite multiple modifications to the GHL, 
many health issues continue to be decided by bureaucrats through internal rulings.  In 
contrast, there are other health areas where the GHL defines in detail procedures and 
instructions that bureaucrats have to follow in the implementation of programs.  For 
example, there is a complete chapter within the GHL that clearly defines that the DH has 
exclusive authority to establish ―extraordinary actions‖ to control and eradicate epidemics 
and contagious diseases.  In particular, article 183 gives exclusive power to the president 
to determine—through an executive decree—which regions of the country are subject to 
extraordinary actions.  In this case, the law does not require that Congress authorize these 
types of actions.  Furthermore, the GHL authorizes the DH and state health departments 
to establish preventive sanitary measures such as the establishment of quarantine, 
isolation of a population, and the suspension of work activities.  Despite the severity of 
these measures, they likewise do not have to be approved by Congress (articles 402-415).                                  
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The General Health Council (GHC) is the second sanitary authority in the 
country, just below the president, on whom its power depends.
17
 The GHC has the 
authority to implement policies against tobacco addiction and alcoholism, as well as 
policies that combat diseases caused by environmental pollution. In contrast to the 
attributions of the DH, the GHL (article 17) stipulates that these GHC policies have to be 
validated by Congress.  Another important decentralized body of the DH is the Federal 
Commission for the Protection against Sanitary Risk (COFEPRIS).  The GHL (article 17 
bis) grants the COFEPRIS the authority to design and carry out programs aimed at 
protecting the population against sanitary risks. The COFEPRIS also has authority to 
impose sanctions on those private or public companies and medical laboratories that do 
not comply with sanitary regulations. Although the GHL specifies in detail the 
COFEPRIS attributions, it does not establish any institutional mechanism that allows 
Congress or its health committees to systematically oversee the functioning of this 
important agency.  This omission is remarkable since the COFEPRIS carries out crucial 
functions and also because the agency was created in 2001, after the PAN had already 
won the presidency.        
 As it can be observed, the GHL delegates ample leeway to the DH to design and 
implement many health policies. Moreover, the law allows states to carry out the majority 
of health programs by themselves or in coordination with the federal agency.  Despite the 
fact that the DH has limited authority in states, the agency is entitled to elaborate health 
regulations that specify the precise procedures that all public and private agencies should 
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adhere to when carrying out a health service.  For its part, Congress also has authority to 
design and implement health policies.  But in many aspects the GHL is ambiguous and 
leaves ample room for DH officials to carry out programs as they wish.  In addition, and 
with few exceptions, the health legislation does not stipulate that Congress has to validate 
either the DH policies or the emergency actions taken by the president.  Consequently, 
the GHL generally does not establish Congress‘ participation, consultation, control, 
oversight or supervision in the implementation of most DH health programs.   
Table 5.1 summarizes the health issues that are decided by the DH and state 
governments, as well as those subjects where Congress is either involved or has 
participation. As it can be observed, the only area in which all three institutions 
participate is in the creation of the National Development Plan. However, neither states 
nor Congress have the power to modify the plan once it is enacted by the president.  The 
DH is the institution with the central authority (to coordinate, make policy, or impose 
sanctions) in almost all health issues.  In contrast, Congress is the weakest institution in 
terms of its authority in health related issues. With the exception of the approval of the 
health budget, Congress has limited or no power to oversee or sanction health agencies, 
or to design specific health programs. Finally, state governments have a level of authority 
that lies between that of the DH and Congress in health matters.  State governments have 
the authority to design and carry out programs in important health areas by themselves or 
in coordination with the DH.  Additionally, regional departments of health can use 
federal resources with ample discretion without being accountable to the federal 





In sum, democratization has not significantly increased the participation of 
Congress in the design and implementation of health policy.  Although modifications to 
the GHL have allowed for the involvement of legislators in many health issues, there are 
many areas that are decided by officials through reglamentos and other internal rulings.  
Furthermore, democracy did not further the establishment of oversight mechanisms to 
hold health bureaucrats accountable. In the next section I examine the effects of 
democracy on the GHL. In particular, I assess what kinds of amendments have been 
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THE EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY ON THE GENERAL HEALTH LAW 
 The GHL, enacted in 1984, is divided into sections and then subdivided into 
chapters.  Each chapter contains a certain number of articles.  Sections regulate diverse 
subjects regarding the health care system, while chapters—through articles—regulate 
specific issues.  Since its enactment until June 2009, the GHL has been modified forty-
three times.  Eighty-six percent of the General Health Law amendments were passed 
during the democratic era.  That is, thirty-seven modifications to the health legislation 
were enacted between the first year of Vicente Fox‘s administration and June 2009 (see 
figure 5.1 below).  And in just the first thirty months of the Calderón administration, 
fifteen changes were made to the GHL.  By contrast, under the PRI regime, the GHL was 
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 The congressional authority to supervise health policies is not stipulated in the General Health Law. 
























Amendments to the General Health Law
 
The high number of modifications in recent years suggests that democracy has 
allowed for greater congressional involvement in the overhaul of the health care system.  
Such transformation includes the establishment of diverse checks and controls in the 
implementation of health policies.  A way to analyze whether democracy has fostered 
tighter constraints on bureaucratic discretion in the health system is by counting the 





modification of the content of original articles or has included new ones.  What does the 
addition of new articles signify about the effect of democratization on the GHL?  In 
principle, new articles can establish limits, constraints, checks, procedures, stipulations, 
and datelines, among other rules, that bureaucrats should follow in the implementation of 
health programs.  Following Huber and Shipan‘s (2002) argument, the more articles there 
are in the law, the less room officials have to manipulate the law to suit their interests 
since each additional article establishes constraints in the implementation of policies.  
Between 1984 and June 2009, the number of articles in the GHL increased by 23 percent.  
That is, the law went from having 472 articles in 1984, to 580 articles in June 2009.
19
  
The great majority of the new articles (81.5 percent) were added in the democratic era.   
But this is a purely formalistic assessment. In fact, new articles could give 
bureaucrats more responsibilities that they could discharge at their discretion.       
Therefore, a better way to assess whether democracy has prompted the enactment of 
stricter legislation is to examine the content of the health amendments.  Although there 
were only six modifications to the General Health Law during the PRI era, four of these 
amendments brought substantial changes to the health care system (see amendments to 
the GHL in the Diario Oficial de la Federación: 05/27/1987; 06/14/1991; 05/07/1997; 
05/26/2000). For instance, in June 1991, Congress passed a comprehensive bill that 
modified eighty-one articles and added twelve more to the GHL. While some of these 
changes established constraints on health officials, others served to regulate diverse 
health subjects that were not previously included in the legislation.  It seems that the 
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 This figure does not include subsections or paragraphs added to original articles of the GHL. As of June 





strategy of PRI presidents was to change key aspects of the health care system by 
bundling multiple changes to diverse health issues in one comprehensive reform, instead 
of introducing to Congress many reforms with few changes throughout their 
administrations.  Given that PRI presidents had absolute majorities in Congress, they did 
not have any problem passing their comprehensive health reforms.  Since 1997, however, 
presidents have not had the majorities necessary to approve their bills.  This political 
context has forced presidents to make gradual changes to the health care system.  What 
kinds of modifications have been enacted during the democratic period?  Has democracy 
forced Congress to pass clearer and stricter guidelines?  Have legislators approved low-
discretion legislation? 
As mentioned above, the number of amendments to the GHL during the 
democratic era is consistent with Huber and Shipan‘s argument (2002) that democratic 
regimes with divided governments and a reasonable degree of legislative 
professionalization tend to enact more regulations in the implementation of public 
policies.
20
  In principle, the amendments to the GHL suggest that the regime change has 
allowed legislators to enact more and stricter controls over public health officials.  
Nonetheless, an examination of the amendments‘ content shows that the reforms were not 
necessarily aimed at limiting health officials‘ discretion or imposing controls or 
procedures for the implementation of programs.  As it can be seen in Table 5.2, 41 
percent of the reforms to the GHL enacted in the democratic era did not establish 
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 It is noteworthy that during the first divided government, when the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber 
of Deputies (1997-2000), the GHL was only amended twice.  This low number of reforms to the health care 





bureaucratic controls, policy instructions, or limits or sanctions on public officials.  The 
majority of these amendments regulate health activities carried out by individuals, private 
companies or non-governmental institutions that were previously not considered in the 
GHL.  Examples of these activities include the transplantation of organs, donation of 
food, and the sale and advertising of cigarettes and medicines.  Thus, these reforms gave 
bureaucrats more responsibilities and powers and, subsequently, more capacity to use 
their discretion in the implementation of the law.  
Another 32 percent of the reforms either set controls or gave instructions 
concerning health programs, but these limits are vague and, consequently, leave ample 
room for bureaucratic discretion. That is, although these amendments try to reduce 
bureaucratic leeway, they do not clearly set limits with regards to what the DH can or 
cannot do.  For instance, in 2002 article 115 subsection II was amended to establish that:  
 
The Department of Health is in charge of regulating educational programs and 
activities on the subjects of nutrition, prevention, treatment and control of 
malnutrition and obesity.  These programs and activities should be aimed at 
developing adequate nutritional habits preferably within the most vulnerable 
social groups.   
 
Although this subsection instructs the DH to implement these programs, it does 
not define in any precise way the objectives, scope, parameters, and funding of the 





social groups‖.  The amendment also does not set policy procedures or instructions that 
health officials have to follow in the implementation of such programs.  The lack of clear 
limits and detailed policy instructions is found in diverse health areas such as nutrition, 
prevention and control of accidents, HIV and the regulation of severe actions to stop the 
spreading of contagious diseases (see table 5.2).   
Finally, only 27 percent of the reforms enacted since the change of regime clearly 
define and impose limits, controls, instructions and procedures for certain aspects of the 
health care system.  The case of the waiver of medical fees for minors is an illustrative 
example of this type of reform.  In November 2004, Congress added a paragraph to 
article 36 that stipulates the following: 
 
Any minor, from birth until five years old, whose family is not affiliated with any 
health care institution, is exempted of fees for any kind of medical attention and 
medicines. In order to comply with this stipulation, it is an indispensable 
requirement that the level of income of the minor‘s family is within the lowest 
three deciles established by the Department of Health. 
  
In this example, legislators clearly and unambiguously established the policy 
procedures public health officials have to follow when providing medical attention to 
poor minors.  In the same vein, this paragraph precisely defines the age range and the 
requirement that has to be fulfilled in order to be exempted from charge.  Similar limits, 





popular health insurance, medical and nursery schools, medical laboratories, and those 
related to sanitary control, among others.  In sum, only ten out of thirty-seven reforms to 
the GHL enacted in the democratic era effectively seek to constrain, through legislation, 
bureaucrats‘ discretion to implement health policies.  The next section assesses whether 
these low discretion reforms effectively constrain health officials in practice.  
Additionally, this part examines to what extent Congress supervises the execution of 
health programs and controls the implementation of those programs that the low- 





Table 5.2: General Health Law Amendments 2001-2009 
Date of 
publication in the 
Diario  








Type of amendment: Does the 
addition or amendment impose 
policy instructions, limits, 
controls or sanctions to officials? 
 
01/05/2001 199 BIS and 464 BIS Donation and distribution of food 
 
No 
06/04/2002 115 subsection VII 
 
Nutrition Yes, but not clearly defined 
05/15/2003 3 subsection III BIS; 13, Apartado 
A, Subsection VII BIS; Apartado B, 
subsection I; Section three, articles 
77 BIS1 to 77 BIS 41; article 17 
subsection IX; article 28 and article 
25 
 
Creation, organization and 
administration of the System of Social 
Protection in Health and the Popular 
Health Insurance 
Yes 
06/13/2003 260 Sale of medicines in drugstores 
 
No 
06/19/2003 114; 115; 210, and 212 
 




06/30/2003 17; 17 BIS 1; 17 BIS 2; 313 
subsection 1; and 340 
 
Sanitary control and creation of the 
COFEPRIS 
Yes 
01/19/2004 276; 421; 277; 277 BIS; 308 BIS; 
309 BIS 
 
Advertising and sale of cigarettes No 
06/02/2004 115 subsection II Nutrition, obesity and malnutrition 
programs 






11/05/2004 329; 333 subsection VI; 461; 462; 
462 BIS 
 
Transplant and donation of organs No 








02/24/2005 13 Apartado A, subsection II, 
Apartado B subsection I; 61 
subsection II; 112 subsection III; 3; 
61 
 
Creation of public programs in diverse 
health subjects  
Yes, but not clearly defined 
06/07/2005 314 subsection II; 360 BIS-6 Definition and regulation of corpses 
 
Yes, but not clearly defined 




12/26/2005 159 Subsection V Establishment of nutritional habits 
 
Yes, but not clearly defined 








04/24/2006 268 BIS; 268 BIS-1; 419 Regulation of tattoos No 
 
05/25/2006 464; 208; 464 Ter. Regulation and sanctioning of medical 







06/06/2006 277 Sale of cigarettes 
  
No 
09/19/2006 10; 11 subsection I; 27 subsection 
X; 54; 106; 393; 403; 3 subsection 
IV BIS; 6 subsections IV BIS and 
VI BIS; 93; 113 
 
Inclusion of the indigenous population 
in the health care system 
Yes, but not clearly defined 
01/18/2007 419; 420; 421; 422; 422 BIS Administrative sanctions on health care 




05/09/2007 164 Research, control and prevention of 
accidents 
 
Yes, but not clearly defined 
05/09/2007 79 Regulation of diverse professional 
activities related to health 
 
No 
06/19/2007 271 Regulation of plastic surgeries and 
dietary medicines 
No 




05/30/2008 Congress repealed the Health law 
articles related to the production and 
sale of tobacco and enacted the 
General Law for the Control of 
Tobacco 
 
Control of Tobacco Yes 
07/14/2008 3 subsection XXVIII; 13 Apartado 
B subsection I; 313 subsection II; 
350 BIS 3 
 
Regulation of diverse health aspects 
(human organs and corpses) 
Yes, but not clearly defined 







12/15/2008 13 Apartado A subsection II, XVII; 
157 BIS 
Programs for the prevention and 
control of HIV 
 
Yes, but not clearly defined 
01/05/2009 184 Extraordinary actions Yes, but not clearly defined 
 
01/05/2009 13 Apartado B subsection I and 
XXX; 27 subsection III; 59; 112 
subsection III; 421 BIS; 33 
 
Rehabilitation, curative and palliative 
treatments 
Yes 
04/17/2009 51; 51 BIS-1; 51 BIS-2; 51 BIS-3 Patients‘ rights 
 
Yes 
05/31/2009 64 subsection IV Midwives‘ training Yes, but not clearly defined 
 
06/11/2009 222 BIS Biotechnological medicines 
 
No 
06/11/2009 17 BIS subsection VIII; 313; 314 
subsections VI; XIII, XIV; 316; 
329; 336; 338 subsection IV and V; 
339; 343, 344, 345; 314 subsections 
XV; XVI, XVII; 322; 337; 341 BIS 
 





CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF HEALTH POLICIES 
 Is there congressional surveillance of health policies?  To what extent do deputies 
and senators oversee health programs?  As mentioned in previous chapters, Congress can 
supervise the work of the bureaucracy either through its committees, or through the 
Auditoría Superior de la Federación (ASF), which is the Chamber of Deputies‘ technical 
body that audits federal programs and policies.  In general, secretaries of the various 
departments appear before committees either to discuss the Informe de Gobierno,
21
when 
legislators ask them to account for the development of a certain policy, or to explain a 
wrongdoing within a program.  According to nearly 100 percent of the interviewees, 
comparecencias (congressional hearings with public officials) are not a very effective 
oversight mechanism for bureaucratic accountability.  With frequency, legislators ask 
officials to appear before Congress as a response to political scandals exposed by the 
media.  During these congressional hearings, opposition legislators often try to embarrass 
officials by making sarcastic comments about the agency‘s performance. Similarly, 
legislators utilize comparecencias to make political statements in order to call the 
attention of the press.  In contrast, legislators from the president‘s party use the hearings 
as a forum to either praise agencies‘ work or reply to opposition attacks on public 
policies.  For their part, public officials use technical jargon and detailed information to 
counterbalance opposition parties‘ criticisms. In fact, information from interviews reveals 
that one or two days before the congressional hearing takes place, top-level officials give 
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legislators from the president‘s party a list of questions that they can ask in the 
comparecencia. In this way, lawmakers from the president‘s party can control the 
impression that bureaucrats make on the committee members (Author interviews: May 8, 
16; July 19; August 2, 23; September 5, 2006; January 7, 2007).  In sum, comparecencias 
are superficial congressional acts mainly because legislators view them as an opportunity 
to reprimand public officials‘ work, and not as a means to correct mistakes of policies 
and programs.  Moreover, once the comparecencias are over, legislators rarely follow up 
on the demands and recommendations made to bureaucrats or investigate whether 
bureaucrats have corrected the wrongdoings. 
The statements from interviewees are consistent with the comparecencia minutes.  
These records show the scarce interest that legislators pay to the appearances of top-level 
officials before legislative committees. By law, all the secretaries of state have to appear 
before the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies‘ committees once a year to assess the 
annual functioning of agency programs. The comparecencias involving the DH secretary 
during the Fox administration exemplify the scarce attention that legislators pay to these 
hearings.  On average, only eighteen deputies from the health committee attended these 
congressional hearings.
22
  This was a  low number since, by law, a minimum of sixteen 
deputies out of the health committee‘s thirty members must be present to start a meeting.  
Moreover, in the six comparecencias to examine the DH‘s annual work, some deputies 
left the meetings before they ended.  In fact, in 2006 two deputies (who were supposed to 
question the secretary) abandoned the meeting just a few minutes after it started.   
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The analysis of the comparecencias’ minutes also reveals that opposition 
legislators frequently made political, instead of technical, statements and comments.  In 
the 2004 comparecencia, for instance, a PRD deputy said (Diario de Debates 
12/22/2004):   
 
We want a change, a true reform of the state. A democratic reform with popular 
content.  We are here for the assessment of President Fox‘s fourth annual report. 
But the social policy of this administration is completely defined. It is defined by 
an increase of inequality and inequity.   
  
Furthermore, minutes from the comparecencias show that deputies from the 
president‘s party usually praise or defend the DH secretary and its programs.  In the 2003 
comparecencia, for instance, a PAN deputy said to the DH secretary: ―We congratulate 
you for the program on medical interns and nursing… you can have our complete support 
for the accomplishment of the National Health Program‖ (Diario de Debates 10/22/2003).  
In 2004, another PAN deputy affirmed, ―There are many [DH achievements] but there 
are some [opposition legislators] that do not want to acknowledge them‖ (Diario de 
Debates 10/22/2004).  Similarly, during the 2006 comparecencia, a PAN deputy replied 
to the oppositions‘ criticisms that the DH did not transfer enough resources to state health 
departments by arguing that ―It is very easy to come here and criticize a project… The 
federal government does transfer enough funds to states governments, but they do not 





have to acknowledge the work of the secretary.  You have done highly regarded work‖ 
(Diario de Debates 10/25/2006). 
Finally, comparecencia minutes uncovered that many members of the health 
committee were not well informed about the DH‘s public policies and programs.  With 
frequency, deputies voiced general or superficial questions and comments to the DH 
secretary.  Accordingly, in each comparecencia between 2001 and 2006, DH Secretary 
Frenk had to provide general information about certain policies or correct certain data 
that opposition deputies used to attack him. During the 2002 comparecencia, for instance, 
rather than asking about the implementation details of the DH‘s programs against cervical 
cancer, a deputy asked what policies for this disease were being carried out.  The deputy, 
thus, did not know basic information such as the number of cases treated or the names of 
the DH programs to prevent and control this disease.  In the same congressional hearing, 
Frenk had to clarify to another deputy how the health budget was distributed among the 
DH, the National Institutes, and the states departments of health (Diario de Debates 
10/4/2002). That Frenk had to explain the distribution of the health budget was surprising 
given that this information was approved by deputies in the appropriations law.  As these 
examples illustrate, comparecencias are not effective oversight mechanisms by which 
legislators examine, discuss or correct the DH policies.                   
By contrast, ASF audits and investigations are effective instruments for 
overseeing the implementation of programs.  Such audits are conducted by professional 
accountants who have the time and resources to analyze policy implementation and 





Pública, the governmental record of all the financial operations undertaken during the 
fiscal year) and prepares a report that is delivered to the Chamber of Deputies for 
examination.    
In the case of the health sector, the ASF has carried out just a few audits of health 
programs and institutions during the democratic era (see figure 5.2). On average, the 
Department of Health was only audited nine times per year between 2001 and 2007.  This 
number of audits is very low, particularly when it is compared to the number of audits 
conducted on other departments. For instance, the ASF audited the Communications and 
Transportation and Hacienda departments, on average, forty-six and sixty-seven times per 
year, respectively, during the same period.  Similarly, the audits conducted in the health 
sector as a percentage of the total number of audits among all agencies was also very low. 
While in the case of the Communications and Transportation and the Hacienda 
departments the percentage reached 12 and 17 percent, respectively, the percentage in the 
Health Department did not even reach 5 percent of the total audits between 2001 and 












Figure 5.2: Number of ASF audits of the Health, Communications and Transportation, 
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Figure 5.3: ASF audits of the Health, Communications and Transportation, and Hacienda  


























What health areas did the ASF oversee through its audits?  The ASF carried out 
sixty-seven regular audits on the health sector between 2001 and 2007.  The health 
institutions and areas audited are shown in Table 5.3.  As can be observed, the majority 
of the ASF audits were conducted on general hospitals and national health institutes but 
not on the DH, which is the main federal agency that coordinates the national health 
system and that is the most important institution within the health sector.  Indeed, only 
sixteen out of sixty-seven audits (or 23.88 percent) were carried out on the DH.  
Specifically, the ASF conducted just seven audits (10.44 percent of the total health sector 





GHL. Stated differently, since the start of the democratic period, the ASF only performed 
seven audits to check whether the DH bureaucrats complied with the new constraints and 
controls imposed by Congress.
23
  The health areas, programs and institutions under strict 
regulation since 2001 that were audited by the ASF were:  the National Commission for 
the Social Protection in Health and Popular Health Insurance (four audits); the National 
Center for the Control and Prevention of HIV, CENSIDA (two audits), and the 
importation of toxic substances (one audit). Thus, the ASF did not verify whether the DH 
complied with the GHL in important areas such as the donation and transplantation of 
organs, rehabilitation treatments, control of tobacco and obesity, nutrition programs, 
donation of food, sanitary control of medical laboratories, and sanctions to health 
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 The rest of the audits conducted on the DH and on general hospitals and national health institutes were 
financial examinations to check whether bureaucrats utilized health resources according to their own 




















Department of Health 
 Health Services Fund 
 Transfers to civil organizations 
GEA General Hospital 
Children‘s General Hospital 
National Institute of Cardiology 
National Institute of Perinatology 
National Institute of Public Health 
Biological Laboratory (BIRMEX) 










National Rehabilitation Center 
General Hospital of Mexico 
Children‘s General Hospital 
National Institute of Cardiology 











Department of Health 
 Oportunidades (nutritional products) 
 Health services subsidies (Popular Health 
Insurance, Oportunidades, and IMSS-
Oportunidades) 
Public welfare administration 
General Hospital of Mexico 
GEA General Hospital 
National Institute of Pediatrics 
Biological Laboratory (BIRMEX) 













Department of Health 
 Acquisition, distribution and prescription of 
medicines 
 Personal services 
Public welfare administration 
National Center for the Prevention and Control of HIV 
(CENSIDA) 










General Hospital of Mexico 
National Institute of Pediatrics 








Department of Health 
 Popular Health Insurance 
 Program of quality, equality and development in 
health 
 Public works (National Institute of Psychiatry and 
National Institute of Respiratory Diseases) 
National Center for the Prevention and Control of HIV 
(CENSIDA) 
National Center on Epidemiological Surveillance and 
Disease Control 













Department of Health 
 Performance audit on Tlalnepantla municipality  
(Morelos) 
 Import of toxic substances 
 General Services 
National Center for Child and Adolescent Health 
National Commission for Social Protection in Health 
National Institute of Nutrition 
National Institute of Genomic Medicine 
National Institute of Neurology 
Biological Laboratory 













Department of Health 
 Health services (first level of attention) 
 Salaries 
 Acquisition of medical supplies and equipment 
General Hospital of Mexico 
National Institute of Cancerology 
National Institute of Respiratory Diseases 
National Institute of Genomic Medicine 












What were the findings of the ASF‘s audits?  In the case of the National 
Commission for Social Protection in Health (hereafter NCSPH), which is the institution 
that operates the Popular Health Insurance (hereafter PHI), the ASF carried out 4 audits.  
As is well known, the PHI was the main health program established during the Fox 
Administration, and it continues to operate in the Calderón administration.  As mentioned 
in the first part of the chapter, the PHI was established in 2003 to provide health coverage 
to the population in poverty, the unemployed, self-employed, and those working in the 
informal sector who lacked effective access to any medical assistance.  The GHL 
contains forty-one articles that describe in detail the procedures, guidelines and 
instructions that bureaucrats have to follow when implementing the PHI.  Despite the 
controls and restrictions established in the GHL, the ASF has found diverse irregularities 
in all the audits that have been carried out on the agency.  In 2003, for example, the 
NCSPH transgressed the Public Administration Law and the reglamento of the 
Department of Health when it allocated subsidies to the PHI without following any 
administrative procedure manual.  The ASF stated that the absence of an administrative 
manual hindered the appropriate control of the subsidies allocated to the PHI and other 
health programs.  Moreover, the NCSPH, which is an agency of the DH, failed to justify 
transfers of resources totaling 144.1 million dollars (or 69.9 percent of the total resources 
allocated to the PHI) from one health item to another. These financial maneuverings were 
neither approved by Congress nor outlined in the appropriations law.  Similarly, the 
NCSPH transgressed the reglamento of the Budget Law since it did not comply with the 





In 2004, the ASF uncovered that the NCSPH violated various accounting 
guidelines by transferring resources to other DH units that were not related to the 
management and operation of the PHI (ASF 2004 IRRFSCP Tomo VII Vol. 1: 298).  In 
2005, the NCSPH failed to provide documentation verifying that 24.5 percent (210.2 
million dollars) of the financial resources were, in fact, spent in the operation of the PHI.  
In the same year, the agency failed to comply with article 77 BIS of the GHL, which 
requires that the NCSPH create a special fund for health services.   Furthermore, the ASF 
found that the NCSPH did not have indicators to assess whether the implementation of 
the PHI reduced insured people‘s expenditures on catastrophic diseases by 75 percent, 
which was one of the main objectives of the PHI. Finally, based on NCSPH information, 
the ASF stated that the agency would not fulfill the GHL objective to enroll 100 percent 
of eligible families by 2010 because of mistakes in the calculation of insurance coverage 
(ASF 2005 IRRFSCP Tomo VII Vol.1: 17-196; Laurell 2007: 531-533).  Irregularities in 
PHI operations continued during 2006. In this year, the ASF found discrepancies in the 
resources allotted to the PHI between the Public Account and the NCSPH‘s financial 
statement (ASF 2006 IRRFSCP Tomo V Vol. 4: 217).  More important, the NCSPH 
failed to document that 33 million dollars were used to deliver PHI cards and establish 
1000 enrollment centers (2006 IRRFSCP Tomo V Vol. 4: 233-234; 237-239). 
Health researchers have also found inconsistencies and irregularities in the 
operation of the PHI.  In terms of health coverage, for instance, analysts argue that the 
PHI does not comply with the objective of reducing health inequalities given that there is 





resources to the program than rich states since PHI rules establish a fixed state premium 
per family that all states have to pay, regardless of the state‘s number of families eligible 
for enrollment and its socio-economic condition (Scott 2006; Laurell 2007; Tamez and 
Eibenschutz 2008).
24
 Other irregularities are the imprecise figures in the number of PHI 
beneficiaries. For instance, some states report over 100 percent coverage rates of their 
estimated target population of uninsured households.  Similarly, there are differences 
between the NCSPH‘s and the DH‘s account of the uninsured population by state (Scott 
2006: 155-156; Tamez and Eibenschutz 2008: 140-141).  This lack of consistency and 
precision in the PHI‘s information hinders the effective functioning of the program and 
impedes its evaluation.       
The National Center for the Prevention and Control of HIV (CENSIDA) is 
another DH institution that has been under stricter regulation since 2001. The ASF 
carried out two audits on this agency in 2004 and 2005.  In the first year, the ASF found 
that CENSIDA failed to fulfill one of its main objectives, which was to reduce the rate of 
HIV sexual transmission by 15 percent within the population between the ages of 15 and 
24 years. Despite the fact that CENSIDA‘s program of action included the 
implementation of specific and detailed policies and programs to prevent the sexual 
transmission of HIV, the institution only allocated 1.2 percent of its annual budget to 
programs related to prevention. CENSIDA also failed to achieve the objective of 
reducing the mortality rate in people between the ages of 24 and 44 years.  The goal of 
CENSIDA‘s HIV action program and the 2001-2006 National Health Program was to 
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 The PHI is funded through three main sources: federal tax money, state tax money and a family premium 





reduce the mortality rate in this population by 16 percent.  However, CENSIDA 
programs only reduced the mortality rate by 1.7 percent.  Another irregularity found 
within CENSIDA was in its purchase and distribution of antiretroviral medicines, as the 
ASF reported that CENSIDA did not provide documentation verifying that 2 percent of 
its total spending was used on this activity.  More important, the ASF report indicates that 
CENSIDA might have put the lives of HIV patients at risk, as the agency did not include 
resources in its annual budget for the purchase of antiretroviral treatments. The DH had 
to transfer resources to CENSIDA in order to comply with this objective (ASF 2004 
IRRFSCP Tomo VII Vol. 1: 227-280).   
In 2005, CENSIDA violated diverse regulations, including the reglamento of the 
GHL, by not updating its operating manuals. The ASF concluded that failure to update 
the  manuals hindered the effective control of the resources from the public trust fund that 
went towards the system of social protection for health operations. The ASF also 
denounced the lack of accountability mechanisms in the management of the trust.  
Another important finding of the audit was that 33 percent of the resources allocated to 
the purchase of antiretroviral medicines were not spent by CENSIDA during the year 
(ASF 2005 IRRFSCP Tomo VII Vol. 1: 253-278).  Despite these irregularities and the 
lack of transparency in the operation of CENSIDA, Congress increased the institution‘s 
resources by 25 percent in 2006 (Author interview: July 11, 2006).
25
    
In addition to the regular audits that the ASF carries out every year on federal 
agencies and programs, deputies can request special audits on certain agencies or policies 
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 The audit on the import of toxic substances, which has operated under strict regulations since 2001, did 





that they believe have committed wrongdoings that were not considered by the ASF.
26
  
The number of deputies‘ requests to make special audits increased significantly (694.4 
percent) since the PAN won the presidency in 2000.  In other words, while in 2001 there 
were thirty-six requests for audits, deputies asked the ASF to carry out 250 special audits 
in 2007 (ASF IRRFSCP Tomo Ejecutivo 2007: 39).
27
  These figures are consistent with 
institutional theories that state that Congress carries out more oversight actions under 
democracy (Huber and Shipan 2002).  
But although the number of deputies‘ special audits increased significantly, only 
eleven (1.19 percent) of these requests were to audit the health sector.  While six of these 
requests asked the ASF to examine the operation of the NCSPH and the PHI, the rest of 
the audits assessed the DH donations to civil organizations, the decentralization of health 
services, the violation of health workers‘ rights, and the resources that the DH transferred 
to the IMSS.
28
   
The number and types of special audits conducted on the health sector indicate 
two points:  First, legislators were not very interested in overseeing the functioning of the 
DH, its programs and agencies.  As previously mentioned, in seven years there were only 
eleven (out of 929) deputy-requested special audits of the DH.  Second, although 
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 The ASF selects the federal agencies and programs to be audited based on diverse criteria such as 
institutional relevance, economic indicators, and technical feasibility (see ASF Tomo Ejecutivo 2007: 15-
18).  Deputies supervise the work of the ASF through the Supervisory Committee. Deputies ask the ASF to 
conduct special audits to the ASF through the Supervisory Committee.  During the PRI era, this committee 
was always headed by a PRI deputy. But since 1997 there has been an informal rule among political parties 
in Congress that the chair of the Supervisory committee has to be selected from one of the opposition 
parties.      
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 Moreover, there were fifty-six additional requests made by individual legislators and diverse committees 
(ASF Tomo Ejecutivo 2007: 39). 
28
 This last audit was not carried out because the executive branch submitted a constitutional challenge to 





members of Congress established controls and restrictions in diverse health areas and 
programs since 2001 (see table 2 above), they were only interested in overseeing whether 
the DH bureaucrats were complying with the PHI legislation.  It makes sense, then, that 
deputies asked the ASF to conduct six audits on the PHI between 2004 and 2007, given 
that this program was the main health policy of the PAN era.  Although the ASF‘s focus 
on PHI can be seen as a wise use of scarce attention and resources, there were other very 
important policies, such as the control of tobacco, nutrition programs and the prevention 
and control of obesity, that were not examined by legislators (at least through audits).   
While the results of the PHI audits show that this public program has had many 
irregularities in its operation, there were also wrongdoings found in the rest of the special 
audits requested by deputies.  For example, the ASF found that there were no established 
procedures for the spending of DH donations to civil organizations (ASF IRRFSCP 2001 
Tomo VIII Vol. 1: 40-43).  Also, regarding the transfers that the federal government 
made to the states in 2001, it was found that Hacienda violated article 3 of the Ley de 
Coordinación Fiscal which instructs the agency to apply the concept of ―equity of health 
services‖ among the states.  The use of such an equity formula would have easily allowed 
the equal allocation of resources among state governments (ASF 2001 IRRFSCP Tomo 
VIII Vol. 1: 17-21). Finally, in 2004 the ASF uncovered that there were irregularities in 
38.82 percent of the total amount allocated to the salaries of DH employees in the sub-
department of the prevention and promotion of health (ASF 2004 IRRFSCP Tomo VII 





In sum, the ASF, either through its regular audits or the special audits requested 
by deputies, has found a wide range of irregularities in the health sector.  Why do 
legislators tolerate these wrongdoings?  Why do members of Congress not pressure 
authorities to sanction officials who commit illegal actions? 
 
 
INFORMAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN LEGISLATORS AND BUREAUCRATS 
The reason why legislators do not push authorities to sanction health bureaucrats 
is that members of Congress need favors from officials. There are at least two types of 
requests and favors that legislators ask of health officials:   
1) Deputies and senators frequently contact top-level officials to ask for resources 
for local medical clinics and hospitals.  Similarly, members of Congress request the DH 
to carry out special health programs in certain states or districts.  Legislators make these 
petitions especially when Hacienda and the DH are preparing the annual budget for the 
health sector.  Moreover, legislators demand the transfer of additional resources for the 
implementation of certain health programs in their states or districts during the fiscal 
year.  Accordingly, legislators and health bureaucrats have meetings where deputies and 
senators request money transfers to specific districts, municipalities or states. Obtaining 
resources for local clinics or hospitals is very important for politicians‘ careers. 
According to information from interviews, every time legislators manage to get resources 
for the implementation of a health program or the construction of a medical clinic, they 





(Author interviews: April 20, 26; May 5; November 1, 6, 7; 19; December 5, 2006; July 
24, 2009).   
Evidence of legislators‘ demands for resources and requests for the 
implementation of policies for their districts and states is found in the puntos de acuerdo.  
As stated in the previous chapter, puntos de acuerdo (PA) are non-binding resolutions 
that lawmakers make to either point out a failure in a public policy, or to request 
resources or a specific program from executive agencies.  Between 1997 and 2009, 
deputies initiated 199 health related PAs.  Sixty-two of these PAs either demanded 
resources for local clinics and hospitals or requested the implementation of health 
policies in specific municipalities or regions.  
Figure 5.4 shows the health related puntos de acuerdo initiated between 1997 and 
2009 in the Chamber of Deputies.  For each Legislature the figure depicts the PA that 
requested the implementation of universal policies and those that demanded specific 
resources or programs for particular states or municipalities.
29
 As can be seen, the 
number of universal and particularistic PA has increased throughout the process of 
democratization in Mexico. The percentage of particularistic PA went from 14 percent in 
the LVII Legislature (1997-2000) to almost 30 percent during the LX Legislature (2006-
2009).  These figures seem to suggest that deputies are utilizing PA more frequently as a 
means to satisfy local or regional needs. Given that officials from the DH are not forced 
to abide by the PA‘s demands, legislators can only hope that bureaucrats will comply 
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 While the inclusion of the morning after pill in the basic chart of medicines provided by the DH is an 
example of a universal policy, deputies‘ request for resources for the construction of a hospital in the 





with their requests. Therefore, in order to obtain resources and benefits for their districts 
and states, legislators must not cause trouble for the bureaucracy by modifying health 
legislation or by carrying out investigations to health programs.  Put differently, 
legislators‘ dependence on bureaucrats‘ resources leads politicians to not effectively exert 
their control powers over the DH‘s policies and programs (Author interviews: July 12; 
August 7 2006; November 3, 6, 19; December 5, 2006).               
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2) Legislators frequently ask health bureaucrats for specific favors on behalf of 
their constituents, friends or relatives.  For instance, members of Congress often ask DH 
officials to facilitate the entrance to the National Health Institutes and Federal Hospitals 
for their constituents.  Although the health sector is decentralized (meaning that each 
state has its own hospitals and clinics) and that the IMSS and ISSSTE provide medical 
attention to salaried and government employees respectively, the DH coordinates the 
National Health Institutes. These institutes serve as research centers and specialized 
hospitals (cancer, cardiology, neurology, nutrition, pediatrics, and psychiatry, among 
others) that provide higher-quality medical attention than those of the IMSS, ISSSTE, or 
state hospitals. Furthermore, the National Health Institutes have the technology and 
resources to treat diseases that no other public hospital would be able to handle.  
According to interviews, legislators frequently contact health bureaucrats to ask them to 
"facilitate" entrance to the NHI for their cronies. In this way, health bureaucrats can help 
legislators‘ friends or relatives obtain high-quality medical attention for free or at low 
cost.  Likewise, it is not uncommon for legislators to ask health officials to register their 
friends in the NHI in order to get expensive medical treatments for free.  Legislators have 
also requested that health bureaucrats ―recommend‖ their cronies or relatives for the 
National Medical Residency Exam, which is coordinated by the DH and which every 
medical student must pass in order to become a medical resident in any hospital or clinic 
in Mexico. (Author interviews: April 20; 26; May 15; July 11; November 1, 3, 7, 21; 





Information obtained from interviews indicates that legislators usually contact 
health bureaucrats only when they are seeking favors. Stated differently, members of 
Congress are more interested in getting favors than overseeing the design and 
implementation of health policies and programs. As stated by one interviewee: 
―Legislators do not call me to check the implementation of health programs, they contact 
me when they ask me to do favors for their friends‖ (Author interview November 3, 
2006).  In this vein, a top-level official from CENSIDA stated that with certain regularity, 
deputies contact him to get AIDS treatments for some of their constituents (Author 
interview: July 11, 2006). Two top-level officials from the DH also affirmed that it is not 
uncommon for legislators to call them to solicit surgeries for their relatives in National 
Health Institutes or federal hospitals.  Such surgeries would normally cost around 30 
thousand dollars in private hospitals (Author interviews: June 26; July 24, 2009).  Other 
health officials stated that legislators regularly ask them to find jobs for their allies within 
the DH (Author interviews: May 12; November 19 2006; July 24, 2009).  Ninety percent 
of the health bureaucrats interviewed made similar statements. What is more, six deputies 
from three different parties and one legislative staff member admitted that getting favors 
for their constituents is a common practice in the bureaucratic-congressional relationship 
(Author interviews: April 20; 25, 26; May 15, 18; November 3, 10, 2006).  
The information from interviews is consistent with the reports of the health 
committee in the Chamber of Deputies.  These reports contain the number of citizens‘ 
medical requests or gestorías médicas that deputies channeled to public hospitals, 





fees, exemption from medical charges, courtesy passes to specialized hospitals, payment 
facilities, renegotiation of medical debts, obtaining of medicines and orthopedic devices, 
channeling of patients to specialized hospitals, recommendation letters for medical 
students, appointments with public officials, among others (see Table 5.4 below). In order 
to satisfy these demands, legislators serve as intermediaries between their constituents, 
friends, or cronies and public officials of the DH, hospitals or national health institutes.  
The number of gestorías made during the democratic era is very high.  According to the 
health committee reports, deputies carried out almost 10 thousand gestorías between 1997 
and 2009.
30
 Figure 5.5 shows the number of gestorías made by the health committee in 
the Chamber of Deputies by Legislature.  Members of the health committee processed the 
most gestorías during the LVII Legislature (1997-2000) and, while the number of 
gestorías decreased during the LVIII (2000-2003) and LIX (2003-2006) Legislatures, it 
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 There are no health committee reports available in the Gaceta Parlamentaria before 1997.  Some of the 
six-monthly or annual reports within this period (1997-2009) do not contain the number of gestorías made 
by deputies.  Therefore, the total number of gestorías by Legislature is an estimate.  The real number of 





Figure 5.5: Gestorías Médicas Processed by the Health Committee of the Chamber of 
Deputies 1997-2009 
 






















Table 5.4 provides an example of gestorías processed by the health committee 
during a particular year.  As is illustrated in this example, the majority of citizens‘ 
petitions were channeled to the Department of Health‘s national institutes and hospitals.  
In this vein, while 191 gestorías were channeled to the DH‘s institutions between 1997 
and 1998, only eighty-eight requests were routed to the Mexican Social Security 
Institute (IMSS).  This fact is consistent with the statements from interviewees that the 
medical attention in the DH‘s institutes and hospitals is better than in IMSS or ISSSTE 





in need of costly surgeries or treatments prefer to receive care from the DH‘s hospitals 
and institutes, rather than from other medical centers. Table 5.5 shows that deputies 
processed a high number of gestorías aimed at exempting or reducing medical fees and 
charges—the majority of which were likewise channeled to DH institutes and hospitals.        










Health Institutes of the Federal 
District Government 
Secretaría de Salud 
(Department of Health) 
CMN 20 de Noviembre  
 
20 Dirección General 
Dispensa de Trámite  
 
48 Hospital General Balbuena  12 Asociación para evitar la Ceguera 
en México Dr. Luis Sánchez Bulnes   
1 
Hospital Regional del 
ISSSTE Toluca  
 
1 Pases de Cortesía  
 
8 Hospital General Xoco   
 




Hospital Regional Lic. 
Adolfo López Mateos 12  
 
18 CMN Siglo XXI  
 
8 Hospital Pediátrico Moctezuma   
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Table 5.5: Type of Gestorías Médicas processed by the Health Committee from October 1997 to August 1998    
Exemption of payment  
 
Minimal fees  
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The high number of gestorías made by the health committee in the Chamber of 
Deputies confirms two important facts:  First, there is frequent and ongoing contact 
between deputies and DH officials.  Legislators make requests to top-level officials on 
behalf of their constituents, the fulfillment of which is important for advancing their 
political careers. By processing gestorías, deputies acquire political support from citizens 
and interest groups. Second, top-level officials carry out the majority of deputies‘ 
gestorías.  Health committee reports from the LXI Legislature (2006-2009), which are the 
only reports that documented whether gestorías were in fact performed, show that 
approximately 65 percent of the legislators‘ petitions were executed by the bureaucracy.  
As Table 5.6 shows, the percentage of gestorías that were successfully carried out by the 
bureaucracy increased as the congressional session advanced.  Accordingly, while 53.42 
percent of gestorías had a positive outcome in the period March-August 2007, 76.37 
percent of the constituents‘ requests were granted between October 2008 and February 
2009.  These figures suggest that as the legislative session comes to an end and legislators 
have to seek other positions because of the non-consecutive reelection rule, they make a 
















































208 136 16 360 57.77 
Mar–Aug 2008 
 




957 278 18 1253 76.37 
Mar-Aug 2009 
 
NA NA NA NA NA 
 
    
As in the case of the puntos de acuerdo, bureaucrats are not legally obliged to 
follow through with gestorías.  Stated differently, the execution of deputies‘ requests 
depends on health officials‘ willingness. Therefore, the fulfillment of a gestoría is 
perceived as a favor that bureaucrats do for legislators. The lack of formal rules that 
would force bureaucrats to comply with gestorías creates a situation whereby legislators 
are dependent on the bureaucracy.  This dependence encourages legislators to maintain a 
cordial relationship with top-level officials of the Department of Health by not effectively 





 Furthermore, although the ASF, health analysts and the media have denounced 
numerous irregularities and wrongdoings in the operation of health programs, legislators 
do not pressure authorities to sanction the offending health officials because they are 
beholden to bureaucrats for special favors and therefore refrain from "pressuring" them in 
terms of accountability and sanctions. When asked why legislators do not press 
authorities to sanction officials who do not comply with health legislation, a top-level 
official responded:  ―Why should they do it? It would not be convenient for them; it 
would go against their interests‖ (Author interview: May 15, 2006). As in the case of 
Hacienda, systematic oversight and control of health programs, as well as the sanctioning 
of bureaucrats, would reduce the flow of special favors and resources to lawmakers.  As 
explained in chapter 2, legislators need these handouts to either increase their political 
prestige, pay back political debts with interest groups that support them, or advance their 
political careers. Consequently, there is an informal agreement by which health 
bureaucrats do special favors in exchange for legislators‘ tolerance for non-compliance 
with health legislation. Given that bureaucrats have control over health resources, and 





    As in other policy areas, democratization greatly affected the Mexican health 





since 2001.  While the number of modifications to the GHL since that time might suggest 
that health officials have become more constrained, in reality just 27 percent of the 
amendments established specific policy instructions and controls for the implementation 
of health policies and programs.  Accordingly, formal changes to the health system have 
neither constrained bureaucrats‘ leeway (in laws), nor have they granted more authority 
to Congress to check and monitor the management of health programs. 
 The chapter also shows that, in practice, health officials have continued to manage 
health policies with almost the same level of discretion as in the PRI era. The persistence 
of ample bureaucratic leeway is more visible in those health areas where strict regulations 
were established, such as in the case of Popular Health Insurance. Not even in these 
health areas did officials fulfill legislation objectives or comply with its policy guidelines.   
Conversely, the low number of ASF audits on the Department of Health uncovered 
legislators‘ scarce interest in overseeing the functioning of the health system. Given that 
legislators paid little attention to the health sector, it is not surprising that they did not 
push authorities to sanction health officials who committed illegal actions or who failed 
to accomplish programs goals. The informal agreement between health officials and 
members of Congress, according to which the former allocate resources to or do special 
favors for the latter in exchange for bureaucratic discretion, hinders officials‘ effective 
accountability in democratic Mexico. The analysis of the health sector, specifically of the 
Department of Health, confirms that while democratization produced formal changes in 





CONCLUSION:   INEFFECTIVE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY 
  
  
Although democratization has brought significant change to many aspects of the 
Mexican political system, its effects on the legislative branch have been less significant 
than expected.  Among the most important consequences of the regime change for 
Congress is that the president no longer controls the legislative agenda by himself.  That 
is, Congress stopped acting as a rubber-stamp institution that almost unanimously ratified 
all of the president‘s bills.  Since the emergence of divided government in 1997, the 
president has had to negotiate with opposition parties in order to pass his bills.  
Furthermore, political parties are now very active in both chambers of Congress and 
introduce dozens of laws during every legislative term. However, in terms of its 
representation and control functions, Congress continues to work almost exactly as it did 
in the PRI era. Regarding the representation of citizen interests, legislators‘ linkages with 
their constituents continue to be weak or even non-existent, given the prohibition of 
consecutive reelection. For instance, a 2009 survey revealed that only 20 percent of the 
citizenry knows the name of her deputy or senator (Gabinete de Comunicación 
Estratégica 2009: 83). The weak connection between the people and their legislators 
hinders the representation of citizenry in Congress (Bejar and Waldman 2004).     
  In regards to Congress‘ control function, this dissertation examines whether 
democratization increased the level of legislative oversight over the bureaucracy. 





congressional control of two policy areas. The study of investigative committees (chapter 
3) and the analysis of the fiscal and public health areas (chapters 4 and 5) show that 
legislative supervision of public programs remains at a low level. Accordingly, the 
dissertation argues that democratization has not had a significant effect on bureaucratic-
legislative relations.  This concluding chapter demonstrates that the mutual influence 
theory can best account for the findings of the case studies. The first section of the 
chapter summarizes the main empirical results of the dissertation. Section two puts 
forward broader theoretical implications. In particular, this section explains how the 
theory presented here contributes to institutionalist studies.  It also examines how the lack 
of effective legislative oversight of the bureaucracy affects the quality of democracy in 
Mexico.  The third section compares the dissertation‘s findings with other studies.  
Specifically, the Mexican case is compared with three important countries in South 
America: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. This concluding chapter ends with ideas for future 






 This dissertation develops a theory to explain why bureaucrats continue to have 
ample leeway in the design and implementation of public policies despite the 
establishment of strict controls in laws. The argument, based on the interactive models 
framework, and contrary to the bureaucratic autonomy and legislative dominance 
approaches, states that there is a bidirectional flow of authority between public officials 





restrictions in legislation that seeks to limit bureaucratic leeway, public officials exert 
informal power over lawmakers by deciding over the allocation of important resources. 
Given the executive branch‘s extensive intervention in economy and society, the 
ineffective application of the rule of law, and the absence of a Weberian state, there is an 
informal agreement between public officials and legislators by which the former 
distribute handouts to or do favors for the latter in exchange for discretion in the 
implementation of public programs. Politicians use bureaucrats‘ handouts to win the 
support of political allies or interest groups, thereby enhancing their electoral base. In this 
way, legislators utilize benefits granted by bureaucrats to maintain or advance their 
political careers.   
 Chapter 3 shows how democratization in Mexico brought the political changes 
that, according to the institutional literature, should foster greater legislative control over 
the bureaucracy. Since the PRI lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997 and 
the PAN won the presidential elections of 2000, Mexico has had divided government 
with an increasing level of legislative capacity. As stated by rational choice 
institutionalists, these conditions should lead to a reduction in the level of bureaucratic 
discretion.  However, the chapter documents how investigative committees, which are 
one of the main mechanisms for supervising the work of decentralized agencies and 
public enterprises, have increased in number but not in their effectiveness to sanction 
public officials who commit wrongdoings. The influence-peddling case involving 
President Fox‘s stepsons, for example, shows the ineffectiveness of investigative 





denounced many irregularities and illicit activities in this case, not a single official 
involved was sanctioned.        
Chapters 4 and 5 analyze legislative control in two key policy areas:  fiscal policy 
and public health policy.  In chapter 4, I use the mutual influence theory to explain the 
ineffectiveness of legislative controls over the allocation of diverse budget items between 
1991 and 2006.  The chapter documents how top Hacienda officials continue to violate 
fiscal legislation and manage federal resources at their discretion, despite the fact that 
members of Congress have passed multiple restrictive changes to annual budgets since 
1997.  Among the most important findings are that, despite precise instructions on the 
disclosure of financial information, Hacienda transgressed fiscal laws and failed to 
disclose information about tax payers, allocation of federal resources, budget surpluses, 
public investment, fiscal credits, customs taxes, and other important issues.  Similarly, 
Hacienda violated budgetary laws regarding government income and spending.  Hacienda 
officials did not follow the stipulations and guidelines established in the appropriations 
law and used public funds at their discretion. The most relevant of Hacienda‘s 
transgressions in this area were: misuse of money allocated to public programs, agencies‘ 
unauthorized budget modifications, excessive variation between the approved and 
implemented budget, partial failure to fulfill agencies‘ goals, lack of transparency and 
control in the allocation of subsidies and economic transfers to states, and underspending 
of public program funds.   
Members of Congress tolerate systematic transgressions of fiscal laws because 





Interviews reveal that Hacienda offers tax breaks to those entrepreneurial and interest 
groups that support lawmakers.  In the same vein, once the legislative term is over, 
Hacienda grants positions within the agency or other government financial institutions to 
key members of Congress who defended bureaucrats‘ interests.  The close relationship 
between Hacienda bureaucrats and key legislators of financial committees is remarkable. 
In fact, there were certain cases where Hacienda officials left their posts in order to 
become members of Congress.  Once they finished their functions as legislators, they 
were rehired by Hacienda or other government institutions. Hacienda officials also 
commonly provide goods such as clothing or food to legislators (for distribution to their 
constituents) in exchange for either introducing or blocking certain articles in fiscal 
legislation, or for not supervising and sanctioning bureaucrats that committed 
wrongdoings or illicit acts.  
Democratization did not encourage members of Congress to efficiently control 
health policies either. Chapter 5 documents how, despite multiple modifications to the 
General Health Law since 1997, only 27 percent of the reforms established clear 
constraints and reduced bureaucratic discretion.  Furthermore, the chapter shows that 
Congress has not been very interested in supervising the health sector, as evidenced by 
the fact that just a few health policies and programs have been audited since 
democratization started.  In other words, the Auditoría Superior de la Federación (ASF) 
carried out only 2.2 audits per year on the Department of Health between 2001 and 2007.  
The ASF reports of these audits revealed that important health programs such as the 





Commission for Social Protection in Health, which is the institution that operates the 
Popular Health Insurance, failed to justify that 24.5 percent of its official budget was, in 
fact, spent on this health program. Despite the fact that ASF, health analysts, and the 
media denounced multiple irregularities in the management of these important programs, 
deputies and senators did not push the authorities to modify the course of health policies 
or to sanction officials that violated legislation.    
As in the budgetary case, members of Congress do not exert control over health 
programs because they wish to stay on good terms with health bureaucrats who can 
channel desired resources and favors to them. The chapter presents evidence from 
interviews and the health committee of the Chamber of Deputies that it is not uncommon 
for legislators to ask top-level officials to allocate resources for local medical clinics and 
hospitals. In the same vein, deputies and senators frequently ask health officials for 
special favors on behalf of their constituents, relatives, and friends. For instance, 
members of Congress have asked top-level Department of Health officials to facilitate 
admission to specialized hospitals for their cronies. Similarly, legislators contact 
bureaucrats to get their friends or relatives free or low-cost medical treatments and 
surgeries, recommendations for the National Medical Residency Exam, or a position 
within the Department of Health. Strict congressional surveillance of health programs and 
the sanctioning of officials who have committed wrongdoings would almost certainly cut 








If, in fact, there is an informal agreement between legislators and bureaucrats in 
which members of Congress get benefits in exchange for accepting bureaucratic 
discretion, what are the theoretical implications of this finding? The analysis of 
bureaucratic-legislative relations in Mexico provides theoretical insights for the rational 
choice institutionalist literature, especially for the debate on whether or not politicians 
have effective control over the bureaucracy. As mentioned in Chapter 2 there are two 
theoretical approaches for the studying of the relationship between bureaucrats and 
legislators: the bureaucratic autonomy approach and the legislative dominance 
framework (principal-agent model). The first one claims the existence of a bureaucratic 
state in which politicians‘ influence in the management of public programs and budgets is 
merely marginal.  The second approach states that politicians have effective control over 
public officials through the use of institutional mechanisms, such as procedures and 
statutes.   
Both approaches, however, fail to explain the bureaucratic-congressional 
relationship in democratic Mexico. On the one hand, the bureaucratic autonomy approach 
cannot account for the new balance of power that has existed between bureaucrats and 
legislators in Mexico since 1997. Stated differently, with its assumption that public 
officials cannot be constrained, the bureaucratic autonomy framework is unable to 
explain the fact that legislators have established strict checks and controls in the 
management of public policies and programs, at least in terms of formal rules.  On the 





that exists between legislators and public officials.  The legislative dominance approach 
also fails to explain why, despite the enactment of low-discretion legislation, bureaucrats 
continue to implement programs with ample leeway.  Similarly, this framework does not 
say anything about why members of Congress tolerate bureaucrats‘ transgressions of the 
law.  
One of the dissertation‘s main contributions to the literature is that it adds 
theoretical insights to the debate on politicians‘ control over the bureaucracy.  In line 
with interactive models, the dissertation‘s findings reveal that the dominant framework, 
the principal-agent model, cannot successfully explain the bureaucratic-legislative 
relationship in political systems that lack a Weberian state, have extensive executive 
branch intervention in economy and society, and are characterized by a deficient rule of 
law. In these systems, politicians and bureaucrats have means and resources to influence 
each other. There is not a unilateral flow of authority from principals to agents, but 
bidirectional influence between these actors. Accordingly, while legislators exert formal 
control over the bureaucracy, bureaucrats have informal leverage over members of 
Congress.  Therefore, one important theoretical implication of this study is that agents in 
developing countries are not completely subordinated to congressional power. Quite the 
opposite, public officials utilize state resources and their authority to influence the 
behavior of members of Congress and neutralize formal checks and constraints.  
Furthermore, bureaucrats in these settings do not have neutral values.  Public officials are 
driven by specific political interests and act accordingly to reach certain goals. For their 





legislation. As described in chapters 4 and 5, since the PRI lost the majority of seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies, legislators gradually established information requirements, 
timetables, policy instructions, procedures, guidelines and other checks to limit 
bureaucratic leeway.  In addition, legislators approved stipulations that empower them to 
request additional information from agencies and carry out investigations in order to 
oversee officials‘ behavior or to change the course of policies and programs. Members of 
Congress employ these institutional mechanisms to not only limit bureaucrats‘ 
management of public policies but also to threaten officials in order to extract more 
handouts for themselves or their cronies.                         
 The dissertation also contributes to the institutionalist literature by showing that 
the institutional factors that rational choice writings claim reduce the level of bureaucratic 
discretion in First World countries, such as divided government and a high level of 
legislative capacity, do not have the same effect in developing nations. While 
democratization allowed for the emergence of these factors, they have only led to the 
establishment of checks and controls in legislation, and have not effectively constrained 
bureaucratic behavior in practice.  Similarly, the case of Mexico reveals that a change in 
formal rules does not necessarily bring a change in bureaucratic behavior. The diverse 
restrictive changes made to fiscal and health laws since the start of democratization, 
along with the numerous transgressions by public officials, show that the enactment of 
legislation does not automatically shape bureaucratic behavior. Analyses of the 
bureaucratic-legislative relationship in developing countries should take into account the 





should examine the effect that informal rules have on the relationships between political 
actors. In the Mexican case, the analysis of the bureaucratic-legislative relationship 
would have been incomplete had the dissertation only focused on the effect of formal 
rules.  The implicit agreement between members of Congress and top-level officials, by 
which the lawmakers get handouts in exchange for bureaucratic leeway, reveals the 
impact of informal rules on the politics of developing countries.   
In the words of Helmke and Levitsky (2006: 5), informal institutions are defined 
―as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced 
outside officially sanctioned channels‖. The informal agreement between public officials 
and legislators in Mexico fits Helmke and Levitsky‘s definition for three reasons.  First, 
the implicit pact is an unwritten rule between top-level bureaucrats and members of 
Congress in which each actor has expectations about the other‘s behavior.  Second, the 
agreement was created and is frequently communicated through non-official or informal 
means such as non-public meetings and under-the-table negotiations between these 
actors.  Finally, both actors know that there would be sanctions if they did not comply 
with the pact.  Bureaucrats, for example, would cut the flow of resources and favors if 
legislators decided to carry out oversight actions that would ultimately lead to sanctions 
on bureaucrats.  And legislators would either establish severe constraints and controls in 
legislation or initiate investigations if bureaucrats did not provide them with handouts.           
In particular, the type of informal rule found in the bureaucratic-legislative 
relationship in Mexico falls into the category of ―competing informal institutions‖, as 





of informal institutions coexists with ineffective formal institutions.  Competing informal 
institutions ―structure incentives in ways that are incompatible with the formal rules… 
[they] trump their formal counterparts, generating outcomes that diverge markedly from 
what is expected from the formal rules‖ (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 15).  The informal 
agreement between legislators and bureaucrats is clearly incompatible with formal 
legislation since such agreement allows for receiving favors granted by bureaucrats. At 
the same time, the existence of this informal institution allows public officials to deviate 
from written rules, thereby producing very different policy outcomes from those 
mandated in legislation by members of Congress. For instance, as documented in chapter 
4, the overspending in diverse executive agencies transgressed the stipulations of the 
annual appropriations laws. On many occasions, this overspending was used for purposes 
different from those established in budgetary legislation. In contrast to other types of 
informal institutions, the implicit pact between members of Congress and public officials 
in Mexico undermines the rule of law and, subsequently, the quality of democracy. 
   The dissertation also provides theoretical insights for students of Mexican 
politics. The PRI‘s loss of its absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997 and 
the PAN‘s victory in the 2000 presidential election, along with the recurrence of divided 
government, have significantly changed the executive-legislative relationship in Mexico.  
Most scholars have studied this transformation either by analyzing the gradual decline in 
the president‘s ability to propose and pass his own legislation (Casar 2000; Lujambio 
2000; Nacif 2002; Nava, Weldon and Yáñez 2000; Weldon 2004) or by examining the 





studies have looked at the role of legislative committees or legislative careers (Nacif 
2000; Langston and Aparicio 2009; Langston 2009).  Few studies, however, have 
assessed to what extent Congress has been able to limit bureaucrats‘ authority in 
policymaking.  This research project analyzes the executive-legislative relationship by 
examining whether democratization increased the level of legislative control over the 
bureaucracy.  The findings of the dissertation reveal that although democracy has allowed 
Congress to strengthen its legislative function by modifying and rejecting executive bills, 
it has not reinforced its control powers, which have remained as ineffective as in the PRI 
era.  Accordingly, the change of regime has not advanced a system of effective checks 
and balances where members of Congress systematically and continuously hold 
bureaucrats accountable for their performance.   
The ineffective oversight and failure to sanction agencies‘ wrongdoings also have 
implications for the quality of democracy in Mexico.  As Ippolito (2004: 174) and other 
authors state, democracy ―is not only an instrumental arrangement to elect those who 
govern‖ but a system in which citizens‘ rights are protected.  Although the assessment of 
the quality of democracy necessarily implies the examination of various dimensions, the 
following discussion focuses on two important components of democratic regimes 
(O‘Donnell 2004: 31-37).
1
  The first component is a legal system that prevents anyone 
from being above the law. The second is the existence of state institutions that are 
authorized and empowered to exercise horizontal accountability (O‘Donnell 2004: 33, 
                                                 
1
 O‘Donnell (2004: 33) defines five unique characteristics of democracy:  1) fair and institutionalized 
elections; 2) a set of participatory rights and political freedoms without which those elections would be 
meaningless; 3) an inclusive and (boundedly) universalistic wager; 4) a legal system that enacts and 
backs—at least—the rights and freedoms; and 5) a legal systems that prevents anyone from being de 





36). Both components are necessary for the protection of citizens‘ rights. That is, 
individual rights are safer under a system that impedes rulers from acting beyond the 
limits of legislation and that has state institutions, such as Congress, that hold public 
officials accountable.    
The informal agreement between legislators and bureaucrats weakens the quality 
of democracy for at least two reasons: First, the superficial monitoring of public 
programs and the failure to punish officials‘ infringements of laws bolster the deficient 
rule of law in Mexico. This problem is especially worrisome since not only public 
officials transgress laws, but lawmakers are not constrained by legislation as well. As 
stated in chapter 4, bureaucrats, as well as members of Congress, violated laws and failed 
to comply with the constitutional mandate of overseeing the work of executive agencies.  
This failure is quite remarkable given that legislators are the ones who approve laws. A 
striking example of legislators‘ deliberate transgression of constitutional stipulations is 
the fact that, until 2010, the Chamber of Deputies had not approved the Public Accounts 
(or Cuentas Públicas, the government‘s annual records of all financial operations) since 
2002, although deputies themselves had established deadlines to approve them. The 
ineffective rule of law allows for the discretionary management of government programs 
by public officials and furthers politicians‘ usage of clientelistic relationships to advance 
their political interests.    
Furthermore, the refusal of members of Congress to oversee public policies and 
programs inevitably leads to bureaucratic abuse of power, to which the low number of 





that the ASF is the auditing office of the Chamber of Deputies and, consequently, it does 
not have legal authority to sanction public officials that commit illegal acts. In order to 
impose a sanction, the ASF has to denounce bureaucrats‘ wrongdoings either before the 
Secretaría de la Función Pública (or SFP, the executive agency that sanctions public 
officials who commit illegal actions)—when officials violate administrative laws—or 
before the Ministerio Público (Public Prosecutor‘s Office), in the case of a major 
offense.
2
  Most of the ASF‘s accusations do not end in sanctions but in simple warnings 
to bureaucrats.  Between 1998 and 2007 the ASF presented charges against only thirty-
one public officials before the Ministerio Público (ASF 2009: 632).
3
  Similarly, although 
between 2001 and 2007 the ASF accused 3049 public officials of administrative 
infringements before the SFP, it is unknown how many of them were subsequently 
punished (ASF 2009: 382).  Morris (2009: 117) shows that the number of sanctions by 
the SFP actually decreased between 1995 and 2006. And whereas during the Zedillo 
administration there were 191 sanctions per year for bribery and extortion, there were just 
127 under the Fox administration. These figures are not surprising given that diverse 
studies point out that governmental corruption has not significantly decreased in the 
democratic era. According to Transparencia Mexicana, a Mexican NGO dedicated to 
fighting corruption, the level of bureaucratic corruption has been virtually the same since 
the beginning of the Fox administration. For example, while in 2001 Mexico got a score 
of 10.6 in the National Index of Corruption and Good Government (where zero indicates 
                                                 
2
 Regardless of the ASF‘s charges against public officials, the SFP has the mandate to supervise by itself 
administrative procedures, as well as to investigate and sanction bureaucrats‘ illegal behavior. 
3
 The ASF‘s report does not specify how many officials were sanctioned (Auditoría Superior de la 
Federación, Informe para la Honorable Cámara de Diputados, Estado de trámite y conclusión de las 





no corruption), the score for 2007 was 10.  Similarly, while 214 million acts of corruption 
occurred in 2001, there were 197 million in 2007 (Transparencia Mexicana 2005; 2007). 
The low number of effective sanctions for bureaucrats‘ wrongdoings leaves restrictive 
laws without constraining power. Taken together, these practices of discretionary 
allocation of government resources, politicians‘ extensive use of patronage, and the non-
sanctioning of public officials‘ wrongdoings weaken Mexican democracy because they 
hinder the universalistic allocation of resources, the implementation of efficient public 
services, and the punishment of illegal bureaucratic behavior.   
All these failures contribute to people‘s distrust in government institutions, and in 
democracy in general, as demonstrated by recent surveys.  For instance, in August 2008 
the Mexican newspaper Reforma reported that only 24 percent of the population has 
either ―a lot‖ or ―some‖ trust in Congress (Moreno 2008).
4
 Similarly, the 
Latinobarómetro 2009 revealed that Mexico is the country in Latin America with the 
lowest number of people who consider democracy to be the best system of government.  
That is, whereas 76 percent of Latin American citizens, on average, hold that view, only 
62 percent of Mexicans support democracy (Moreno 2009).  In the same vein, another 
survey found that only 36 percent of citizens were satisfied with Mexico‘s democracy 
(Woldenberg 2008).  Although public officials‘ and politicians‘ transgressions of the law 
are not the only causes of citizens‘ disenchantment with democracy, they can only further 
undermine people‘s trust in this form of government. 
                                                 
4
 The same survey points out that the Mexican Army is the only institution that received a majority of 





Second, unlimited bureaucratic discretion, as well as officials‘ impunity, lessen 
the quality of democracy because these actions weaken Mexico‘s institutional 
framework. Put differently, the transactions that occur between legislators and 
bureaucrats, where the former obtain benefits in exchange for discretion, undermine the 
power of Congress as an institution and subvert the system of checks and balances. The 
Mexican constitution calls on Congress, among other duties, to revise, monitor, 
supervise, oversee, and control the work of executive agencies and to sanction any 
bureaucratic wrongdoing.  By deliberately failing to perform this function, deputies and 
senators leave the design and implementation of policies and programs to bureaucrats‘ 
discretion. Consequently, members of Congress allow public officials to dominate the 
decision-making process. This acquiescence produces a disparity of power between the 
legislative and executive branches of government.  Although individual legislators may 
benefit from the informal agreement, in which they receive handouts and government 
resources to advance their careers in exchange for their consent to carry out public 
programs at bureaucrats‘ discretion, Congress--as an institution--loses leverage, 
especially in the policymaking arena.  Legislators‘ refusal to exert their control function, 
then, distorts the institutional arrangement and generates disequilibrium of power 
between the branches of government.  Such a disparity has negative consequences not 
only for Congress but also for the citizenry, given that public officials may abuse their 
authority by implementing policies and programs that bring benefits only to themselves 
or their cronies.  In sum, legislators‘ decision not to use their authority violates the 





enhances executives agencies‘ power vis-à-vis Congress, allows for the abuse of 
bureaucratic power, and fails to protect citizens‘ rights. All of these by-products of the 
lack of effective legislative oversight of the bureaucracy negatively affect the quality of 




Is the lack of effective legislative control over the bureaucracy a political 
phenomenon unique to Mexico, or is it a more common problem?  How do the 
dissertation‘s findings on Mexico compare to scholars‘ findings regarding other 
countries?  Before answering these questions, it is important to recall that the 
bureaucratic-legislative relationship has not been studied in-depth in developing 
countries.  In Latin America, there are few studies that examine congressional control 
over the bureaucracy.  And while most scholars agree that the level of congressional 
control over the bureaucracy is either low or ineffective, they differ in their explanations 
of why legislators do not exert effective supervision of executive agencies‘ work.  This 
section examines whether patterns similar to those found in Mexico prevail in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile.                 
What is the level of legislative control over the bureaucracy in these South 
American countries? As in Mexico, the majority of the studies on bureaucratic-
congressional relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile state that the level of 





high degree of supervision in the U.S. and other developed countries (Eaton 2003; 
Figueiredo 2001, 2003; Morgenstern and Manzetti 2003; Palanza 2006, 2009).  Although 
these studies agree that lawmakers in these South American countries do not hold 
bureaucrats accountable, the factors that explain this phenomenon differ from those that 
explain the persistence of bureaucratic leeway in democratic Mexico.  In contrast to this 
research project, nearly all these analyses use at least one institutional factor to account 
for the ineffective supervision of public policies.  In this vein, constitutional constraints 
on the legislature, executive decrees, executive agenda setting powers, party leaders‘ 
control over candidate nominations, and party discipline are frequently put forward as 
explanatory variables. Other studies underscore the effect of contextual factors and 
















Table C.1: Legislative Control over the Bureaucracy in Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
Country Author(s) Level of Legislative 
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In Argentina, institutional factors seem to account for the lack of effective 
congressional oversight of public policies (Eaton 2003; Morgenstern and Manzetti 2003; 
Palanza 2006).  In this vein, party leaders‘ control over lawmakers, the majority status of 
the presidents‘ party in Congress, and executive decrees are the main variables that 
explain the low number of serious congressional investigations of public policies. For 
instance, in his study of Argentina‘s tax reform during the 1990s, Eaton (2003) argues 
that Congress‘ delegation of ample leeway to the tax bureaucracy is explained by a high 
level of party discipline and the Peronist majority in the legislature.   
Figueiredo‘s (2001, 2003) studies on Brazil reveal that the degree of 
congressional control over the bureaucracy is also low. The author claims that, in 
addition to executive decrees and party leaders‘ centralized control of legislative 
policymaking, the formation of coalition governments negatively affects congressional 
control over officials in Brazil. Accordingly, coalition governments increase the 
president‘s ability to dominate the policy-making process and lessen Congress‘ power to 
oversee executive actions. Although there are no coalition governments in Mexico, 





governments in Brazil given that these parties have prevented the sanctioning of 
bureaucrats involved in unlawful actions, as observed in the Bribiesca influence-peddling 
case. 
In contrast to the limited legislative powers of the executive branch in Mexico, 
presidents in Argentina, Brazil and Chile have greater congressional powers. As 
previously mentioned, these formal powers are said to account for ineffective legislative 
control over governmental programs, at least in Argentina and Brazil (Eaton 2003; 
Figueiredo 2001, 2003; Morgenstern and Manzetti 2003; Palanza 2006). Even when 
Mexican presidents cannot utilize executive decrees or agenda setting powers to exert 
leverage on Congress, bureaucrats manage to implement public programs without 
congressional constraints through the use of informal tools.  Public officials thus allocate 
resources and do favors for legislators in exchange for leeway to carry out government 
programs.  Hence, the Mexican case suggests that presidents‘ strong legislative powers 
are not the main explanation for the ineffective legislative oversight of the bureaucracy.  
As described above, Argentina and Brazil specialists invoke formal-institutional 
factors to explain the lack of legislative control over the bureaucracy. These studies 
clearly contrast with the Mexican case where those formal-institutional factors do not 
apply but there still is ineffective oversight of public policies. This difference suggests 
that formal institutions are not the decisive, necessary, and sufficient cause of that 
outcome at least in these three countries. Instead, there may be a substitution effect: the 
executive branch and the bureaucracy tend to be dominant either through formal 





use informal mechanisms. Stated differently, where formal-institutional factors do not 
favor the bureaucracy, it can still use informal mechanisms to defend its discretion. 
Therefore, the ultimate outcome (ineffective congressional oversight) does not "depend" 
on institutional factors but on informal practices.  
 In fact, there are some studies that recognize the effect of informal factors on 
bureaucratic-legislative relationships. The findings of Lemos on Brazil and Palanza on 
Argentina reveal that members of Congress use legislative oversight as a bargaining tool 
to obtain benefits from the executive agencies, thus advancing their political interests 
(Lemos 2006: 110; Palanza 2006: 3). For instance, Palanza‘s research on Argentina 
(2009) uncovers that written inquiries initiated by powerful legislators tend not to find a 
rapid executive response through formal means. Instead, individual members of Congress 
and bureaucrats enter into informal negotiations through which the former are successful 
in extracting resources from the latter. This similarity proves two important facts: first, 
the executive branches in Argentina and Brazil also deeply intervene in economic and 
social spheres, and legislators are incapable of balancing presidents‘ influence, despite 
their ability to be reelected.  Second, members of Congress and top-level officials in these 
South American countries also participate in informal negotiations in which the former 
use their legal authority to extract resources from the latter.  This exchange suggests that, 
although individual legislators may increase their leverage, Congress—as a legislative 
institution—is neither effectively checking the work of executive agencies nor 





Although most analyses of bureaucratic-congressional relationships in these South 
American countries document ineffective congressional control over executive agencies, 
some studies on Brazil and Chile assert that the legislatures of these countries exert a 
higher level of control over policies than those of Mexico. In this vein, Lemos (2006, 
2009) argues that legislative control of the bureaucracy exists in Brazil since oversight is 
one of the main activities performed by the Brazilian Congress.  According to Lemos, 
supervision actions, such as hearings and summoning of ministers, represent 
approximately 35 percent of the congressional workload. However, despite this high 
percentage, the amount of supervision activities is not necessarily a reliable indicator of 
the effectiveness of legislative oversight. Therefore, it cannot be inferred from Lemos‘ 
analyses whether the Brazilian Congress is, in fact, effectively checking the 
bureaucracy‘s work.  As in Mexico, congressional hearings and other oversight actions in 
Brazil may be ineffective mechanisms to modify policies or sanction bureaucrats.       
Siavelis (2000, 2002) and Ferraro‘s works (2008) on Chile present very different 
findings from those of Mexico. These studies suggest that, despite legislators‘ limited 
formal powers, the Chilean Congress is more effective in holding public officials 
accountable than the congresses of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. As in this dissertation, 
Siavelis (2002) and Ferraro (2008) recognize the existence of informal mechanisms in the 
bureaucratic-legislative relationship.  But in contrast to the informal agreement between 
politicians and officials in Mexico, Siavelis and Ferraro argue that informal tools in Chile 
favor legislators‘ control over public policies and programs. That is, through the use of 





grants to the executive branch. The continuous use of these informal mechanisms allows 
Congress to wield significant influence over the bureaucracy.  For instance, legislative 
patronage is the informal practice through which deputies and senators from the 
governing coalition recommend candidates to fill positions in the public administration. 
According to Ferraro and Siavelis, the cronies recommended by deputies and senators 
respond to legislators‘ interests. In this vein, members of Congress exert influence on 
executive agencies‘ decisions and have control over the bureaucracy.    
Siavelis and Ferraro‘s finding, that informal mechanisms are used by Chilean 
legislators to exert influence over the bureaucracy, is quite contradictory to the findings 
of this dissertation, since Mexican officials use informal tools to neutralize constraints 
and controls established in legislation. However, it is important to mention that the fact 
that congressional influence on public policies exists in Chile does not necessarily mean 
that Congress effectively supervises the bureaucracy.  In other words, the use of informal 
mechanisms may help legislators to have leverage on executive agencies but bureaucrats 
may still have ample discretion to design and implement programs. Moreover, as in 
Mexico, Chilean officials may also distribute government resources to ‗buy‘ discretion or 
stop congressional investigations. Therefore, it cannot be stated from Ferraro and Siavelis 
studies that Congress is the dominant actor in Chile.                        
As regards which branch of government dominates the other, almost all analyses 
conclude that presidents dominate the policy arena and, consequently, legislatures‘ 
influence on policies is marginal (Eaton 2003; Figueiredo 2001, 2003; Morgenstern and 





Ferraro (2008) depict ―interbranch cooperation‖ or balance of power between the 
legislative and executive branches in Chile. While the former utilizes informal 
mechanisms to influence public policies, the latter uses its formal powers to exert 
leverage on Chile‘s Congress. This finding is similar to the relationship between 
politicians and officials in Mexico, in that in both countries there is mutual influence 
between both actors. The Chilean case is different from the Mexican one, however, in 
that Chilean legislators employ informal mechanisms to shape policies, while in Mexico 
bureaucrats use informal mechanisms in exchange for discretion and members of 
Congress use formal rules (legislation) to try to constrain bureaucratic behavior.  
More research is needed before concluding that there is a balance of power 
between the legislative and executive branches in Chile. As stated above, Siavelis and 
Ferraro analyses suggest that the president in Chile is not as powerful as formal rules 
establish and that legislators use informal mechanisms to exert leverage on public 
policies. However, this finding does not necessarily mean that lawmakers exert 
significant control over the bureaucracy.  As in Mexico, officials in Chile may offer 
handouts to legislators in exchange for discretion to carry out governmental programs. 
Similarly, bureaucrats may do favors to legislators‘ cronies in order to prevent effective 
congressional oversight.           
In sum, it seems that Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have similar patterns of 
bureaucratic-legislative relations, and that the level of congressional oversight in the three 
countries is low. Although Argentina and Brazil specialists claim that formal-institutional 





Mexico suggest that formal mechanisms are not decisive. Instead, informal practices 
seem to better account for the lawmakers‘ failure to monitor governmental programs. 
As regards of Chile, although it is likely that legislators exert more influence on policies 
than lawmakers in the other countries, it cannot be affirmed that Congress is dominant 




This dissertation started with the question: Has democracy made bureaucrats 
accountable? Even though democratization in Mexico has led to the strengthening of 
certain functions of Congress—especially its proposing, amending and blocking 
powers—legislative control of the bureaucracy has barely increased in the democratic 
era. The factors that, according to the dominant institutionalist approach, decrease the 
level of bureaucratic discretion have only had a limited effect on reducing officials‘ 
leeway to implement public policies and programs. The analysis of the budgetary process 
and of health policies suggests that divided governments with unified legislatures, 
coupled with a higher level of legislative capacity, have allowed legislators to enact 
stricter laws.  However, the analysis of fiscal and health policies also illustrates that 
changes in formal rules have not significantly altered officials‘ behavior.   
Mexican public officials have the political power to influence their controllers.  
The source of this bureaucratic power lies in their capacity to control valuable resources 





patron-client relationships where the former provide governmental resources or favors to 
the latter in exchange for their consent to carry out public policies in a discretionary 
manner. Thus, legislators deliberately refrain from using their control powers to rein in 
agencies.  In the same vein, democracy has not induced legislators to press authorities to 
sanction bureaucratic failures. What democracy did bring about was an increase in 
individual legislators‘ influence on executive agencies. In other words, while Congress‘ 
effective level of control over the bureaucracy has remained almost as low as in the PRI 
era, the political leverage of individual deputies and senators has increased. The plural 
configuration of Congress, along with the enactment of strict legislation, has allowed 
individual legislators to negotiate benefits or favors with public officials in exchange for 
bureaucratic discretion and immunity. Effective oversight actions on certain public 
policies or programs lead bureaucrats to cut the flow of resources that are distributed to 
legislators.            
The findings of the dissertation, then, suggest that there is perverse accountability  
(c.f. Stokes 2005) in Mexico, where legislators accept bureaucratic discretion in the 
implementation of public programs in exchange for personal benefits and favors to 
advance their political careers.  This type of accountability is harmful because it results in 
Congress‘ failure to comply with its mandate of counterbalancing the executive branch.  
Accordingly, Congress fails to effectively and systematically oversee, supervise, control, 
and modify public policies. Likewise, it does not press authorities to impose sanctions on 





their authority to extract benefits for themselves, their cronies, or their constituents 
instead of complying with their constitutional mandate to control the bureaucracy. 
The case study of Mexico suggests that the explanatory power of the principal-
agent framework is limited in countries without a Weberian state, with deficient rule of 
law, and with extensive state intervention. In these settings, legislators may be able to 
reduce bureaucratic discretion in formal legislation, but in practice they still allow ample 
bureaucratic discretion to design and implement public policies. Although 
democratization has produced changes that give more formal control powers to 
legislatures, it has not eliminated the informal mechanisms used by bureaucrats to 
influence legislators. The lack of adherence to formal regulations indicates that while 
democracy may facilitate conditions conducive to bureaucratic accountability, it will not 
necessarily make it happen.  In other words, democracy is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for holding public officials accountable.       
This dissertation‘s principal argument—that there is mutual influence between 
legislators and top-level officials by which the former get benefits in exchange for 
bureaucratic discretion—can be tested in other policy areas.  For instance, field research 
in the environmental policy area has uncovered a similar lack of congressional control 
over its policies. Information from interviews reveals that politicians only exert their 
oversight functions when their interests are being damaged by environmental policies.  
Non-governmental environmental organizations play an important role in this policy area 
given that they press Congress to act against certain policies.  Additionally, these NGOs 





effort to counterbalance the asymmetry of information that favors the Environment 
Department.  In the same vein, activists press legislators to enact stricter regulations to 
protect the environment.  However, as in the case of fiscal and health policies, members 
of Congress rarely push authorities to sanction businesses and industries that violate 
environmental legislation.  
Further research needs to be conducted in other areas in order to see if the level of 
oversight is as low as it is in the fiscal and health policy areas. Education and labor 
policies may be good areas for future research, as investigations in these areas may reveal 
whether parents‘ organizations and unions have an effect on the degree of legislative 
control over executive agencies. Foreign affair is another area where research may 
uncover different patterns in the bureaucratic-legislative relationship. Given that 
diplomatic appointments and international treaties have to be frequently ratified by the 
Mexican Senate, it is likely that senators could wield considerable influence over the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry.  Stated differently, since senators have powerful institutional 
mechanisms to influence foreign affairs officials, one would expect a greater balance of 
power in this policy area.   
Furthermore, studies on bureaucratic-legislative relations in other developing 
countries may reveal both common patterns and important differences. As mentioned 
above, there are few studies that analyze bureaucratic-legislative relationships in the 
developing world. Comparative studies may focus on the effect that different 
constitutional designs and rules have on the level of legislative oversight of certain public 





legislative reelection on congressional monitoring.  Similarly, it may be important to 
know why informal rules in Chile, for example, produce a greater balance of power 
between the legislative and executive branches, while in Mexico unwritten rules generate 
benefits for individual legislators but weaken Congress as an institution.  In sum, more 
research needs to be carried out in order to know why democratization has not made 
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